Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, challenged the judgment of the lower courts that the tax sharing agreement between NetBank, the parent company, and its subsidiary, Bank, established a debtor-creditor relationship between the parties and awarding the tax refund to the bankruptcy estate of NetBank. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the FDIC, concluding that the parties to the tax sharing agreement in this case intended to create an agency relationship rather than a debtor-creditor relationship with respect to IRS refunds attributable to the Bank. View "FDIC v. Zucker" on Justia Law

Defendants Jeffrey W. Edwards and Frontier Holdings appealed the district court's order of restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Edwards' convictions stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to solicit funds from investors by promising astronomical returns and then using the funds for extravagant personal expenditures. The court concluded that the district court correctly ignored Edwards' finances when determining the amount of restitution; the district court did not clearly err by ordering restitution to Camencita Jocson for losses caused by a related scheme; the district court properly found that Edwards owed restitution to victims whose related counts were dismissed at trial; and there was insufficient evidence supporting the restitution order to Teana Reece's alleged victims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions; affirmed the restitution order generally; vacated the restitution order in respect to Reece's alleged victims; and remanded for a hearing to determine whether they were entitled to restitution. View "United States v. Edwards, et al." on Justia Law

R.J. Reynolds appealed money judgments in favor of the survivors of two smokers. At issue was whether a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in an earlier class action was entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. The court affirmed the judgments in favor of the survivors because R.J. Reynolds had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the Florida class action and the application of res judicata under Florida law did not cause an arbitrary deprivation of property. View "Walker, et al. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the City of Milton's decision to deny T-Mobile's applications for permits to build three cell phone towers. At issue was the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which stated that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless services shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." The court concluded that T-Mobile had access to documents - including transcripts of the planning commission's hearings, letters the city sent to T-Mobile, and detailed minutes of the city council hearings- before its deadline for filing the lawsuit and collectively, these documents they were enough to satisfy the writing requirement of section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia" on Justia Law

This case arose when three former employees of ASU alleged that they were subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliation during their employment. ASU appealed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying ASU's motion to sever where the district court had broad discretion to deny the severance in the interest of judicial economy; the court did not have jurisdiction to hear ASU's appeal of the district court's denial of its Rule 50(b) and 59(b) motion where ASU had not filed a notice of appeal with the district court clerk; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding front pay. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Weatherly, et al. v. Alabama State University" on Justia Law

Temple B'Nai Zion brought statutory and constitutional challenges to its designation as a historic landmark by a municipality. At issue was whether Temple's challenges were ripe for adjudication. The court concluded that the Temple's complaint alleged a dispute sufficiently concrete to render the instant controversy ripe and justiciable without further delay. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the district court. View "Temple B'Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, FL, et al." on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court held that appellants violated 11 U.S.C. 527 and 528(a)(1), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-3.3(a)(1), and 4-8.4(c), and possibly 18 U.S.C. 157(3) by helping appellee file an "ostensibly pro se [Voluntary Chapter 13] bankruptcy petition in bad faith to stall a foreclosure sale." The bankruptcy court held that appellants prepared the Chapter 13 petition as ghostwriters and consequently made false and fraudulent representations to the court. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in its determination that appellants committed fraud when they contracted with appellee to provide foreclosure defense services, took appellee's money, had appellee sign documents, and then filed an ostensibly "pro se," bad faith bankruptcy petition on appellee's behalf. At bottom, the court concluded that appellants did not "draft" a document within the scope of Rule 4-1.2(c) and did not commit fraud in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct or 18 U.S.C. 157(3). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Torrens, et al. v. Hood, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death, challenged the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. The court concluded that the failure of the district court to give notice to the parties that it would decide the merits of the claims without briefing did not rise to the level of a due process violation; in light of the nature of petitioner's crimes and the specific findings of the trial court and his own testimony about his deprived childhood, the court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the presentation of further, mainly cumulative, evidence regarding petitioner's horrific home life would have changed the outcome of his sentence; the district court did not err in dismissing petitioner's lethal injection challenge in his federal habeas petition where relief was still available to him in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action; and the court rejected defendant's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McNabb v. Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Wilson Lucom was an American expatriate who wished to bequeath assets worth more than $200 million to a foundation established for impoverished children in Panama. Plaintiff, Lucom's attorney, filed suit against the Arias Group/Arias Family, Lucom's wife and step-children, under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, alleging that the Arias Group participated in a criminal conspiracy to thwart plaintiff through acts of intimidation, extortion, corruption, theft, money laundering, and bribery of foreign officials, so that the Arias Group could steal the Estate assets for themselves. At issue on appeal was RICO's four-year statute of limitations on civil actions and the "separate accrual" rule. Under the rule, the commission of a separable, new predicate act within a 4-year limitations period permitted a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused by that act. The court concluded that none of the injuries in plaintiff's complaint were new and independent because all of his alleged injuries were continuations of injuries that have been accumulating since before September 2007. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had done little more than repackage his 2007 abuse of process complaint. Therefore, plaintiff's civil RICO complaint was untimely, and the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Arias Group. View "Lehman, et al. v. Lucom, et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned the constitutional validity of two statutes, O.C.G.A. 15-21A-6(c), the statute requiring a person to pay $50 for the appointment of counsel in a criminal case, and O.C.G.A. 42-8-100(g), the statute permitting a Georgia county to contract with private entities for the provision of probation services. The court concluded that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the two statutes where plaintiff failed to establish, inter alia, the likelihood that he would once again be brought before the state court to answer a criminal charge, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of being convicted in state court and being placed on probation. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's case as moot. View "McGee v. Solicitor General of Richmond County, et al." on Justia Law