Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of a trademark dispute between two advertising and marketing companies—both of which operate under the name Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group. Pinnacle Illinois filed suit, and then Pinnacle Florida filed a counterclaim seeking to cancel Pinnacle Illinois's trademark registrations under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1119.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred by disregarding the jury's findings that Pinnacle Illinois's marks were distinctive and protectable and misapplying the presumption of validity given to registered marks. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the district court's order cancelling Pinnacle Illinois's registrations. Although the court affirmed the district court's finding that Pinnacle Illinois's claims for monetary damages were barred by laches, the court remanded for the district court to consider whether to grant Pinnacle Illinois injunctive relief to protect the public's interest in avoiding confusion. View "Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group, Inc. v. Pinnacle Advertising and Marketing Group, LLC" on Justia Law

SCAD filed suit against Sportswear for trademark infringement, unfair competition, false designation of origin, and counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, and for unfair competition and trademark infringement under Georgia common law. The dispute involves Sportswear's use of SCAD's word marks "SCAD" and "SAVANNAH COLLEGE OF ART AND DESIGN" as well as the college's design mark that includes its mascot, Art the Bee.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on remand, holding that the district court properly entered summary judgment on two Lanham Act claims and the corresponding permanent injunction enjoining Sportswear from selling products bearing the SCAD marks at issue. The court concluded that its trademark precedents of Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), Univ. of Ga. Ath. Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985), and Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc. v. Sportswear, Inc., 872 F.3d 1256, 1264, 1265 (11th Cir. 2017), require affirmance of the district court's judgment. In this case, the district court correctly found a likelihood of confusion as to Sportswear's use of SCAD's word marks and Bee Design Mark. View "Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. v. Sportswear, Inc." on Justia Law

ETS filed a trademark infringement action against Scarpello over the "Engineered Tax Services" mark under the Lanham Act. The district court held that the mark lacked distinctiveness and granted summary judgment in favor of Scarpello.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that ETS's mark was not suggestive, but merely descriptive—and thus invalid. Furthermore, the district court failed to consider whether the mark might also have acquired any protectible secondary meaning or whether any actionable infringement occurred. The court held that a jury could reasonably find the mark inherently distinctive and remanded for further proceedings. View "Engineered Tax Services, Inc. v. Scarpello Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

Royal Palm Properties filed suit against Pink Palm Properties for infringing its registered service mark on the phrase "Royal Palm Properties." Pink Palm Properties counterclaimed, challenging the validity of the mark.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred by flipping the jury's verdict and by granting judgment as a matter of law on Pink Palm Properties' trademark-invalidation counterclaim. The court held that Pink Palm Properties failed to show that no reasonable jury could have found that it failed to prove grounds for cancelling Royal Palm Properties' mark. In this case, Pink Palm Properties' argument that the service mark lacked distinctiveness, and that the mark was confusingly similar to the "Royale Palms" marks, did not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law on its claim that the "Royal Palm Properties" mark was invalid. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Royal Palm Properties, LLC v. Pink Palm Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in holding Velex and its officers in contempt or in awarding PlayNation's attorneys' fees and costs. In this case, the court had previously upheld the entry of a permanent injunction preventing Velex from infringing on PlayNation's mark. PlayNation later discovered that Velex continued to sell and distribute goods using the infringing mark. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "PlayNation Play Systems, Inc. v. Velex Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, luxury eyewear manufacturers holding registered trademarks, filed a contributory trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act against defendants, owners of a discount mall whose subtenants were selling counterfeit eyewear.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiffs, holding that the district court correctly determined that the evidence was sufficient—even under the legal standard the defendants urge the court to adopt—to support the jury's verdict finding defendants liable for contributory trademark infringement; committed no reversible error in instructing the jury; correctly determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on each defendant's individual liability; and did not abuse its discretion in the challenged evidentiary rulings. View "Luxottica Group v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

PlayNation filed suit against Velez for trademark infringement over the use of the Gorilla Gym mark and the district court entered judgment for PlayNation. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in holding that Velez infringed on PlayNation's trademark, and in cancelling Velex's trademark registration on that basis. However, the district court abused its discretion in holding that PlayNation was entitled to an accounting of Velex's profits due to willful infringement based solely on Velex's continued lawful use of its mark after Velex was served with the complaint. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "PlayNation Play Systems, Inc. v. Velex Corp." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Hard Candy's request for a jury trial in an action under the Lanham Act. In this case, Hardy Candy sought every remedy permitted by the Act besides actual damages: an injunction to prevent future infringement, an accounting and the disgorgement of profits that the defendant made from the allegedly infringing goods, and declaratory relief, along with fees and costs.The court held that the remedy of an accounting and disgorgement of profits for trademark infringement is equitable in nature and has long been considered that way, and thus a plaintiff seeking the defendant's profits in lieu of actual damages is not entitled to a jury trial. The panel also held that the district court did not err in its merits determinations on infringement and fair use. View "Hard Candy, LLC v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on its finding that Kroma EU lacked standing to enforce the KROMA trademark. By Lee Tillett, Inc. was the owner and registrant of the mark and had the rights to use the KROMA mark in the United States. Some time after Tillett granted an exclusive license to Kroma EU, defendants (the Kardashian sisters) endorsed a cosmetic line called "Khroma Beauty," that was sold and manufactured by Boldface. The California district court subsequently granted Tillett's motion for a preliminary injunction against Boldface, finding that Tillett had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the trademark infringement claim.On appeal here, the court adopted the position taken by the district courts in this circuit and held that a licensee's right to sue to protect the mark largely depends on the rights granted to the licensee in the licensing agreement. The court held that the licensing agreement at issue did not give Kroma EU sufficient rights in the name to sue under the Lanham Act. In this case, the plain language of the licensing agreement demonstrated that the parties' intent was for Tillett to retain all ownership and enforcement rights; the agreement plainly authorized Tillett to file suit against infringers; and Kroma EU was limited in its available recourse. View "Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc." on Justia Law

Yellowfin filed suit against Barker Boatworks and Kevin Barker, alleging claims for trade dress infringement and false designation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, common law unfair competition, common law trade dress infringement, and violation of Florida's Uniform Trade Secret Act (FUTSA).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. The court, weighing the likelihood of confusion factors holistically, held that the district court did not err in holding that Yellowfin could not, as a matter of law, prove a likelihood of confusion between Barker Boatworks' trade dress and its own. Therefore, the court held that the district court properly rejected the rest of Yellowfin's claims related to trade dress and consumer confusion. The court rejected Yellowfin's claims under FUTSA and held that Yellowfin failed to show that Barker allegedly misappropriated Source Information and Customer Information trade secrets. View "Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC" on Justia Law