Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Oceania Cruises after he became ill on the cruise and received allegedly substandard care. Plaintiff claimed that Oceania negligently hired, retained, and supervised the ship's doctor. Oceania attempted to bring this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), contending that the district court erred when it held that a limitation-of-liability provision in Oceania's ticket contract was unenforceable. The district court concluded that the provision, which incorporated by reference portions of international treaties and the United States Code, was so confusing that it did not reasonably communicate to the passengers the cruise line's liability limits. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, which held that the application of the limitation-of-liability provision was not an immediately appealable order under section 1292(a)(3). View "Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a debt which consisted of claims of tort liability possessed by relatives of people buried in a cemetery called Graceland. Creditors alleged that debtors were liable to them and the members of their class for damages because, due to inadequate record keeping, debtors were unable to locate upon request the grave sites of family members or close relatives buried in Graceland. At issue was whether a bankruptcy court in one federal district had jurisdiction to determine whether a debt was discharged in a bankruptcy case litigated in another federal district. The court held that the court lacked jurisdiction and therefore did not reach the other issues on appeal. View "Alderwoods Group, Inc., et al. v. Garcia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and others who purchased houses from a builder, Ryland, in the Newport subdivision of Vista Lakes, a residential development in Orlando, Florida. The Newport subdivision was adjacent to land known as "Pinecastle." Pinecastle was used as a bombing range during World War II and remained laden with, among other things, unexploded bombs. When plaintiffs bought houses from Ryland, they were unaware of Pinecastle. Later, after Pinecastle's existence became public, plaintiffs' houses lost considerable market value and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compensate for the loss. Counts 1, 3, and 4 sought compensation for the loss of value plaintiffs' houses sustained due to their close proximity to Pinecastle. Count 2 sought recovery of 1.5 percent of the purchase price of every home Ryland sold in the Newport subdivision. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 with prejudice and Count 3 without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 4, pursuant to Rule 56. View "Virgilio, et al. v. Terrabrook Vista Lakes L.P., et al." on Justia Law

IWC appealed the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of IDH. Hawaiian, a Florida condominium, contracted with IDH for roof repair. While IDH was conducting the repairs, a large stone veneer wall fell, causing damage to the condominium. Hawaiian's insurer, ICW, sued IDH for negligence. IDH alleged that the wall fell because it was structurally unsound. During trial, at the close of ICW's case, the district court granted IDH's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could find that IDH was negligent because ICW failed to present any evidence on the standard of care in the roofing industry. Without reaching the issue of whether roofers were "professionals" under Florida law, the court held that ICW was required to put forth some evidence of the standard of care in the roofing industry in order to meet its burden. Because ICW failed to do so, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Further, the specificity requirement in Rule 50(a)(2) did not bar the granting of judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ins. Co. of the West v. Island Dream Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and their child, appealed the dismissal of their complaint against the United States and the denial of their motions for relief from judgment and to reopen the case. The primary issue on appeal was whether the United States was amendable to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80, for the negligence of medical professionals employed by a federally supported health center when like private professionals would be immune from suit under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, Fla. Stat. 766.301-16. The United States claimed that the Compensation Act could not expand the liability of the United States under the FTCA beyond that to which an analogous private party would be amenable and that plaintiffs have waived any right to have the district court abate their action pending the determination by the ALJ. Because the court agreed with the United States, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint and the denial of their motions for relief from judgment and to reopen the case. View "Maradiaga, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's order dismissing his complaint against Target and Virginia Winn. Plaintiff, a Hispanic male, alleged that Winn, a white Target cashier, refused to serve him based on his race and publicly humiliated him when she turned him away from her register. Plaintiff brought suit against Winn for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); against Target for vicarious liability and for negligent training, supervision, and retention; and against both defendants for violating his right to make contracts under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the case, explaining that plaintiff could not maintain a section 1981 claim because he was ultimately able to complete his purchase, and that Winn's alleged actions did not rise to the level of outrageousness required to state an IIED claim under controlling Florida law. After thorough review and having had the benefit of oral argument, the court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lopez v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents and the personal representative of the deceased's estate, sued defendant, a police officer, for use of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Florida's wrongful death statute. Defendant used lethal force against the deceased after the deceased failed to follow defendant's commands and attempted to flee in a vehicle that struck defendant in the process. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the use of deadly force was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case and there was no clearly established law at the time of the incident that would have given defendant fair notice that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Terrell, et al. v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a controversy between the insured and their insurer over whether the insurer breached its obligations under a commercial general liability insurance policy that the insureds had with the insurer at the time of the accident. The coverage dispute arose out of a personal injury lawsuit filed against the insured by an injured homeowner. Because the case involved unanswered questions of Florida law that were central to the appeal and because these questions were determinative of the cause in this case and there were no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Florida, the court certified these questions for resolution.

This case arose when plaintiff, who was exposed to various chemicals during his employment with defendant and subsequently became legally blind in both eyes, sought workers compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950. At issue was which date - the date on which disability occurred, or the date one which the injured employee was awarded benefits for such disability - determined the maximum weekly rate of compensation for a permanently totally disabled employee who was "newly awarded compensation." The court applied long-standing principles of statutory construction and found that the maximum weekly rate of compensation was governed by the rate in effect at the time of the award. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for calculation of the sum to be paid.

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V.