Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff for unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court held that the district court did not err by entering summary judgment for Abalux where plaintiff's employment was not covered by the Act because Abalux had annual gross sales of less than $500,000; Abalux was entitled to use the cash method to calculate its annual gross sales for 2015; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to expand discovery; and the district court did not commit any error when it struck plaintiff's notice of acceptance after a final judgment had already been entered. View "Collar v. Abalux, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who are valets, filed a putative class action against FCPS, alleging claims under the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Eleventh Circuit held that, although the district court correctly ruled that the vehicles parked by plaintiffs were "goods" subject to the ultimate consumer exception, and not "materials" under the FLSA, FCPS was not entitled to summary judgment on the FLSA claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a jury could reasonably find that the uniforms they had to wear as valets for FCPS constituted "materials" under 29 U.S.C. 203(s)(1)(A). Furthermore, the labels on the uniforms, which reflect foreign manufacture, similarly created a jury issue as to whether the uniforms moved in international or interstate commerce under section 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Rodriguez Asalde v. First Class Parking Systems LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in an action brought by plaintiffs, former sheriff deputies, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Florida Minimum Wage Act (FMWA). The court held that the deputies were not entitled to compensation under the FLSA or the FMWA for the time that they spent donning and doffing police gear or the time that they spent driving to and from work in marked patrol vehicles. View "Llorca v. Sheriff, Collier County, Florida" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted Everglades' petition for review of the NLRB panel's order concluding that the company violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In light of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), which held that employer-employee agreements did not violate the Act and must be enforced as written, the court reversed the NLRB panel's ruling that Everglades violated the NLRA by maintaining and enforcing an employment agreement requiring that employment disputes be resolved through individualized arbitration. The court vacated the NLRB panel's grant of summary judgment on the claim regarding prohibiting unfair labor charges and remanded it to the NLRB so that it can apply the new standard set forth in The Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. 14, 2017) (abandoning the "reasonably construe" standard) and any other relevant law. Consequently, the court vacated the NLRB panel's ruling as to the unlawful discharge claim. Therefore, the court denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement. View "Everglades College, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted Cowabunga's petition for review of the NLRB panel's order concluding that the company violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In light of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), which held that employer-employee agreements did not violate the Act and must be enforced as written, the court reversed the NLRB panel's ruling that Cowabunga violated the NLRA by maintaining and enforcing an employment agreement requiring that employment disputes be resolved through individualized arbitration. In accordance with the NLRB's request, the court vacated the NLRB panel's grant of summary judgment on the prohibiting unfair labor charges claim and remanded it to the NLRB so that it can apply the new standard set forth in The Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. 14, 2017) (abandoning the "reasonably construe" standard) and any other relevant law. Therefore, the court denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement. View "Cowabunga, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Wilcox was a corrections officer at McRae Correctional Facility. On July 10, 2009, Wilcox’s coworker, Jackson slapped her on the buttocks. Wilcox filed a formal complaint with the company that operates the Facility that same day. The company told Jackson not to associate with Wilcox or be around her. In the days that followed, Jackson repeatedly rolled his eyes at Wilcox and once punched a metal machine in her presence to intimidate her. On July 23, Wilcox submitted a second complaint, adding that she was afraid he would touch her again, that this was not the first time that he had touched her, and that he stated he could touch her if he wanted to. Wilcox conceded that Jackson never touched her or made any inappropriate comments to her after her July 10 complaint. The company's outside investigator submitted a report finding that Jackson had sexually harassed Wilcox and other coworkers. On September 14, the company fired Jackson. Wilcox later filed suit under Title VII. On remand, a jury returned a verdict for Wilcox of $4,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the company, finding that the company’s prompt remedial action in response to Wilcox’s complaints barred liability. View "Wilcox v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed an employment discrimination case against US Steel, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition that did not disclose the employment-discrimination claims. The Chapter 7 Trustee was treating the bankruptcy as a “no asset” case. U.S. Steel moved the district court for dismissal. An Eleventh Circuit panel initially affirmed the district court in holding that judicial estoppel required dismissal of the bankruptcy case. Upon rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit overruled precedent “that permitted the inference that a plaintiff intended to make a mockery of the judicial system simply because he failed to disclose a civil claim” and remanded for a determination of whether a plaintiff’s inconsistent statements were calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system. When the plaintiff’s inconsistent statement is an omission in bankruptcy disclosures, the court may consider such factors as the plaintiff’s level of sophistication, whether and under what circumstances the plaintiff corrected the disclosures, whether the plaintiff told his bankruptcy attorney about the civil claims before filing the bankruptcy disclosures, whether the trustee or creditors were aware of the claims before the plaintiff amended the disclosures, whether the plaintiff identified other lawsuits to which he was party, any findings or actions by the bankruptcy court after the omission was discovered, and any other fact relevant to the intent inquiry.” View "Slater v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a joint stipulation with NHMA purporting to voluntarily dismiss a 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) and then moved the district court to enter final judgment on her remaining employment-related claims. The district court denied the motion because it no longer had jurisdiction over the action after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her lone remaining claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal was invalid where Rule 41(a)(1) permitted voluntary dismissals only of entire actions, not claims. Therefore, the court held that the invalid joint stipulation did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the case. View "Pamela M. Perry, M.D. v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana" on Justia Law

As a matter of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was sufficient for an opt-in plaintiff to file a written consent pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), to confer party-plaintiff status. In this case, appellants were parties to the litigation upon filing consents and, absent a dismissal from the case, remained parties in the litigation. The court affirmed the district court's denial of conditional certification and vacated the district court's clarification order, remanding with instructions for the district court to either dismiss appellants from the case without prejudice to refile, or to go forward with appellants' individual cases since discovery has been completed. The court also held that appellants were entitled to statutory tolling of their claims beginning on the dates they filed their written consents. View "Houston v. Country Club, Inc." on Justia Law

The Union notified TCI, a Martha’s Vineyard bus company, that a majority of its drivers had signed Union authorization cards. The parties agreed to an election. TCI was required to provide a list of eligible voters and their addresses. TCI identified 39 drivers and delivered 37 residential addresses, one P.O. Box address, and combination of a residential address and a P.O. Box. The Union mailed voting information but only seven drivers attended a meeting. In the first election, the drivers voted 21 to 18 against unionization. Subsequently, 22 envelopes the Union had mailed were returned as undeliverable. A hearing officer determined that the list was deficient. The NLRB ordered a new election, in which the drivers voted in favor of representation, 17 to 14. TCI asserted that, before the election, two drivers had threatened another driver that they would “kill him” if he did not vote for the Union. A hearing officer concluded that the statements “were made in jest.” The NLRB certified the Union. The NLRB found that TCI had engaged in unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(1)(5), when it refused to bargain with the Union. The Eleventh Circuit granted the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order. The record supported the decision to order a new election and that the drivers were not acting as Union agents engaging in intimidation. View "Transit Connection, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law