Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on an insurance-coverage dispute that began in 2011 between Severin and Stephanie Hegel and The First Liberty Insurance Corporation. The Hegels claimed that First Liberty improperly denied their claim for a "sinkhole loss," defined under their homeowner's insurance policy as "structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity." First Liberty argued that the damage to the Hegels' residence did not qualify as "structural damage," a term that was not defined in either the policy or the version of the Florida sinkhole-insurance statute applicable to their claim. The the district court granted summary judgment for the Hegels, finding that "structural damage" meant any "damage to the structure" and awarded them $166,518.17 in damages. First Liberty appealed. After review, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded: the district court erred in equating the contractual term "structural damage" with any "damage to the structure." The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how much, if any, structural damage to the Hegels' house (as properly defined) was due to sinkhole activity. The district court's determination on this issue will in turn lead to either a new grant of summary judgment for the appropriate party or to a trial on the merits. View "Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Redus filed a foreclosure complaint against the Zagames and the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in a joint stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure. At issue on appeal was what a Marshal collects when he auctions a public judicial sale pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1921(c)(1). The district court calculated the Marshal's commission based only on the amount of the judgment lien because the judgment creditor failed to establish the property's appraisal value. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings because the court found that the plain meaning of "collected" in section 1921(c)(1) refers to the amount of the accepted winning bid. The court noted that this decision does not abolish the Marshal's commission. View "Redus Florida Commercial v. College Station Retail Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to rescind a loan she entered into with the trustee of a mortgage investment trust, and the district court granted rescission, finding that the mortgaged property was plaintiff's "principal dwelling" and the trustee failed to give plaintiff adequate notice of her right to rescind. In this case, the trustee failed to comply with two requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635, and a related regulation where he instructed plaintiff to sign simultaneously the loan documents and a postdated waiver of her right to rescind the transaction and the trustee failed to give plaintiff two copies of the notice of her right to rescind. The court concluded that the record fairly supports the district court's findings of fact; plaintiff was entitled to rescission because the trustee failed to give plaintiff clear and conspicuous notice of her right to rescind; but the district court lacked the discretion to deny plaintiff statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a determination of the amounts owed. View "Harris v. Schonbrun" on Justia Law

Hundreds of property owners filed toxic tort suits against P&W, an aircraft and rocket engine manufacturer, for damages resulting from purported groundwater contamination. The district court granted P&W's motions for Lone Pine case management orders. The district court subsequently dismissed plaintiffs' second amended complaints with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded, as a general matter, that it is not legally appropriate for a district court to issue a Lone Pine order requiring factual support for the plaintiffs' claims before it has determined that those claims survive a motion to dismiss under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Whatever the general propriety and/or utility of Lone Pine orders, they should not be used as (or become) the platforms for pseudo-summary judgment motions at a time when the case is not at issue and the parties have not engaged in reciprocal discovery. On the merits, the court held that the grounds for dismissal urged by P&W and relied upon the district court did not warrant dismissal of the second amended complaints. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Adinolfe, et al. v. United Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Association under the Federal and Florida Fair Housing Acts (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(b) and Fla. Stat. 760.23(9)(b). Plaintiff alleged that the Association violated these statutes when it enforced its pet weight policy and demanded that plaintiff remove his emotional support dog from his condominium. The jury awarded plaintiff damages and the district court awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees. The Association appealed. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on the refusal-to-accommodate element; plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show he has a disability within the meaning of the FHA; plaintiff produced evidence supporting the conclusion that the requested accommodation was necessary; the jury instructions do not warrant reversal; in allowing the dog to remain in the courtroom, the district court did not abuse its discretion; and the district court did not err in awarding attorneys' fees. Because there was no merit to any of the arguments the Association made on appeal, the court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's order.View "Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605(e); conversion; breach of contract; wrongful attempted foreclosure; and trespass. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims where, although the court recognized that HUD regulations are enforceable terms of the contract, plaintiff failed to put forward any evidence of damages caused by the purported breach of these contract terms or seek any cognizable relief; plaintiff's trespass claim failed because plaintiff was admittedly in default and any visits by Chase's agents to the property at issue were permitted; plaintiff's wrongful attempted foreclosure claim failed where Chase believed it was entitled to foreclose on the property at the time and plaintiff attributed the problems with Chase only to its inability to fully keep track of her payments and communicate her payment status to her; and plaintiff's RESPA claim failed where Chase's response to plaintiff's requests was adequate and there were no damages as a matter of law from an inadequate response. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all claims. View "Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners in the City of Sanibel, filed suit against the city challenging a municipal ordinance that prohibits them from building a boat dock or accessory pier on their properties. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their substantive due process claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. created a new "substantial advancement" test for substantive due process claims based on state-created property rights. The district court correctly concluded that the riparian rights asserted by plaintiffs were state-created rights, not fundamental rights. Because plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on its face rather than contesting a specific zoning or permit decision made under the auspices of the ordinance, the court concluded that they were challenging a legislative act. Under the court's existing precedent, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not show that the ordinance lacked a rational basis and the court declined to adopt a new standard of review. Plaintiffs themselves plead at least two rational bases for the ordinance in their Amended Complaint: protection of seagrasses and aesthetic preservation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kentner, et al. v. City of Sanibel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BHDR under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., alleging that by failing to remedy certain flaws in the design and construction of the District Universal Boulevard Apartments (the District), BHDR discriminated against people with handicaps in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(1)-(2). The court held that the FHA's design-and-construction guidelines do not provide a standard for determining whether discrimination under section 3604(f)(1) and (f)(2) exists outside of the design and construction contexts. Despite the fact that BHDR was not involved in the design or construction of the District, all of plaintiff's claims that BHDR violated subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) were alleged through the lens of the design-and-construction guidelines in subsection (f)(3). The court held that an FHA plaintiff cannot establish the discrimination of a defendant who was uninvolved in the design or construction of a dwelling by reference to the guidelines at section 3604(f)(3)(C). Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to BHDR. View "Harding v. Orlando Apartments, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Heatherwood and FCB appealed the district court's affirmance of a final amended judgment entered by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that there was an implied restrictive covenant limiting the use of real property at issue to a golf course. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, because FCB satisfied the person-aggrieved doctrine, FCB also met Article III standing requirements. On the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it held that FCB and Heatherwood had actual, constructive and inquiry notice of the implied restrictive covenant; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that most, if not all, of the homeowners within the Heatherwood subdivision bought their home with the expectation that the golf course property would remain a golf course; the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the doctrine of estoppel by deed precluded the enforcement of the covenant; with respect to FCB and Heatherwood's argument that the doctrine of integration in the Agreement between HGC and Heatherwood served to destroy an implied covenant, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding integration did not apply under the facts of the case; in considering the doctrine of changed circumstances, the bankruptcy court relied on various factual findings in determining that the homeowners' benefit from the continued existence of the covenant outweighed the detriment borne by FCB and Heatherwood; and the court rejected FCB and Heatherwood's argument that HGC had no standing to enforce the implied restrictive covenant because HGC owned no property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Heatherwood Holdings, LLC v. HGC, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the City of Milton's decision to deny T-Mobile's applications for permits to build three cell phone towers. At issue was the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which stated that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless services shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." The court concluded that T-Mobile had access to documents - including transcripts of the planning commission's hearings, letters the city sent to T-Mobile, and detailed minutes of the city council hearings- before its deadline for filing the lawsuit and collectively, these documents they were enough to satisfy the writing requirement of section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia" on Justia Law