Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, Jimmy Davis, Jr., an Alabama prisoner sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of Johnny Hazle during a gas station robbery, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. Davis argued that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and the circumstances of his prior conviction for third-degree robbery.The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Davis then filed a state postconviction petition, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The state court found that Davis’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently and that Davis was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the postconviction petition, concluding that the investigation conducted by Davis’s attorneys was reasonable and that Davis failed to show prejudice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Davis’s § 2254 petition, concluding that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.The Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s conclusion that Davis was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficiencies was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the additional mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction proceedings, including evidence of childhood abuse and the non-violent nature of the prior robbery, did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The court emphasized that the state court’s decision was not so obviously wrong that it lay beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. View "Davis v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Louis Mercado was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery in Florida. During his trial, the court granted judgments of acquittal on two counts and declared a mistrial on the third count due to prosecutorial error. The trial court then barred a retrial, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause. The State appealed this decision, but Mercado's attorney, mistakenly believing he had withdrawn from the case, failed to file a response brief. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, leading to Mercado's retrial, conviction, and life sentence.The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarily denied Mercado's state habeas petition, in which he argued ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to file a response brief. Mercado contended that this failure should be presumed prejudicial under United States v. Cronic, rather than requiring proof of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The appellate court's decision was based on the reasoning that the failure to file a brief did not constitute a complete denial of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Mercado's federal habeas petition. The court held that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has never applied the Cronic presumption of prejudice to a situation where counsel failed to file an appellee's brief. Therefore, the state court's requirement for Mercado to prove actual prejudice under Strickland was deemed reasonable. View "Mercado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 1993, Anthony Mungin was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Mungin argued that his lawyer was ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Mungin presented four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Two were initially raised in his federal habeas petition, while the other two were added later. The court found that the first two claims failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and habeas caselaw. The other two claims were deemed inadmissible in federal court because they did not relate back to the initial habeas petition and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The court corrected its precedent on the standard of review, stating that under Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 560 U.S. 538 (2010), they review those decisions de novo. The district court's denial of Mungin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed. View "Mungin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and substantive health care fraud for fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid for millions of dollars for visits to nursing home patients that he never made. He challenged the convictions, sentence, restitution amount, and forfeiture amount on appeal.The co-conspirator pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreed to cooperate with the government. Part of his plea agreement addressed his compensation during the conspiracy. Defendant contends that the district court erred in quashing his subpoena of the co-conspirator’s attorney. The court ruled that any erroneous exclusion of the attorney’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because his testimony would not have impeached the co-conspirator. He further argues that the district court erred in limiting how many character witnesses he could present. The court found that the district court did not err because defendant overstates the importance of character witness testimony in this case. He was not on trial for being uncaring or uncompassionate but for lying and billing Medicare for services he did not provide.Additionally, defendant contends that the district court improperly limited part of his counsel’s closing argument when he was discussing whether defendant had made a profit. The court found that the government does not have to prove a defendant profited to establish the elements of fraud. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating the loss amount used to determine defendant's sentence or the amount of restitution ordered. View "USA v. Douglas Moss" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for appellees in an action brought by appellant, alleging claims for securities fraud and state common law claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, suppression and fraud. Appellant alleged that appellees wrongfully failed to inform appellant of the risks involved in making a certain investment. The court found that the alleged wrongful conduct of appellees did not cause the economic loss for which appellant sues. In this case, there is no viable claim against appellees; no act or omission asserted against them was the cause of the loss suffered by appellant; and thus the district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor. View "Whitehead v. BBVA Compass Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (the customer) filed suit against State Street (the custodian bank), alleging in essence that it had a duty to notify him that the securities in his account were worthless. The district court granted State Street's motion to dismiss the contract claims on the ground that State Street had a merely administrative role in managing plaintiff's accounts and thus owed him no duty to guard against his investment advisor's misconduct. The district court concluded that plaintiff's negligence claims were barred by Florida's economic loss rule and plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged knowledge on the part of State Street in regards to the aiding and abetting claims. The court affirmed, holding that, under these facts, the custodian bank breached no duty, contractual or otherwise, by accepting on behalf of its customer securities that later turn out to be fraudulent and listing those securities on monthly account statements issued to the customer. Plaintiff's allegations failed to state claims for breach of contract; plaintiff failed to establish that State Street owed him an independent duty to monitor the investments in his account, verify their market value, or ensure they were in valid form; therefore, he failed to state valid negligence claims; plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to state a claim for aiding and abetting; and plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation also failed. View "Lamm v. State Street Bank and Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that the fiduciaries of their retirement plan violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., in ways that damaged their efforts to stockpile savings for their winter years. The court held that because plaintiffs have not pleaded facts establishing that defendants abused their discretion by following the Plan's directions, they have not stated a valid claim for breach of the duty of prudence. The court also held that plaintiffs have failed to state a viable breach of loyalty claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' third and last amended complaint. View "Lanfear, et al. v. Home Depot, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In this securities fraud class action, the investor plaintiffs sued the defendant company and three of its principal officers, alleging that they had made a series of eleven false or misleading statements to the public, in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. Plaintiffs claimed that the false statements had the effect of artificially inflating the price of defendant's stock until the truth belatedly came out, at which time the stock price dropped and plaintiffs suffered substantial financial losses. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims arising from the alleged misstatements made on March 5, 2004 and July 26, 2004, because plaintiffs have inadequately pled scienter and falsity. However, as for plaintiffs' claims arising out of defendant's February 23, 2005 and March 16, 2005 statements, the court vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment. The court held that the securities laws prohibited corporate representatives from knowingly peddling material misrepresentations to the public, regardless of whether the statements introduced a new falsehood to the market or merely confirmed misinformation already in the marketplace. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

The United States appealed an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, section 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519, and two attorneys, Sean Cronin and Andrea Hoffman, appeal public reprimands entered against them based on their work as Assistant United States Attorneys in an underlying criminal action marked by hard adversarial tactics. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions against the United States for a prosecution that was objectively reasonable, and the district court violated the constitutional right to due process of the two lead prosecutors, when it denied them notice of any charges of misconduct and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the award of attorney's fees and costs against the United States and the public reprimand of Cronin and Hoffman, but the court denied the request of Cronin and Hoffman that the court reassign the case to a different district judge at this stage.