Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

These cases stemmed from plaintiff's complaint that defendants conspired to induce plaintiff to purchase the "M/V Pacific" (vessel) - better known as the eponymous "Love Boat" from its television days of the 1970s and 1980s - by fraudulently misrepresenting the vessel's deterioration and defective condition. Plaintiffs brought claims for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; maritime torts of fraud in the inducement, recklessness, and negligence/negligent misrepresentation; and common law claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court vacated the district court's order dismissing the complaint and remanded for further proceedings where the court could not conclude at that stage in the proceedings that the alleged transfer of title to the shares in the United States was beyond section 10(b)'s territorial reach in light of Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. Accordingly, the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's claim on that basis.

Plaintiff challenged the denial of his claims for long-term disability benefits by defendant, who served as both the administrator of claims and the payor of benefits in the long-term disability plan in which defendant participated. At issue was whether there was a conflict of interest where defendant was both administrator and payor of benefits of the plan governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. The court found that defendant considered the medical information submitted by plaintiff's doctors and relied upon the advice of several independent medical professionals to conclude that plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of disability under the plan and, even where plaintiff's own doctors offered different medical opinions than defendant's independent doctors, the plan administrator could give different weight to those opinions without acting arbitrarily or capriciously. Therefore, the court held that a reasonable basis supported defendant's benefits decisions and that the conflict of interest did not render the decisions arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiff brought this diversity action in district court against defendant, a medical device manufacturer, alleging that the SurgiWrap, a product designed and produced by defendant, used in her surgical procedure had a manufacturing defect that caused it to perform in a manner other than as intended, and seeking relief under Georgia products liability law. At issue was whether the district court erred in limiting the testimony of her physicians and in granting summary judgment for defendant. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of her treating physicians in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the strictures of Daubert. The court also held that plaintiff failed to produce evidence, expert or otherwise, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the SurgiWrap implanted in her abdomen contained a manufacturing defect. Accordingly, the district court correctly entered summary judgment for defendant.

Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against its insurer to determine whether its professional liability policy issued to plaintiff provided coverage for plaintiff's erroneous disbursement of client funds from its trust account. At issue was whether the district court properly granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment denying coverage where the district found no coverage under the policy. The court held that plaintiff's erroneous transfer of its clients' trust funds to a third party was an act or omission in the conduct of its professional fiduciary duties to its clients that would give rise to a claim of negligence against it by those clients and for which it would have been liable for damages. Such a claim for a negligent act or omission was covered by the plain terms of the policy issued by the insurer to plaintiff. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment for insurer was reversed and the case remanded for entry of summary judgment for plaintiff. The district court's award of costs against plaintiff was also reversed.

Plaintiffs sued defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, alleging that the negligence of defendant's employees caused the death of Michelle Evette McCall. The central issue presented on appeal was whether Florida's cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages violated the Florida or United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's application of that statutory cap. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the cap where the court's independent review of the trial record confirmed that no evidence at trial singled out a specific nonpractitioner for negligent conduct. The court also held that Florida's statutory cap passed muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States, as well as the Takings Clause of Article X, 6(a) of the Florida Constitution, where the legislature identified a legitimate government purpose in passing the statutory cap, namely to reduce the cost of medical malpractice premiums and healthcare, and Florida's choice of a per incident cap on noneconomic damages was rationally related to that end and where plaintiffs were not deprived of a vested right. The court further held that, because no Florida Supreme Court decisions provided controlling guidance to resolve plaintiffs' other challenges to the cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages under the state's constitution, the court granted, in part, plaintiffs' motion to certify questions to the Florida Supreme Court.

The children of three former union leaders murdered in Colombia in 2001 sued appellee alleging that it hired paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia to assassinate their fathers in violation of the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C 1350, the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the wrongful death laws of Colombia. The children alleged that the murders of their fathers caused them damages including emotional harm, loss of companionship, and loss of financial support. At issue was whether the children possessed constitutional standing and a cause of action under these statutes. The court held that the children easily satisfied Article III standing requirements and clearly have a stake in the controversy that was real enough and concrete enough to entitle them to be heard in a federal district court concerning their TVPA and ATS claims. The court also held that the children have adequately pled a cause of action cognizable under the ATS and the TVPA. The court further held that it could not conclude that the children were also parties to the Drummond I suit and, as a result, reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the children's TVPA claims to the extent that it concluded on a motion to dismiss where the doctrine of res judicata precluded the children from proceeding with the case.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") and Dole Food Company, Inc. ("Dole"), for physical and psychological injuries they sustained from exposure to a pesticide, dibromocholoropropane, Dow supplied to Dole to use on its banana plantations. At issue is whether the over $97 million judgment a Nicaraguan court awarded plaintiffs is enforceable under the Florida Uniform Out-of-country Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("Act"). The court affirmed the district court's holding that the Nicaraguan judgment is not due recognition and enforcement under the Act where the Nicaraguan court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and/or personal jurisdiction over the defendants, where the judgment was "rendered under a system which does not provide... procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law" under the Act, and where recognizing the Nicaraguan judgment would be repugnant to Florida public policy.

Plaintiff sued CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") seeking damages for injuries that he sustained in an accident involving a rail car CSX delivered to his employer. At issue was whether the district court erred by admitting a video depicting the accident and if the district court did erroneously admit the video, whether the erroneous admission was prejudicial. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the video without proper foundation under the substantially similar conditions standard in Barnes v. Gen. Motors Corp. The court also held that the district court's erroneous admission of the video was prejudicial where the video unfairly prejudiced the jury on the pivotal issue of the case.