Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A franchisee brought several claims against a franchisor and related parties, including allegations of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violations of Florida law, and Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) violations. The parties settled, with the franchisee receiving $50,000 and both sides signing a mutual release that broadly barred any future claims. The agreement was not approved by a court or the Department of Labor and contained a confidentiality provision. Subsequently, the franchisee initiated a separate action for fraudulent transfer and other non-FLSA claims, arguing these were not barred by the settlement’s release.After the settlement, the franchisee filed a supplemental complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging fraudulent transfer and related non-FLSA claims. The franchisor responded with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, citing the settlement’s release. The franchisor also filed counterclaims, including breach of contract based on the franchisee’s new filings. The franchisee attempted to amend his complaint to add a claim for rescission, arguing fraudulent inducement, but the magistrate judge denied this motion, finding it was inadequately pleaded and untimely. The franchisee did not properly object to this denial before the district judge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the unapproved settlement agreement barred the non-FLSA claims. The court held that, while FLSA claims cannot be waived or settled without court or Department of Labor approval, non-FLSA claims may be released according to state contract law. The court found the release enforceable under Florida law as to non-FLSA claims and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the fraudulent transfer claims and grant of summary judgment to the franchisor on its counterclaims. The court also ruled the franchisee had waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to amend. View "O'Neal v. American Shaman Franchise Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

A Black man worked as a truck salesman at a Florida business where he was the only nonwhite employee. He observed that his supervisors and colleagues frequently made derogatory, racially charged comments about nonwhite customers, including the use of slurs for various ethnic groups and stereotypes about Black customers. These comments occurred nearly every time a nonwhite customer entered the business, which happened often. The employee was also the subject of racial slurs behind his back and was sometimes called “boy” in a heated workplace dispute. He reported these incidents to his supervisor, but no corrective action was taken. Over time, his managers began documenting performance and attendance issues, and he was ultimately terminated and replaced by a white employee.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims, finding the employee did not provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory termination or a racially hostile work environment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer on the claims of discriminatory and retaliatory termination. It held the employee failed to present substantial evidence that his termination was motivated by racial animus or retaliation for protected complaints, and the employer articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.However, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the employee presented substantial evidence that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, including pervasive use of racial slurs and discriminatory conduct towards nonwhite individuals, sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on that claim. View "Melton v. I-10 Truck Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Elena Mukhina, a Russian national who practices Russian Folk Christianity and has limited English proficiency, worked at Walmart in the apparel department where she interacted with customers. During her employment, she reported experiencing daily mockery and rude behavior from both customers and coworkers due to her inability to speak English fluently. She requested a transfer to the night shift, which was granted several weeks later, and her working conditions improved, though some negative treatment persisted. Mukhina also requested time off for New Year’s Eve, which she described as an important holiday for Russians. Her supervisor denied the request based on a first-come, first-served policy. Mukhina took the day off anyway and received attendance points per Walmart policy. After filing an ethics complaint, she experienced mixed changes in coworker behavior and eventually quit; Walmart then formally terminated her employment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama reviewed Mukhina’s claims of hostile work environment based on national origin, religious discrimination for denial of holiday leave, and retaliatory discharge. The court granted summary judgment for Walmart, finding that Mukhina did not present sufficient evidence that the alleged harassment was based on her national origin, that any harassment was severe or pervasive, or that Walmart was liable for coworker or customer conduct. The court also held that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for religious discrimination and did not inform Walmart of the religious nature of her holiday request. On retaliation, the court found no causal connection between her complaints and any adverse employment action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit held that Mukhina failed to present substantial evidence of a hostile work environment or retaliation, and failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her religious discrimination claim. View "Mukhina v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Several participants in a terminated employee stock ownership plan asserted claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) following the sale and dissolution of their plan. The plan, created by A360, Inc. in 2016, purchased all company stock and became its sole owner. In 2019, A360 and its trustee sold the plan’s shares to another entity, amending the plan at the same time to include an arbitration clause that required all claims to be resolved individually and prohibited representative, class, or group relief. The plan was terminated shortly thereafter, and the proceeds were distributed to participants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants undervalued the shares and breached fiduciary duties, seeking plan-wide monetary and equitable relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration based on the plan’s amended arbitration provisions. The district court determined that although the plan itself could assent to arbitration, the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it precluded plan-wide relief authorized by ERISA. The court found that the provision constituted a prospective waiver of statutory rights and concluded that, per the plan amendment’s own terms, the arbitration provision was not severable and thus entirely void.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the arbitration provision was unenforceable under the effective vindication doctrine because it barred participants from seeking plan-wide relief for breaches of fiduciary duty, as provided by ERISA. The court joined other circuits in concluding that such provisions violate ERISA’s substantive rights and affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the arbitration procedure and denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Williams v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

A company that provides temporary labor to various industries offers daily work opportunities to individuals at its labor halls. Workers can choose whether to accept job assignments, and once they do, they are responsible for arriving at the jobsite on time. The company offers several transportation options—including vans, carpools, and public transit—with a nominal fee deducted from paychecks for those who use company-arranged transportation. Workers can also bring their own tools or use company-provided equipment, with deductions only made for unreturned items.A group of workers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Florida Minimum Wage Act. They claimed that transportation deductions reduced their pay below the minimum wage and that the company failed to pay for travel time, time spent collecting tools, and waiting time. The plaintiffs also raised a claim under the Florida Labor Pool Act regarding excessive transportation charges. The district court granted summary judgment to the company on the FLSA and minimum wage claims, denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, and declined to certify the subclass related to excessive transportation charges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the transportation deductions were lawful because the transportation was optional and for the benefit of employees, not the employer. The court further held that time spent traveling, collecting tools, and waiting was not integral and indispensable to the workers’ principal activities and was thus noncompensable under the FLSA. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of class certification for the excessive-transportation-charge subclass, finding that individual inquiries would predominate. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Villarino v. Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff of Arabic descent, employed by the Richmond County Sheriff’s Office, was assigned to an off-duty security position at a local business. During his assignment, he alleged that his supervisor subjected him to repeated racial harassment, including derogatory remarks about his ethnicity. Witnesses at the business supported these allegations, noting that the supervisor frequently made such comments. The deputy was also interested in joining the SWAT team, which the supervisor led, but after failing the SWAT entrance exam, the deputy filed a formal internal complaint about the harassment.Shortly thereafter, the deputy was investigated and ultimately terminated for allegedly violating departmental policy by making personal use of his patrol vehicle, specifically for visiting another county’s sheriff’s office to inquire about job opportunities. The deputy provided evidence that other officers regularly made similar personal use of patrol vehicles without being disciplined, and argued that his termination was in retaliation for his internal complaint. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, claiming retaliatory discharge.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the deputy had not shown that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for retaliation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the District Court erred by conflating the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis with the “convincing mosaic” standard. The Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by presenting circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue regarding retaliatory intent, even if pretext is not conclusively shown. The court reversed and remanded for the District Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard. View "Ismael v. Roundtree" on Justia Law

Cheriese Johnson began experiencing a range of symptoms, including coughing and pain in her hands and feet, prior to her employment in July 2016 with The William Carter Company. She purchased a long-term disability insurance policy from Reliance Standard that became effective in October 2016. During the three months before her coverage began, Johnson sought medical care for various symptoms and received several diagnoses, but not scleroderma. In early 2017, after her policy was active, she was diagnosed with scleroderma—a rare autoimmune disease—following a lung biopsy. Johnson then filed a claim for long-term disability benefits, which Reliance Standard denied, arguing her disability was caused by a preexisting condition for which she had received treatment during the policy’s lookback period.After her claim was denied and her appeal was unsuccessful, Johnson sued Reliance Standard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). She moved for judgment on the administrative record, while Reliance Standard sought summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Reliance Standard, finding its decision to deny benefits was correct under the terms of the policy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. Applying ERISA’s interpretive framework and reviewing the plan administrator’s decision de novo, the Eleventh Circuit held that Reliance Standard’s interpretation of the policy was both incorrect and unreasonable. The court concluded that Johnson had not received medical treatment “for” scleroderma during the lookback period because neither she nor her doctors suspected or intended to treat that specific condition at that time. The court found that Reliance Standard’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A company operating stevedoring services at the Port of Mobile, Alabama, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union representing longshore workers. The agreement included a no-strike provision and outlined procedures for resolving disputes, including arbitration. After an alleged strike by union members, the company filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a temporary restraining order and later damages for breach of the no-strike provision. The state court issued a restraining order, ending the strike within days. The union subsequently removed the case to federal court, where the company amended its complaint to seek damages, asserting that all conditions precedent for judicial action had been met.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, the union moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the dispute should be resolved through the arbitration process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement permitted the company to seek monetary damages in court for violations of the no-strike provision. The union then filed an interlocutory appeal of the order denying arbitration, while the underlying damages action remained pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the Federal Arbitration Act’s provision for interlocutory appeals does not apply to collective bargaining agreements covering workers engaged in interstate commerce, such as longshoremen. The court also found no basis for jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act or the collateral-order doctrine. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the district court’s order in place and expressing no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. View "APM Terminals Mobile, LLC v. International Longshoremen's Association" on Justia Law

Joseph Simone worked as a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. He disclosed a heart condition when hired, which did not generally affect his job performance. In 2014, TSA determined Simone was no longer medically qualified and placed him on administrative leave, eventually removing him from federal service in 2015. Simone filed an administrative complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, which was denied by an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative law judge and later on appeal. He then brought suit in federal district court against the Secretary of Homeland Security, asserting four claims under the Rehabilitation Act: disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and unlawful interference.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss. The court relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in Castro v. Secretary of Homeland Security, which held that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) exempted TSA from the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act regarding the hiring of security screeners. The district court concluded that ATSA precluded Simone’s claims and rejected his argument that the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), enacted in 2012, abrogated Castro and allowed Rehabilitation Act claims against TSA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the WPEA abrogated Castro and extended Rehabilitation Act protections to TSA security screeners. The court found that the WPEA’s statutory language superseded ATSA’s exemption and allowed TSOs to bring claims under the Rehabilitation Act. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Simone satisfied administrative requirements to bring his claims. View "Simone v. Secretary of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey, three licensed insurance adjusters were assigned by an outsourcing company to process claims for a Texas state-created insurer. The adjusters were required to complete additional certification and follow specific procedures set by the insurer. Their contracts labeled them as independent contractors, but the assignments lasted between one and a half to two years, during which they worked exclusively for the insurer. The company set their work schedules, required timesheets, and provided necessary equipment, though the adjusters were responsible for some personal and professional expenses. A shift to remote work introduced new monitoring policies, but the company maintained control over work hours and approval for overtime.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Applying a six-factor test to determine employment status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the court found that four factors favored independent contractor status and two favored employee status, with one of the latter given little weight. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding the adjusters were independent contractors and thus not entitled to FLSA overtime protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court found that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the adjusters, five of the six factors favored employee status. The court held that a reasonable jury could find the adjusters were employees under the FLSA, as they were economically dependent on the companies, had little control over their work, and their services were integral to the business. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Galarza v. One Call Claims, LLC" on Justia Law