Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Secretary of State, arguing that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The 90 Day Provision requires states to "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters." Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections, the Secretary engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. Determining that the issue was not moot even if the 2012 elections have passed, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that the Secretary's actions fall under the category of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters." Further, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA supported the court's conclusion that the plain meaning of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" was intended by Congress to include programs like the Secretary's. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arcia, et al. v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CRI, claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.10. Congress made significant changes to the ADA by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The court concluded that, in light of these recent amendments to the ADA, plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence on his ADA and FCRA disability claims to make out a prima facie case; the district court erroneously applied the prima facie standard created for reduction-in-force cases to plaintiff's age discrimination claims; and, therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CRI, remanding for further proceedings. View "Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against State Farm under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, which provides a damages remedy for cellular-phone subscribers who received autodialed phone calls without having given prior express consent to receive such calls. State Farm, in turn, sued Clara Betancourt, plaintiff's housemate who had listed plaintiff's number as an emergency contact number, for the balance due on Betancourt's delinquient credit-card account and for its legal expenses in defending itself against plaintiff's TCPA lawsuit. Determining that it had jurisdiction, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm on plaintiff's TCPA claim and reversed the grant of summary judgment to State Farm on its negligent misrepresentation claim against Betancourt because there were various genuine disputes of material fact regarding both complaints. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B." on Justia Law

Santander appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order overruling Santander's objection to the confirmation of debtor's plan under Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court proposed that petitioner surrender his vehicle under 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(C) to satisfy Santander's claim. The bankruptcy court held that 11 U.S.C. 506(a)(1) and (a)(2) determined the vehicle's value and hence the amount of Santander's secured claim, which would be satisfied by debtor's surrender of the vehicle. The court held that section 506(a)(2)'s valuation standard applied when a Chapter 13 debtor surrendered his vehicle under section 1325(a)(5)(C). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment. View "Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment to petitioner on his pro se petition for review of a tax deficiency determination. At issue was whether the Tax Court erred as a matter of law in holding that petitioner and his wife were entitled to the first-time homebuyers tax credit even though, when considered as a single marital unit, they did not qualify for the credit under 26 U.S.C. 36(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 36(c) requires that for a married couple to qualify for the first-time homebuyer tax credit, both spouses collectively must meet the same statutory requirements, either as first-time homebuyers under section 36(c)(1) or as long-time residents under section 36(c)(6). The court held that the Tax Court's decision was directly contrary to the plain language of the statute and should be reversed. View "Packard v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Heatherwood and FCB appealed the district court's affirmance of a final amended judgment entered by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that there was an implied restrictive covenant limiting the use of real property at issue to a golf course. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, because FCB satisfied the person-aggrieved doctrine, FCB also met Article III standing requirements. On the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it held that FCB and Heatherwood had actual, constructive and inquiry notice of the implied restrictive covenant; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that most, if not all, of the homeowners within the Heatherwood subdivision bought their home with the expectation that the golf course property would remain a golf course; the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the doctrine of estoppel by deed precluded the enforcement of the covenant; with respect to FCB and Heatherwood's argument that the doctrine of integration in the Agreement between HGC and Heatherwood served to destroy an implied covenant, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding integration did not apply under the facts of the case; in considering the doctrine of changed circumstances, the bankruptcy court relied on various factual findings in determining that the homeowners' benefit from the continued existence of the covenant outweighed the detriment borne by FCB and Heatherwood; and the court rejected FCB and Heatherwood's argument that HGC had no standing to enforce the implied restrictive covenant because HGC owned no property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Heatherwood Holdings, LLC v. HGC, Inc." on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 45(a), and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (the Telemarketing Act), 15 U.S.C. 6102, by deceiving consumers in the sale of trade-association memberships. According to the FTC, consumers were led to believe that they were purchasing major medical insurance, but what they actually received were memberships in a trade association that offered only limited discounts for certain medical care. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against IAB, the individual Wood defendants, and IAB-affiliated entities. The court affirmed, concluding that the FTC met its burden of proof for injunctive relief by demonstrating that it was likely to succeed on the merits and that an injunction would serve the public interest; the district court did not abuse its discretion in freezing defendants' assets; and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012, does not preempt the FTC's claims. View "Federal Trade Commission v. IAB Marketing Assoc., LP, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FedEx on his disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq. When plaintiff failed his Department of Transportation (DOT) medical examination due to his diabetes, FedEx withdrew plaintiff's job offer since he did not qualify for a Technician position. FedEx claimed that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) required it to do so. Plaintiff argued that by imposing a requirement that he must obtain a DOT medical card even though he would be a mechanic and not a commercial truck driver, FedEx violated the ADA and the FCRA, which prohibited an employer from using qualification standards that screen out people with disabilities. The court concluded that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether test-driving FedEx trucks was an essential function of the Technician position. The court also concluded that, the occasional test-driving of empty FedEx trucks in the Fort Myers area did not constitute transporting property or passengers in interstate commerce. Therefore, the FMCRs did not oblige FedEx to require plaintiff to obtain DOT medical certification to be "qualified" for the Technician position. The FMCRs did not afford FedEx a defense to plaintiff's disability discrimination claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Samson v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, trustee for the estate of debtor, attempted to avoid eight transfers made by debtor to the IRS as payment for the income tax liability of debtor's principal. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the United States as to the first seven transfers. The bankruptcy court concluded that plaintiff succeeded in proving constructive fraud and ruled that the IRS was an initial transferee from whom plaintiff could seek recovery. The district court affirmed with regard to the first seven transfers but reversed as to the eighth. The district court concluded that the IRS could not be held liable as an initial transferee because it qualified for the mere conduit exception. The court affirmed, viewing the transaction as sufficiently similar to the deposit of funds into a bank account to conclude that the IRS acted as a mere conduit. View "Menotte v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MAM, a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff was a MAM secured creditor and he held two Convertible Promissory Notes. Plaintiff's complaint alleged claims related to the Security Agreement that each note was secured by. MAM failed to respond to plaintiff's complaint and two weeks after plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment, Michael Gleicher moved to intervene in the case. Gleicher sought leave to intervene in two capacities: (1) as a MAM general creditor holding two Convertible Promissory Notes; and (2) as a MAM shareholder. The court concluded that Gleicher cited no source giving a general creditor a right to defend his debtor from another general creditor for the sole purpose of defeating the latter's claim. Further, Gleicher cited no source giving a corporation's shareholder the right to intervene in a suit brought against the corporation by one of its creditors for the sole purpose of defeating the creditor's claim. Gleicher has not established, nor could he, that he suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of plaintiff's filing of this lawsuit. Therefore, Gleicher lacked standing to intervene and he lacked standing to appeal the district court's final judgment. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hawes v. Gleicher" on Justia Law