Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an insurance coverage dispute, the court was required to determine, under Florida law, what constituted "property damage" under a post-1986 standard form commercial general liability (CGL) policy with products-completed operations hazard (PCOH) coverage. Specifically, whether such a policy issued to a general contractor for damage to the part of the completed project performed by a subcontractor, but not to any other project component, caused by a subcontractor's defective work. In light of Florida precedent addressing the scope of similar CGL policies, the court concluded that the policy provided no coverage in this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the damage at issue was not covered under the policy. View "Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co., et al. v. Amelia Island Co." on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the decision of the Tax Court allowing taxpayers to apply the parsonage allowance income exclusion of Internal Revenue Code 107(2) to multiple houses. A divided Tax Court held that taxpayers were entitled to exclude from their income the parsonage allowance allocated to their second house under section 107(2). The court concluded that "a" maintained a singular connotation, especially when the context indicated a singular meaning as here, "a home." The Supreme Court stated that income exclusions should be "narrowly construed." In light of this directive, the court believed that it should construe any ambiguity in section 107(2) to favor a more expansive reading of the parsonage allowance income exclusion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings. View "Commissioner of IRS v. Driscoll, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a fundamental misunderstanding about the enforcement of an injunction. The district court approved a settlement between defendant and a national class represented by plaintiffs, as part of its judgment, enjoined permanently "anyone claiming... for the benefit of" members of the class for prosecuting released claims. Movants opted out of the settlement of that class action, but continued to prosecute a putative class action against defendant in a California court. Instead of moving the district court to enforce its extant injunction, defendant then moved the district court to enter another injunction to bar movants from prosecuting their putative class action in the California court, under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. The district court granted that motion and entered a second injunction, which movants now challenge on appeal. The court held that because the district court failed to comply with "equity's time-honored procedures" to enforce an injunction, the second injunction against movants was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a property dispute between the parties. White Springs appealed the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Glawson, challenging the grant of attorneys' fees, expert fees, and prejudgment interest and sought to vacate or modify the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10, 11. The court held that the arbitration panel had the power to decide Glawson's claims for attorneys' fees and that Glawson properly submitted the issue to the panel. The court was unable to grant White Springs' request that the court review the legality of the award of expert fees and prejudgment interest on the ad valorem taxes, as the FAA did not permit it to do so. Therefore, the court found no basis to overturn any portion of the panel's final arbitration award.

This case involved a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a real property insurance contract between plaintiff and defendant. The insurance policy provided coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to" a building plaintiff owned in the Buckhead area of Atlanta. At issue was whether the Georgia courts would hold that the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Mabry rule extended to standard insurance contracts for buildings. Because this was an important unsettled question of state law, and there was no controlling precedent from the Georgia state courts, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Plaintiff joined a suit alleging violations of state and federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, laws against defendants. EMI Resorts and DMK appealed the district court's entry of an agreed order appointing a receiver-like "monitor" to oversee defendants' financial and business assets. The court held that because defendants failed to demonstrate facts sufficient to nullify their consent to the district court's appointment of the "monitor" and to its waiver of jurisdictional objections, the court declined to vacate the district court's order.

This case stemmed from Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc.'s (Odyssey) discovery of a 19th Century Spanish vessel in international waters where Odyssey filed a verified admiralty complaint in rem against the shipwrecked vessel and sought a warrant of arrest. The Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Peru, and twenty-five individuals filed claims against the res and Spain subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the res was a Spanish warship and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Odyssey's claims because the vessel was immune from judicial arrest under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Spain's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly applied the Rule 12(b)(1) standard for factual challenges to jurisdiction to Spain's motion to dismiss; the district court did not abuse its discretion by evaluating Spain's Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on the extensive record before it; the evidence in the record fully supported the finding of the district court that the res was the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes (Mercedes), a Spanish vessel that sank in 1804, for the purposes of sovereign immunity and the district court correctly decided that FSIA immunity applied to the arrest of the Mercedes; the cargo aboard the Mercedes was treated as part of the shipwreck of the Mercedes for sovereign immunity purposes; and the district court did not err when it ordered the Odyssey to release the recovered res to the custody of Spain.

Plaintiffs brought an action against the City of Marietta, Georgia, challenging the validity of its zoning ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and against plaintiffs on all claims except for one plaintiff's claim (Covenant) that the city's ordinance, as amended in November 2004, facially violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, by treating religious assemblies less favorably than non-religious assemblies. The court held that claims seeking injunctive relief were moot in light of the passage of the 2008 Ordinance and dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that, to the extent that RLUIPA claims sought damages, they failed on the merits because all damages stemmed from Covenant's inability to build a church in the R-2 residential zone and Covenant was not entitled to build a church in that zone. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that the 2004 Ordinance facially violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA and did not err in awarding nominal damages for this claim. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Covenant's motion to leave to amend the complaint.

Several purchasers of condominium units sued developer Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP (Harborage), alleging that Harborage violated the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and several Florida statutes. Central to this appeal was whether Harborage violated section 1703(a)(1)(B) by failing to provide the purchasers with a property report prior to their signing the purchase agreements. The court held that Harborage failed to prove that it was entitled to an exemption from the ILFSDA and its admitted failure to provide the report violated the ILFSDA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claim under section 1703(a)(1)(B) and (C). The court also affirmed the district court's award of damages and attorney's fees under section 1709; affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Gentry-Hunt on the claim that Harborage violated Fla. Stat. 718.506 and vacated the judgment in favor of the Stones on the section 718.506 claim; and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim that Harborage violated the anti-fraud provision of the ILSFDA and the claim asserted under Fla. Stat. 501.204(1).

The city filed a complaint in admiralty against defendant, a vessel, claiming that defendant committed the maritime tort of trespass because it remained at the city marina after the city explicitly revoked its consent, and seeking to foreclose its maritime lien for necessaries (unpaid dockage provided to defendant by the city). Claimant, owner of the vessel, appealed from the district court's entry of an order of summary judgment and an order of final judgment for the city in an in rem proceeding against defendant. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that it had federal admiralty jurisdiction over defendant where defendant was a "vessel" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction; the district court's factual findings regarding the amount claimant owed under the city's maritime lien for necessaries were not clearly erroneous; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the city on claimant's affirmative defense of retaliation; the district court correctly concluded that the city was not estopped from bringing its action in admiralty against defendant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply collateral estoppel because the issues at stake were significantly different from those in dispute in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the district court's orders were affirmed.