Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants fraudulently obtained over 300 mortgage-backed loans for buyers who used the loans to purchase houses and condominiums from defendants at more than market value. An indictment charged 18 defendants with a total of 187 counts, including three separate conspiracies and a host of substantive counts. The jury delivered split verdicts on defendants and guilty verdicts on other defendants. Numerous issues were raised on appeal related to defendants' motions for severance, jury selection issues, evidentiary issues, miscellaneous trial issues, the sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy claims, Kastigar v. United States claims, and sentencing issues. The court affirmed all the convictions and sentences of all of defendants in all respects except that the court vacated the district court's order denying Leslie Rector's motion to dismiss, which asserted as its ground that the government had breached the proffer agreement; as to that motion, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was indicted along with seventeen other people in a mortgage fraud case and was tried separately from his co-defendants because he insisted on proceeding pro se, at least up until the very day his trial began. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts and defendant now challenged his convictions. The court held that the district court acted well within its discretion when it refused to grant defendant yet another continuance on the day set for the trial to begin where defendant had insisted on proceeding pro se despite the district court's repeated warnings and thereby, contributed to his own situation. The court also held that defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial was not violated by the fact that he wore prison attire instead of furnishing his own street clothes as he had promised the court he would do. The court further held that the district court did not err in permitting a former real estate attorney to testify as a lay witness because the part of the witness' testimony that was elicited by the government was based on his own personal knowledge of mortgage fraud and therefore, he did not have to be qualified as an expert. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging claims under the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c),(d), and under various state laws based on allegations that defendants defrauded individuals throughout the United States by devising an investment scheme through which investors could purchase real estate interests in luxury vacation properties in the Dominican Republic. At issue was whether the district court properly severed the 232 plaintiffs, and their claims, and instructed each plaintiff to file his or her complaint in a separate action. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the severance order was not final and the collateral order doctrine did not apply to an interlocutory order severing claims.

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempting to obstruct an official proceeding by attempting to dispose of and hide assets involved in a forfeiture proceeding. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court held that, because the government offered no evidence that defendant knew that his actions were likely to affect a forfeiture proceeding, the court concluded that a jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent to obstruct. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion where the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction.

Defendants, Don Eugene Siegelman, the former Governor of Alabama and Richard Scrushy, the founder and former Chief Executive Officer of Health South Corporation ("HealthSouth"), were convicted of federal funds bribery and five counts of honest services mail fraud and conspiracy. Siegelman was also convicted of obstruction of justice. The Supreme Court of the United States remanded to the court for reconsideration in light of Skilling v. United States. Defendants raised numerous issues of error related to their convictions and sentences. The court affirmed Count 3 and 4 for Federal Funds Bribery and held that there was no reversible error in the bribery instructions given by the district court and that the evidence of a corrupt agreement between defendants was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find quid pro quo. The court affirmed Count 5, 6, and 7 for Honest Services Mail Fraud and Conspiracy and held that any error in the honest services instructions was harmless. The court reversed Count 8 and 9 for Self Dealing where there was lack of evidence from which the jury could infer that Siegelman knowingly agreed to or participated in a broader scheme that included Scrushy's alleged subsequent dealing and where, in light of Skilling, the evidence was insufficient to show self-dealing. The court affirmed Count 17 for Obstruction of Justice and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that a certain statement at issue met the United States v. Caraza standard. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was no reasonable possibility of prejudice to defendants that arose out of the exposure of the jury to certain extrinsic evidence and denied the motion for new trial. The court held that exposure of the jurors to media reports about the trial was harmless in view of the limited and incidental nature of the exposure and the substantial evidence of defendants' guilt. The court also agreed with the district court that defendants were not entitled to a new trial where there was no possibility that defendants suffered prejudice from any premature deliberations, discussion of penalty, or deliberation with fewer than all the members of the jury present. The court further held that Scrushy's recusal motion was untimely and without merit; that defendants' claims regarding the Middle District of Alabama's jury selection procedures were without merit and did not entitle them to any relief; and that Siegelman's upward departure in sentencing was not an abuse of discretion.