Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a native of Brazil, sought to adjust her immigration status to become a legal permanent resident. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court concluded that the remarriage bar in the second sentence of the "intermediate relatives" definition of 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) did not apply to plaintiff's renewed application to adjust her status under the recently enacted section 1154(l). Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Williams v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for assault of a federal officer that resulted in bodily injury. Because it was undisputed that defendant made physical contact with the officer, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an instruction relevant only to a scenario in which no physical contact had occurred; because this case did not involve threats or attempts, but did involve an intentional act and bodily injury, as the jury was so instructed, the district court's decision not to include the pattern instructions' definition of forcible assault was not plain error; the district court did not plainly err by not presenting the defense instruction to the jury; and the district court's instruction did not constructively amend the indictment. Further, the district court did not commit error or abuse its discretion in the challenged rulings at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a federal death-row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his petition to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to investigate mental health mitigation evidence and then present it during the sentencing phase of the trial; his attorneys failed to object to jury instructions on the issue of petitioner's future dangerousness and escape risk; and his attorneys failed to request a jury instruction that the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors could be conducted according to the reasonable doubt standard. The court applied Strickland v. Washington's deferential standard and rejected defendant's arguments. Even if counsels' performances were deficient, petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "LeCroy, Jr. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of 71 counts including murder of an Eleventh Circuit judge, petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the recusal of a district judge who was randomly assigned to hear his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directing the transfer of this matter to a district judge outside the bounds of the Eleventh Circuit. Petitioner then moved for the recusal of all judges on this court, requesting that the court likewise transfer his mandamus petition to a different circuit. At issue was whether, 24 years after the judge's murder, recusal was required for current Eleventh Circuit judges who had no personal connection or relationship with the judge and who were not members of the Circuit at the time. The court answered in the negative, concluding that under the unique facts of this case such a tenuous connection would not, standing alone, raise significant doubt in the mind of an informed, objective, and disinterested lay observer about the court's ability to fairly decide cases involving defendant. Further, the court could not conclude that the court became prospective members of the so-called "victim class" upon the court's confirmation to the Eleventh Circuit. The court finally concluded that defendant was not entitled to the recusal of the district court judge. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for recusal and the mandamus petition. View "In re: Walter Moody, Jr." on Justia Law

This appeal primarily concerns a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to various sections of the Alabama Constitution that are central to the State's system of ad valorem property taxation. Plaintiffs filed suit asserting that these provisions are rooted in the State's historic racially discriminatory policies and cripple the ability of certain rural, nearly all-black public school systems in Alabama to raise revenues. Because the requested remedy would not address the alleged injury, plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutional millage cap provisions despite the district court's finding that they were enacted with discriminatory intent; plaintiffs' challenges to these provision were therefore dismissed without prejudice; plaintiffs' challenge to the State's property classification system (as set forth in Amendments 325 and 373 to Section 217) were not similarly barred, yet these claims failed because the court could not say that the district court clearly erred in finding that this system was not the product of invidious discriminatory intent; sufficient evidence also rendered permissible the district court's finding that these Amendments were financially, and not discriminatorily, motivated; under clear-error review, the court was not free to second-guess the district court's choice between two permissible views of the evidence; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss in part. View "Lynch, et al. v. State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

The PAPER COMPANY's creditors successfully petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court then granted the PAPER COMPANY's motion to transform the Chapter 7 case into a Chapter 11 proceeding. While the Chapter 11 case was pending, the PBGC brought an action against the PAPER COMPANY. At issue on appeal was whether, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., the trustee of a corporation that is a contributing sponsor and is in bankruptcy can maintain an action for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and the estate's unsecured creditors against the corporation's former owner (as a former member of the controlled group) for liabilities arising from the termination of a pension plan. The court held that the answer is no. The court concluded that ERISA's funding requirements were put in place for the benefit of plan beneficiaries, not for the protection of a bankrupt plan sponsor's unsecured creditors. The trustee's complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it was brought for the benefit of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors. View "Durango-Georgia Paper Co., et al. v. H.G. Estate, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Chapter 2007-1 of the Laws of Florida made state-subsidized reinsurance available to Florida insurers at rates lower than those offered in the private market. Plaintiffs filed suit against Allstate alleging that it violated Chapter 2007-1 by failing to promptly reduce its premiums and retaining the costs savings resulting from the state's subsidy of its reinsurance. The district court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court relied on several alternative grounds to reach the conclusion that plaintiffs failed to state a claim. Plaintiffs failed to clearly raise any challenge to the alternative holdings. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs abandoned any argument they may have had that the district court erred in its alternative holdings that each of their four claims was inadequate as a matter of Florida law independent of any issue concerning the filed rate doctrine or whether there was a private right of action for insureds against insurers who violate Chapter 2007-1. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sapuppo, et al. v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of motions for a stay of execution and applied for a stay of execution with the court. Plaintiff challenged the method of execution in Florida as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that he had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; the Supreme Court of Florida had already decided his Eight Amendment claim; and res judicata barred his federal complaint. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to stay the execution and the amended motion to stay the execution. The court also denied plaintiff's application for a stay of execution. View "Muhammad v. Secretary, FL DOC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Harris and Stanley appealed their securities fraud convictions and sentences stemming from their role in a "pump and dump" scheme. The court concluded that Harris waived his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the district court did not err by refusing to allow counsel to represent an absconded Harris; the district court, which issued a curative instruction to mitigate any perceived prejudice, did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant severance and mistrial; because the district court at no point pressured Harris into foregoing his right to silence, it did not err by considering remorseless statements freely volunteered by Harris at the sentencing hearing; and the district court did not clearly err in finding that Stanley played more than a minor role in this massive fraud, and it did not abuse its considerable discretion because Stanley's sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed both defendants' convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition brought under the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, concluding that petitioner satisfied the five requirements necessary to proceed with a section 2241 petition under section 2255(e) as set forth in Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium. View "Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium" on Justia Law