Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging that the five letters sent to them between May 16 and December 13, 2013 violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and/or the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), Fla. Stat. 559.55 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in concluding that the HOA fine at issue is not a debt for FCCPA purposes and granting summary judgment on that basis. The court did not decide whether under Florida law Marbella could be vicariously liable for the FCCPA violations of its agent because the district court failed to apply Florida law in the first instance. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Affinity, vacated the grant of summary judgment to Marbella, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Agrelo v. The Meloni Law Firm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a marine salvor, filed this action in rem against the Blacksheep, seeking a salvage award for services he provided to the yacht. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff, finding that he failed to show that his services were necessary to the rescue of the Blacksheep. The court concluded, however, that a claim for a salvage award does not require such a showing. In this case, the district court's findings and some facts from the record could support the conclusion that plaintiff's action contributed to saving the Blacksheep where he deployed his high-capacity dewatering pump; dove below the ship where he successfully pushed the propeller shaft twelve inches closer to its intended position; and applied packing material to prevent further flooding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Girard v. M/V "Blacksheep"" on Justia Law

Under Regulation X, 12 C.F. R. part 1024, which implements the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a loan servicer’s duty to evaluate a borrower’s loss mitigation application is triggered only when the borrower submits the application more than 37 days before the foreclosure sale. At issue is whether Ocwen, a loan servicer, had a duty to evaluate an application for loss mitigation options submitted by the Borrowers when, at the time the application was submitted, a foreclosure sale of the Borrowers’ property was scheduled to occur in two days. The court concluded that Regulation X requires the court to measure the timeliness of the Borrowers’ application using the date the foreclosure sale was scheduled to occur when they submitted their complete application. Because the Borrowers’ application was untimely, the court agreed with the district court that Ocwen had no duty to evaluate the Borrowers’ loss mitigation application. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Ocwen on the Borrowers’ claim seeking to hold Ocwen liable for failing to evaluate their loss mitigation application. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the Borrowers’ claim based on Ocwen’s inadequate response to their notice of error. The court agreed with the district court that to survive summary judgment the Borrowers had to present evidence that they suffered actual damages or were entitled to statutory damages and that they failed to do so. View "Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

New York law required CitiMortgage to file within 30 days a certificate of discharge with the county clerk to record that plaintiff had satisfied his mortgage. N.Y. Real Prop. Law 275; N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law 1921. When CitiMortgage failed to record the satisfaction of the mortgage until more than 90 days after the date of satisfaction, plaintiff filed a putative class action against CitiMortgage. The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The court agreed with CitiMortgage that plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff has not alleged that CitiMortgage's violation of New York law caused or could cause him any harm. View "Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired bank manager, filed suit against Nationstar under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a consumer-protection statute geared toward mortgagors. Plaintiff claimed that her mortgage payment incorrectly increased after Nationstar began servicing the loan. The district court granted Nationstar's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Nationstar did not offer a written explanation stating the reason or reasons for its determination, in violation of section 2605(e)(2)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 1024.35(e)(1)(i)(B); that this failure indicated Nationstar's investigation was unreasonable; and that Nationstar’s unreasonable investigation prevented it from discovering and appropriately correcting the account error. The court concluded that the district court improperly elevated Nationstar's allegations over those of plaintiff at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and that plaintiff adequately pleaded damages. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Renfroe v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

FEB filed suit against the government seeking to quiet title to a spoil island off Key West, known as Wisteria Island. Wisteria Island was formed as a result of the Navy's dredging operations. In this case, it is undisputed that the state of Florida, F.E.B.’s predecessor in interest, had actual knowledge of the United States’ claim to the island in 1951. F.E.B.'s Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a(g), claim expired in 1963, well before initiation of this suit. The court concluded that the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315, does not rise to the level of the “clear and unequivocal” abandonment of the government’s interest in Wisteria Island necessary to reset the QTA statute of limitations. The court found F.E.B.'s arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. Therefore, the court found that the QTA's statute of limitations has run and affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "F.E.B. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on an insurance-coverage dispute that began in 2011 between Severin and Stephanie Hegel and The First Liberty Insurance Corporation. The Hegels claimed that First Liberty improperly denied their claim for a "sinkhole loss," defined under their homeowner's insurance policy as "structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity." First Liberty argued that the damage to the Hegels' residence did not qualify as "structural damage," a term that was not defined in either the policy or the version of the Florida sinkhole-insurance statute applicable to their claim. The the district court granted summary judgment for the Hegels, finding that "structural damage" meant any "damage to the structure" and awarded them $166,518.17 in damages. First Liberty appealed. After review, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded: the district court erred in equating the contractual term "structural damage" with any "damage to the structure." The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how much, if any, structural damage to the Hegels' house (as properly defined) was due to sinkhole activity. The district court's determination on this issue will in turn lead to either a new grant of summary judgment for the appropriate party or to a trial on the merits. View "Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Redus filed a foreclosure complaint against the Zagames and the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in a joint stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure. At issue on appeal was what a Marshal collects when he auctions a public judicial sale pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1921(c)(1). The district court calculated the Marshal's commission based only on the amount of the judgment lien because the judgment creditor failed to establish the property's appraisal value. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings because the court found that the plain meaning of "collected" in section 1921(c)(1) refers to the amount of the accepted winning bid. The court noted that this decision does not abolish the Marshal's commission. View "Redus Florida Commercial v. College Station Retail Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to rescind a loan she entered into with the trustee of a mortgage investment trust, and the district court granted rescission, finding that the mortgaged property was plaintiff's "principal dwelling" and the trustee failed to give plaintiff adequate notice of her right to rescind. In this case, the trustee failed to comply with two requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635, and a related regulation where he instructed plaintiff to sign simultaneously the loan documents and a postdated waiver of her right to rescind the transaction and the trustee failed to give plaintiff two copies of the notice of her right to rescind. The court concluded that the record fairly supports the district court's findings of fact; plaintiff was entitled to rescission because the trustee failed to give plaintiff clear and conspicuous notice of her right to rescind; but the district court lacked the discretion to deny plaintiff statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a determination of the amounts owed. View "Harris v. Schonbrun" on Justia Law

Hundreds of property owners filed toxic tort suits against P&W, an aircraft and rocket engine manufacturer, for damages resulting from purported groundwater contamination. The district court granted P&W's motions for Lone Pine case management orders. The district court subsequently dismissed plaintiffs' second amended complaints with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded, as a general matter, that it is not legally appropriate for a district court to issue a Lone Pine order requiring factual support for the plaintiffs' claims before it has determined that those claims survive a motion to dismiss under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Whatever the general propriety and/or utility of Lone Pine orders, they should not be used as (or become) the platforms for pseudo-summary judgment motions at a time when the case is not at issue and the parties have not engaged in reciprocal discovery. On the merits, the court held that the grounds for dismissal urged by P&W and relied upon the district court did not warrant dismissal of the second amended complaints. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Adinolfe, et al. v. United Technologies Corp." on Justia Law