Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs are “business development managers” tasked with persuading corporate customers to purchase vehicles for their fleets. The task often requires over 40 hours of effort per week, and the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to overtime compensation. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are covered by the administrative exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).Under the FLSA, employees who work over 40 hours per week are generally entitled to time-and-a-half overtime compensation. However, not all workers qualify, as the statute exempts employees working in “a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” The plaintiffs contend that they do not meet the third prong of the exemption, which requires that they exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance. The court reasoned that a worker need not have “limitless discretion” or a total lack of supervision to qualify as an administrative employee. Further, the defendant pointed to ample evidence that the plaintiffs exercised discretion in their job pursuits. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that the administrative exemption in the FLSA applies to the plaintiffs. View "Alicia Brown v. Nexus Business Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of tipped employees at Nusret, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), challenging Nusret's compensation scheme. Plaintiffs alleged that from November 1, 2017, through January 18, 2019, the restaurant paid them less than the required federal minimum and overtime wages and forced them to participate in an illegal tip pool with non-tipped employees.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Nusret's mandatory 18% "service charge" is not a tip under the FLSA and associated regulations and could lawfully be used to offset Nusret's wage obligations under the FLSA. The court agreed with the district court that the mandatory service charge was a bona fide service charge and not a tip because it was a compulsory charge for service, and the decision to pay it—and the amount to pay—were not determined solely by the customer. The court declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of Nusret. View "Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging race discrimination after defendant terminated plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court properly found that plaintiff failed to show that defendant engaged in race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, in the alternative, plaintiff provided a convincing mosaic of discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment at this stage. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of showing factual disputes that should be decided by a jury—a jury whose role it is to weigh conflicting evidence and make any necessary credibility determinations. Therefore, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Jenkins v. Nell" on Justia Law

Norton operated a pressure washer on a Tampa Convention Center dock that had no guardrails or barricades and was surrounded on three sides by water. Norton fell into the bay while working and drowned. He was wearing rubber boots and was not wearing a personal flotation device. During an investigation, an OSHA officer did not identify any incidents of employees falling off the dock before Norton’s accident, but did learn that two employees who had pressure washed the same dock voluntarily wore personal flotation devices. OSHA issued a citation to C&W for its failure to provide and require the use of a personal flotation device and proposed a $12,675 penalty.Eleventh Circuit precedents required proof either that the use of personal flotation devices was an industry custom or that C&W had “clear actual knowledge that personal protective equipment was necessary under the circumstances.” OSHA did not present any evidence of industry custom. An ALJ concluded that C&W had “clear actual knowledge" that personal protective equipment was necessary, given “an open and obvious hazard.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated the citation. The Commission misapplied the standard for actual knowledge in the absence of industry custom. A finding that C&W had actual knowledge of the requirement to provide and require the use of personal flotation devices for employees when they pressure washed the dock was not supported by substantial evidence. View "C&W Facility Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Davis, a former Congressman, mayoral candidate, candidate for governor of Alabama, and federal prosecutor, is Black. In 2016, he became Executive Director of LSA, a non-profit law firm serving low-income Alabamians. Davis experienced problems with some of his subordinates and colleagues; some complained to LSA’s Executive Committee. On August 18, 2017, as Davis left work, he was informed that the Executive Committee had voted to suspend him with pay pending an investigation of those complaints. A “Suspension Letter” cited spending decisions outside the approved budget, failure to follow LSA's hiring policies and procedures, creating new initiatives without Board approval, and creating a hostile work environment for some LSA employees. LSA posted a security guard in front of its building and hired Mowery, an Alabama political consultant, to handle public relations related to Davis’s suspension. Mowery had handled one of Davis’s failed political campaigns until their relationship soured; Mowery had worked for the campaign of Davis’s opponent in another race.Days later, Davis notified the Board of his resignation. He filed suit, alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and under Title VII, and defamation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Being placed on paid leave was not an adverse employment action and Davis did not raise a fact issue on his constructive discharge claim. LSA’s disclosures to Mowery did not constitute “publication”—an essential element of defamation. View "Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that relocation benefits provided by a railroad to its employees are exempt under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act as bona fide and necessary expenses incurred by the employee in the business of the employer, 26 U.S.C. 3231(e)(1)(iii). The court also held that, because no regulatory substantiation requirements apply, CSX is entitled to a refund. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States in regard to whether relocation benefits are exempt under section 3231(e)(1)(iii); reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in regard to CSX's need and failure to satisfy the Accountable Plan Regulation; and remanded for the district court to calculate the amount of CSX's refund and administer the notification process. View "CSX Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff in an action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After considering the FLSA, the Supreme Court's decision in Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942), as well as the Department of Labor's regulatory guidance, the court held that Plastipak paying plaintiff bonuses—a shift premium for night work and holiday pay—on top of his fixed salary does not preclude the use of the fluctuating workweek method. The court explained that so long as an employee receives a fixed salary covering every hour worked in a week, the payment of a bonus on top of the employee's fixed salary does not bar an employer's use of the fluctuating workweek method to calculate overtime pay. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandez v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law

Akal, a government contractor, repatriates persons ordered removed from the U.S., transporting detainees on airplanes. Akal staffs it flights with air security officers (ASOs). Once the detainees have been transported to their respective destinations, the ASOs are required to return to the U.S. aboard the same aircraft. Because return flights carry no detainees, the ASOs have few affirmative duties during them. On arrival, the ASOs unload and clean the plane and perform other minor administrative duties to prepare for the following day. Akal acknowledges that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207it has to pay its ASOs for overtime spent on the Returns. For Returns lasting longer than 90 minutes, Akal automatically deducts one hour from each shift as a “meal period” and instructs ASOs to disengage from work duties during meal periods.ASOs sued Akal under the FLSA for unpaid wages. The district court granted the ASOs summary judgment, holding that Akal’s automatic “meal period” deductions violated the Act but that Akal had acted in good faith and had not willfully violated the FLSA. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Akal was not entitled to make the challenged meal-period deductions from otherwise compensable work. The district court correctly found that Akal acted in good faith and not willfully. View "Gelber v. Akal Security, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Denny's, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and seeking to bring claims on behalf of herself and all similarly situated tipped employees who were subject to Denny's alleged policy or practice of paying these employees sub-minimum hourly wages in violation of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that material issues of fact exist concerning plaintiff's dual-jobs-regulation claims (Counts Two and Three), and thus summary judgment was not appropriate. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's tip-credit notification claim (Count One). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment as to Count One, but reversed its entry of summary judgment as to Counts Two and Three. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rafferty v. Denny's, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's final judgment against plaintiff in an action brought against Koch for race and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII. In regard to plaintiff's Batson challenges, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for Juror 9. Even assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case for Juror 32, Koch offered plausible non-discriminatory reasons for the strike; a company defending the decisions of a manager in a civil lawsuit would naturally not want a current union member and disgruntled worker's compensation claimant on the jury.The court rejected plaintiff's argument that Koch counsel's violation of the order in limine so prejudiced the jury that a new trial is warranted. Rather, considering the length of the trial, the shortness of the offending remarks, the context of the "prevailing party" comment as a response to a door plaintiff opened, and the curative instructions offered, the court could not find that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's motions for mistrial and a new trial. View "Vinson v. Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC" on Justia Law