Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine; possessing with intent to distribute cocaine; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that, under the independent source exception, the exclusionary rule did not bar admission of the evidence seized on the property, even if the placement of the GPS tracking device and the dog sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to give the Allen charge where the charge was not premature nor coercive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Bush, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant McQueen, a Sergeant at the South Florida Reception Center (SFRC), appealed his conviction for conspiring to deprive several inmates of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and for obstruction of justice. Defendant Dawkins, a corrections officer at the SFRC, appealed his conviction for obstruction of justice. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants; the district court did not err in denying defendants' request to give the jury two defense instructions regarding accomplices, informers, or immunized witnesses, and multiple conspiracies; and the government did not improperly bolster the credibility of a corrections officer where any claimed error did not affect defendants' substantial rights. The court concluded, however, that defendants' sentences were substantively unreasonable because they were wholly insufficient to achieve the purposes of sentencing set forth by Congress in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Accordingly, the court vacated each sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McQueen" on Justia Law

After the Estate of Juanita Amelia Jackson could not collect on a judgment because assets were allegedly fraudulently transferred to GE and Rubin Schron, it initiated a supplementary proceeding in a Florida state court under Florida Statutes section 56.29(6). Section 56.29(6) allowed a court to void any transfer of personal property that was made by a judgment debtor to "delay, hinder or defraud." GE removed to federal district court and the Estate moved to remand. The district court remanded, concluding that the Colorado River abstention doctrine applied. The court concluded that the supplementary proceeding here was an independent action because it sought to impose new liability on new parties on wholly new legal theories based on a completely different factual matrix. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion when it remanded the case to state court absent the rare and exception circumstances found in Colorado River, and therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jackson-Platts v. General Electric Capital Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her child, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Georgia Department of Human Services, Division of Family & Children Services (DFCS), Gwinnett County DFCS, and a social worker with Gwinnett County. The social worker brought this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to qualified immunity. At issue was plaintiff's substantive due process claim that the social worker violated her liberty interests in the care, custody, and management of her minor child with respect to the social worker's actions in preparing and implementing a safety plan that allegedly prohibited plaintiff from removing her child from the paternal grandmother's care. The court concluded that, in this circumstance, it could not hold that a reasonable social worker would have been on notice that her actions violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the social worker on plaintiff's substantive due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maddox v. Stephens, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, in his official capacity as the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD), bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Florida's statutory scheme for involuntarily admitting intellectually disabled persons to residential services, Florida Statutes 393.11. The court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida regarding the scope of the APD's obligations under the statute. View "J.R. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against several companies alleging that they engaged in deception, fraud, and conspiracy in violation of Florida law based on actions they took after she was in a car accident while on vacation. The district court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider the dismissal of her complaint and plaintiff appealed. The court remanded for the limited purpose of determining whether the parties were completely diverse but plaintiff never responded with evidence of her citizenship. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions that the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the court could not determine whether jurisdiction existed on the record before the court. View "Travaglio v. American Express Co., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2232(a) because he harvested undersized red grouper in federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. The court concluded that sufficient evidence was presented at trial for the jury to conclude that the fish thrown overboard were undersized; a fish is a "tangible object" within the meaning of section 1519; and defendant's right to present a defense was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling that disallowed defendant from calling an expert witness during his case-in-chief. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of drug-related offenses. Count 2 charged that defendant did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and did knowingly possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court concluded that the district court constructively amended Count 2 of defendant's superseding indictment and that the amendment satisfied the plain-error standard. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction as to that count and remanded. The court affirmed defendant's other convictions. View "United States v. Madden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each filed suit against Darby Bank and various real estate developers and contractors (collectively, the Drayprop Defendants) in state court alleging negligent misrepresentation, fraud, beach of contract, and breach of warranty. Subsequently, the FDIC was appointed receiver of Darby Bank. In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenged the denial of their motions for remand to state court after the FDIC removed to federal court, the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FDIC on federal claims, and the district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims against other defendants. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the FDIC on plaintiffs' claims against Darby Bank. The court concluded, however, that the district court improperly dismissed the remaining claims against the non-FDIC defendants because 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(A) operated to create original jurisdiction over those claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lindley v. FDIC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for distributing crack cocaine and was sentenced as a career offender. Defendant argued that his prior Florida conviction for third degree abuse of a minor did not require intent to cause physical injury or even a reasonable likelihood of physical injury and, therefore, that conviction did not satisfy the federal crime-of-violence definition. Defendant unsuccessfully raised this issue at both sentencing and on direct appeal but the court held that he could use a timely-filed first motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to pursue the same issue when an intervening case from the Supreme Court validated his argument and applied retroactively. The court concluded that, as a result of the intervening Supreme Court cases of Begay v. United States and Sykes v. United States, the record did not permit the conclusion that defendant's Florida conviction for third degree felony child abuse was a crime of violence. The court concluded that categorizing defendant as a career offender amounted to a violation of the laws of the United States in a way that was a fundamental defect that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice and presented exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus was apparent. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to resentence defendant. View "Spencer v. United States" on Justia Law