Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lakeland appealed a decision of the NLRB finding Lakeland in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), (1), for its refusal to bargain with the Union. The NLRB cross-appealed for enforcement. At issue was whether substantial record evidence supported the NLRB's determination that certain licensed practical nurses (LPNs) employed by Lakeland were "supervisors" within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. The court found unreasonable the NLRB's conclusion that the LPNs' involvement in certified nursing assistants (CNAs) coaching did not make them supervisors under the Act. The court also concluded that the NLRB's determination that the LPNs did not exercise independent judgment in assigning CNAs was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court granted Lakeland's petition for review and denied the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Lakeland Health Care Associate v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

This case arose when Gimrock refused to bargain with the Union and its operating engineers went on strike. The Board found, among other things, that the strike was an economic strike and that Gimrock's refusal to reinstate the strikers violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3). The court concluded that the evidence before the ALJ fully supported the ALJ's recommendation - that the Board award the strikers the sum total stated in the Compliance Specification - and therefore the Board's adoption of the recommendation. The court found merit, though, in Gimrock's argument that only this court had the power to modify its order and, for example, require Gimrock to meet with the Union at set times. Accordingly, the court denied the Board's petition to the extent that it sought enforcement of its order requiring Gimrock to meet with the Union for sixteen hours a week and, in doing so, bargain in good faith. The court enforced the Board's petition regarding the reinstatement and back pay awards. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Gimrock Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed summary judgment in favor of her former employer and against her complaint of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. At issue was whether the employer was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court held that the employer was a state agency immune from plaintiff's complaint of disability discrimination and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's complaint of racial discrimination where plaintiff unequivocally answered "no" when she was asked if her termination had anything to do with her race. View "Ross v. Jefferson Co Dept of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in a class action suit alleging that Broward County's employee wellness program violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that the wellness program's biometric screening and online Health Risk Assessment questionnaire violated the ADA's prohibition on non-voluntary medical examinations and disability-related inquiries. The court held that the district court did not err in finding as a matter of law that the wellness program was a "term" of Broward County's group health insurance plan, such that the wellness program fell within the ADA's safe harbor provision. View "Seff v. Broward County, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding. View "Ramirez v. U.S. Dept. of Trans." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the Eleventh Circuit's authority to review an order remanding an action based on an antecedent and erroneous ruling that an agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable. Petitioner St. Hugh Williams filed in a Florida court a complaint that, while working onboard the M/V Norwegian Sky, he was injured as a result of the negligence and other tortious conduct of the owner of the ship, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. NCL removed the action to the district court on the ground that Petitioner was contractually bound to arbitrate his complaint under the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but Petitioner moved to remand the action to state court. The district court ruled that the arbitration clause was unenforceable and granted Petitioner's motion to remand. NCL appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit later held in "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.," (652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011)), that an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention is enforceable. Petitioner argued that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction, but the Court found that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to compel under "City of Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.," (293 U.S. 140 (1934)). The Court reversed the order denying the motion to compel of NCL, vacated the order remanding Petitioner's complaint to state court, and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Williams v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

Petitioner Leandre Layton, on behalf of himself and the similarly-situated members of his conditionally-certified class (collectively, "Drivers"), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHL Express, Inc. ("DHL") on his claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). DHL contracted with Sky Land Express, Inc. to manage local parcel deliveries. Petitioner worked on DHL routes for Sky Land. Petitioner filed his collective action for unpaid overtime, naming DHL, Sky Land and Gary Littlefield (owner and president of Sky Land) as his joint employers and defendants to the suit. DHL moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not the drivers' employer. The district court granted DHL's motion: "DHL did everything it could possibly do to relate to Sky Land only as an "independent contractor[."] The contract with Sky Land allowed DHL to exercise only the minimal supervision necessary to monitor compliance with the contract. The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that if plaintiffs were employed by anybody, they were employed by Sky Land, the entity that they ostentatiously dismissed as a defendant, for reasons this court can only guess at. DHL was not an employer, much less a joint employer." After a thorough examination of the realities of the economic relationship between Drivers and DHL, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the grounds that DHL was not a joint employer of the Drivers. View "Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Secretary of Labor's decision in favor of petitioner's former employee who intervened in this case. In contradiction to the findings of an ALJ, the Secretary's Administrative Review Board (ARB) found that petitioner gave pretextual, shifting explanations for terminating the employee and found that the employee suffered disparate treatment in comparison to other similarly situated employees. Consequently, the ARB found that the employee proved that petitioner fired him for engaging in conduct protected by the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851. The court concluded that the ARB erred by reviewing the ALJ's decision de novo rather than observing the Secretary's regulation requiring substantial review. The court also concluded that the ARB failed to follow Eleventh Circuit precedent when analyzing its contrary factual findings. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stone & Webster Construction, Inc. v. U. S. Dept. of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African -American, brought this action against UPSF, his former employer, alleging that he had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of UPSF and plaintiff timely appealed. The court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the events alleged by plaintiff created an objectively hostile work environment and therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. UPS Ground Freight" on Justia Law

The Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Stacey Williams appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' claim of pregnancy discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and state law negligence. The court held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on Williams' Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., claim for pregnancy discrimination because Williams had presented enough circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to reasonably infer that her supervisor's action in terminating her because of her pregnancy and his inaction in not attempting to find her a light-duty job were a violation of Title VII. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981 race discrimination claims because she had not shown a genuine issue of material fact about whether Gate Gourmet intentionally discriminated against her based on her race. Summary judgment was improperly granted against Williams' Title VII and section 1981 retaliation claims because there was a reasonable inference that the statutorily protected filing of and refusal to settle the EEOC charge caused Gate Gourmet to deny Williams a light-duty position, which was a materially adverse action. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Williams v. Gate Gourmet, Inc." on Justia Law