Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This diversity action asked whether the property damage alleged in a California class action lawsuit brought by purchasers of homes built by Morrison was caused by an "occurrence" and therefore covered under the terms of Morrison's CGL policy with Gerling. Central to the case are questions of Georgia law, among them whether property damage can constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy where its effects are not felt on "other property." As this question is determinative of the case, and the single Supreme Court of Georgia case touching upon the matter failed to answer it, the court certified these questions for resolution. View "HDI-Gerling America Ins. v. Taylor Morrison Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Leon County appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the FHFA, it's acting director, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Leon County argued that by directing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks to refrain from purchasing mortgages encumbered with certain first-priority lien obligations, some of which were held by Leon County, the FHFA engaged in rulemaking without providing notice and comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 12 U.S.C. 4526(b). The court agreed with the district court that, under the specific facts in this case, the FHFA's directive not to purchase Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) encumbered mortgages was within the FHFA's broad powers as conservator. Accordingly, because 12 U.S.C. 4617(f) provided that "no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or receiver," the district court held that section 4617(f) barred Leon County's claims. View "Leon County Florida, et al v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's amendment to an existing criminal forfeiture order to include two Thailand condominiums defendant owns. The court held that the condos were subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1) and (d). The court held that even if the statute of limitations, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1621 were applicable in this instance, the statute of limitations would be tolled because the condos were not located in the United States. Further, defendant's laches argument failed because the United States was generally not subject to the defense of laches when it enforced its rights. In any event, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(e)(1) permitted the district court to amend a criminal forfeiture order "at any time" on motion by the government. The court also held that defendant's due process rights were not violated. Finally, defendant's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty argument lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order amending the 1999 forfeiture order to include defendant's condos. View "United States v. Duboc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and others who purchased houses from a builder, Ryland, in the Newport subdivision of Vista Lakes, a residential development in Orlando, Florida. The Newport subdivision was adjacent to land known as "Pinecastle." Pinecastle was used as a bombing range during World War II and remained laden with, among other things, unexploded bombs. When plaintiffs bought houses from Ryland, they were unaware of Pinecastle. Later, after Pinecastle's existence became public, plaintiffs' houses lost considerable market value and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compensate for the loss. Counts 1, 3, and 4 sought compensation for the loss of value plaintiffs' houses sustained due to their close proximity to Pinecastle. Count 2 sought recovery of 1.5 percent of the purchase price of every home Ryland sold in the Newport subdivision. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 with prejudice and Count 3 without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 4, pursuant to Rule 56. View "Virgilio, et al. v. Terrabrook Vista Lakes L.P., et al." on Justia Law

IWC appealed the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of IDH. Hawaiian, a Florida condominium, contracted with IDH for roof repair. While IDH was conducting the repairs, a large stone veneer wall fell, causing damage to the condominium. Hawaiian's insurer, ICW, sued IDH for negligence. IDH alleged that the wall fell because it was structurally unsound. During trial, at the close of ICW's case, the district court granted IDH's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could find that IDH was negligent because ICW failed to present any evidence on the standard of care in the roofing industry. Without reaching the issue of whether roofers were "professionals" under Florida law, the court held that ICW was required to put forth some evidence of the standard of care in the roofing industry in order to meet its burden. Because ICW failed to do so, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Further, the specificity requirement in Rule 50(a)(2) did not bar the granting of judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ins. Co. of the West v. Island Dream Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs defaulted on a loan that they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. A law firm representing the lender sent plaintiffs a letter and documents demanding payment of the debt and threatening to foreclose on the property if they did not pay it. Plaintiffs then filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm alleging that the communication violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that the complaint contained enough factual content to allow inference that the law firm was a "debt collector" because it regularly attempted to collect debts. The complaint also alleged that the law firm was "engaged in the business of collecting debts owed to others incurred for personal, family[,] or household purposes" and that in the year before the complaint was filed, the firm had sent more than 500 people "dunning notice[s]" containing "the same or substantially similar language" to that found in the letter and documents attached to the complaint in this case. Further, the complaint alleged enough to constitute regular debt collection within the meaning of 1692a(6). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reese, et al. v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree, & Adams, LLP" on Justia Law

This case arose from charges against defendants, which related to the stealing of prescription medical devices from hospitals and selling them on the black market. In this interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged a district court's order denying their motion to vacate a pretrial protective order restraining their assets. Defendant argued that, in addition to traceability, they should have been allowed to challenge the factual foundation supporting the grand jury's probable cause determinations at a pretrial, post-restraint hearing. Because defendants were not entitled to try the entire case twice, once before trial and then again before a judge and jury, the court affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion to vacate the protective order. View "United States v. Kaley, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging that Chase failed to comply with its obligations under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) by declining to issue him a permanent loan modification. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that HAMP did not provide a private cause of action and that, even if his claims were independent of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. The court applied the factors under Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Inves. to Hamp and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 12 U.S.C. 5201-5261, holding that there was no implied right of action. Therefore, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims. To the extent plaintiff's claims fell outside of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. Rejecting plaintiff's remaining claim of promissory estoppel, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

In an insurance coverage dispute, the court was required to determine, under Florida law, what constituted "property damage" under a post-1986 standard form commercial general liability (CGL) policy with products-completed operations hazard (PCOH) coverage. Specifically, whether such a policy issued to a general contractor for damage to the part of the completed project performed by a subcontractor, but not to any other project component, caused by a subcontractor's defective work. In light of Florida precedent addressing the scope of similar CGL policies, the court concluded that the policy provided no coverage in this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the damage at issue was not covered under the policy. View "Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co., et al. v. Amelia Island Co." on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the decision of the Tax Court allowing taxpayers to apply the parsonage allowance income exclusion of Internal Revenue Code 107(2) to multiple houses. A divided Tax Court held that taxpayers were entitled to exclude from their income the parsonage allowance allocated to their second house under section 107(2). The court concluded that "a" maintained a singular connotation, especially when the context indicated a singular meaning as here, "a home." The Supreme Court stated that income exclusions should be "narrowly construed." In light of this directive, the court believed that it should construe any ambiguity in section 107(2) to favor a more expansive reading of the parsonage allowance income exclusion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings. View "Commissioner of IRS v. Driscoll, et al." on Justia Law