Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved Executive Order 11-58 (EO), which mandated two types of suspicionless drug testing: random testing of all employees at state agencies within the Governor of Florida's control, and pre-employment testing of all applicants to those agencies. In this case, the district court declared the EO unconstitutional as to all current state employees. This relief swept too broadly, enjoined both constitutional and unconstitutional applications of the EO, and did so without examining the specific job categories to be tested. What the Supreme Court's case law required, in contrast, was that the trial court balance the governmental interests in a suspicionless search against each particular job category's expectation of privacy. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Union and denying summary judgment to the State. On remand, the State must meet its burden of demonstrating important special needs on a job-category-by-category basis. View "American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Emp'ees Council 79 v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendants each pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to steal government funds and one count of theft of government funds. The convictions stemmed from their participation in a scheme that involved submitting fraudulent tax returns to the IRS using stolen Social Security numbers, receiving refund checks from the federal government, and depositing these proceeds in various bank accounts of corporate entities controlled by them. On appeal, defendants challenged their sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in imposing the six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) for a crime involving 250 or more victims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Philidor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., claim. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint was filed after the FTCA's two year statute of limitations had expired. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim was not constructively filed in time. Further, without intentional concealment of the appropriate agency or other circumstances that made obtaining the required information truly out of plaintiff's control, there could be no equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Motta v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for being a deported alien found in or having reentered the United States without permission. At issue on appeal was whether the sentencing judge erred when he applied the modified categorical approach and determined that defendant had committed a prior "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Defendant's prior convictions were for a State of Florida crime, "aggravated battery," consisting of battery upon a pregnant victim whom the perpetrator knew or should have known was pregnant. The court concluded that defendant committed a prior crime of violence when he admitted that the way he committed aggravated battery on a pregnant victim was by striking the victim. Therefore, the district court properly imposed a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Diaz-Calderone" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian national, petitioned for review of a final order of the BIA affirming the denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA concluded that petitioner provided material support to a designated terrorist organization, the AUC, in the form of six annual payments of $300 in war taxes. Alternatively, the BIA found that petitioner's claims for relief failed on the merits. The court concluded that the BIA's factual finding that petitioner paid $1,800 to a designated terrorist organization was supported by substantial evidence; the fact that the AUC was demobilized in 2006 did not render the material support bar inapplicable; it was not relevant whether petitioner knew, or should have known, that the AUC was deemed a terrorist organization; the BIA's legal determinations that the funds provided by petitioner constituted "material support" within the meaning of the statutory bar and that the statute did not contain a duress exception were permissible constructions of the INA to which the court must defer; and the BIA reasonably concluded that the statutory bar did not exempt material support provided to a terrorist organization under duress. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Alturo, et al v. US Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, seeking habeas relief, contended that he was mentally incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." The court concluded that there was no extreme malfunction in petitioner's case. The Florida Supreme Court properly applied Panetti's "rational understanding" standard, considered conflicting expert testimony about the nature and severity of petitioner's mental illness, and made a determination about his competency to be executed that was by no means beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement. Accordingly, AEDPA required that federal habeas relief be denied and the court affirmed that denial. View "Ferguson v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Allen Davis exercised an option to purchase additional shares in CNG, a closely-held corporation but did not report the option as income on his federal income tax return. On appeal, Davis and CNG taxpayers challenged their respective deficiency notices in the Tax Court. The Tax Court determined that Davis should have included the value of the shares he received from the option's exercise in his 2004 gross income and sustained the Commissioner's deficiency notice. The Tax Court upheld the CNG taxpayers' deductions. Because the court held that CNG granted Davis the option in connection with the performance of services and that he should have included the value of the shares he received as ordinary income under 26 U.S.C. 83(a), the court also upheld CNG taxpayers' deductions, which were proper under section 83(h). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court. View "Davis v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed a complaint regarding the government's management of the Central and Southern Florida Project for Flood Control in the Everglades. The gist of the four-count complaint the Tribe filed was that the project diverted excessive flood waters over tribal lands. The district court dismissed three of the complaint's counts for failure to state a claim for relief and the fourth on summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Count I because the complaint contained nothing to support Count I's allegation that the Corps had an obligation to protect and not interfere with the Tribe's rights; the district court properly dismissed Count II because it contained no allegation of the process the Tribe claimed was due, much less that it was inadequate; the district court properly dismissed Count III because it failed for the same reasons the court found Count I insufficient to state a claim; and the district court properly dismissed Count IV because its allegations were vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew serving time as a prisoner of the State of Florida, filed a complaint against defendants alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Plaintiff claimed that defendants violated his right to practice his religion because they would not give him a strictly kosher diet. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims were not moot because Florida has not unambiguously terminated its policy which deprived plaintiff of kosher meals; while safety and cost could be compelling governmental interests, defendants have not carried their burden to show that Florida's policy in fact furthered these two interests; and defendants have not carried their burden of showing that Florida's policy of not providing kosher meals to prison inmates was the least restrictive means to further the cost and security interests they asserted. Because defendants failed to satisfy their burden at summary judgment, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to them and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rich v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Coca-Cola, his employer, alleging that the psychiatric/psychological fitness-for-duty evaluation he was required to undergo violated 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Coca-Cola, concluding that the evaluation was both job-related and consistent with business necessity and, therefore, permissible under the ADA. View "Owusu-Ansah v. The Coca-Cola Co." on Justia Law