Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The underlying case stemmed from a tragic accident that occurred on an oceangoing passenger vessel that resulted in the death of the captain. Under these circumstances, a marine engineering firm purchased an architect’s and engineer’s professional liability insurance policy, which insured the firm against any liability it might incur in a tort action for the negligent preparation of working drawings used to build the vessel. At issue was whether, under the terms of the architect's and engineer's professional liability (A&E) policy, Evanston was obligated to provide AMI a defense in the underlying lawsuit. Also at issue was whether the A&E policy obligated Evanston to pay American Home, as AMI's subrogee, the price of its settlement in the underlying lawsuit. The court found no basis for the district court's third-party beneficiary finding and set aside the district court's determination that Evanston was obligated to provide AMI a defense. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that Evanston was liable for the $325,000 sum American Home paid in the underlying lawsuit to settle the claims where American Home failed to establish, as established by Endorsement No. 11, that AMI's liability for the captain's death was the result of an act, error, or omission of GPA arising out of the professional services it had performed. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Atlantic Marine Florida, LLC v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010 the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance closed Community Bank & Trust. St. Paul, which provided liability coverage to the Bank’s officers and directors, sought a declaratory judgment in response to a separate lawsuit (underlying action) brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the Bank, against Miller and Fricks, former Bank officers. In that action, the FDIC alleged gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty related to the Bank’s Home Funding Loan Program and claimed more than $15 million in damages. Finding the policy’s an “insured-versus-insured” exclusion unambiguous, the district court held that there was no coverage. The exclusion precludes coverage only for actions brought “by or on behalf of any Insured or Company in any capacity.” Neither the exclusion nor the defined terms make any reference to the FDIC, regulators, or any liquidating entity. St. Paul argued that the FDIC “steps into the shoes” of the bank, as a receiver. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the provision ambiguous. View "St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

In this case involving interpretation of an insurance policy under Georgia law, the court certified the following three questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia: (1) Under the facts of this case, and in the light of the Final Judgment and Order -- in the Underlying Suit -- approving of and authorizing and directing the implementation of the terms of the settlement agreement, is Piedmont “legally obligated to pay” the $4.9 million settlement amount, for purposes of qualifying for insurance coverage under the Excess Policy? (2) In a case like this one, when an insurance contract contains a "consent-to-settle" clause that provides expressly that the insurer's consent "shall not be unreasonably withheld," can a court determine, as a matter of law, that an insured who seeks (but fails) to obtain the insurer's consent before settling is flatly barred --whether consent was withheld reasonably or not-- from bringing suit for breach of contract or bad-faith failure to settle? Or must the issue of whether the insurer withheld unreasonably its consent be resolved first? (3) In this case, under Georgia law, was Piedmont's complaint dismissed properly? View "Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Travelers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage for and thus no duty to indemnify defendant under his employer's commercial automobile insurance policy for an incident which is the subject of underlying tort actions pending in state court. In the underlying actions, plaintiff is being sued for killing one individual and wounding another individual with a shotgun while defendant was chasing them in his employer's van as they were in the process of repossessing defendant's car. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants where there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendant had his employer's permission to use its van as he did. Consequently, he was not insured under the Travelers insurance policy at issue and there can be no indemnity for him under the policy for the claims presented in the underlying state court actions. The court remanded for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Travelers and against defendants.View "Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Moore, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the decision of an arbitrator that had denied his claim under a crop insurance policy obtained from ProAg. On appeal, ProAg challenged the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion to vacate the award and motion for summary judgment, vacating the arbitrator's decision. The court concluded that the district court erred in vacating the arbitrator's decision because the arbitrator was entitled to conclude that ProAg had the authority under the policy to set a reasonable deadline for the receipt of necessary documentation in support of the claim; plaintiff's failure to comply with the deadline was an adequate basis for ProAg's denial of his claim; the arbitrator was entitled to make his findings without first seeking a formal opinion of the FCIC; and plaintiff waived any argument based upon the arbitrator's failure to deliver his decision and award within the time limitations provided by the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Davis v. Producers Agricultural Ins." on Justia Law

The court concluded that this appeal presented an issue of first impression that the Alabama Supreme Court is best-suited to resolve. Accordingly, the court certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: Is an attorney whom an insurance company hires as an attorney agent providing a "legal service" within the meaning of Ala. Code 6-5-574 when he performs a title search, forms an unwritten opinion about the status of title, and then acts on that unwritten opinion by issuing a commitment to insure or an insurance policy?View "Mississippi Valley Title Ins., et al. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to enforce against Allied a tort judgment she received against a person Allied insured. Plaintiff initially filed suit in state court and Allied removed based on diversity jurisdiction. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court erred in denying her motion to remand to state court. The court concluded that the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion to remand because her claim against Allied was not a direct action within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1332(c). The court found no error in the district court's order compelling arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kong v. Allied Professional Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After Charles Eugene Becker died from falling from a two-story home after the ladder he was climbing detached from the house, his estate filed a wrongful death suit. This appeal stems from plaintiff's claims against Anchorage Homes LLC, another contractor working on the home construction project. At the time, Anchorage held a commercial general liability insurance policy with Mid-Continent. The district court reasoned that the state court pleadings and the record evidence established that Becker was exempted from Anchorage's insurance policy with Mid-Continent under the policy's employee exclusion clause. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that Florida's law requires that the employee exclusion clause in Anchorage's insurance policy be construed as applying both to actual and statutory employees of Anchorage. Because Anchorage was the statutory employer of Becker, Team Fritz's employee, Anchorage was not entitled to indemnification under its general liability insurance policy for damages arising from Becker's death on the job. Therefore, plaintiff could not establish that Mid-Continent had a duty to indemnify Anchorage in the underlying suit in order to enforce the settlement agreement against Mid-Continent. There were no genuine issues of material fact and Mid-Continent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and affirmed the district court's fee and cost order. View "Stephens v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Interline purchased a series of commercial liability policies from Chartis. The policies contained an exclusion for violations of any statute that addresses transmitting any material or information (the "Exclusion"). Interline was sued for violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227 et seq., and Chartis denied coverage based on the Exclusion. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Chartis's motion for judgment on the pleadings where the Exclusion was no ambiguous and the Exclusion was not against public policy. View "Interline Brands, Inc., et al. v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Wellness filed a putative class action in state court seeking a declaration that the form language Allstate used in the class members' personal injury protection insurance policies did not clearly and unambiguously indicate that payments would be limited to the levels provided for in Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a). The district court subsequently granted Wellness' motion to remand, concluding that the value of the declaratory relief was too speculative for purposes of satisfying the Class Action Fairness Act's (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), amount-in-controversy requirement because Allstate had failed to show that declaratory judgment in this case necessarily triggered a flow of money to plaintiffs. The court concluded, however, that Allstate had carried its burden of establishing an amount in controversy that exceeded $5 million and Wellness did not provide any evidence to rebut Allstate's affidavit or controvert its calculations. Here, the amount that would be put at issue is the amount that the putative class members could be eligible to recover from Allstate in the event that they obtain declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law