Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

New South Media Group, LLC, along with other plaintiffs, sought to construct four types of signs—flags, artwork, political messages, and event notices—on private property in Rainbow City, Alabama. The city denied their permit applications, determining that the proposed signs were billboards, which are prohibited under Section 214 of the city’s sign ordinance. The plaintiffs believed their signs qualified for exemptions under Section 213, but the city’s definition of “billboard” encompassed their proposed signs. After receiving the denial, New South requested variances, which were also denied by the city’s zoning board.Following these denials, New South appealed in state court and brought federal and state constitutional challenges, which were dismissed in state court and then refiled in federal court. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, New South alleged that several city sign regulations violated the First Amendment and the Alabama Constitution by imposing content-based restrictions, lacking time limits for permit decisions, and granting unbridled discretion to city officials. The district court granted summary judgment to Rainbow City, finding that New South lacked standing because the injury—the denial of the applications—was caused by the unchallenged billboard prohibition, not the provisions New South contested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that New South lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the non-billboard regulations because the injury was not traceable to those provisions and a favorable decision would not redress the harm caused by the billboard prohibition. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Rainbow City and dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "New South Media Group, LLC v. City of Rainbow City" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law

Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

In this long-running property use dispute, the plaintiffs, the Thai Meditation Association of Alabama and four of its organizers (collectively, TMAA), seek to convert a property zoned for residential use into a meditation center. In Thai Meditation Association of Alabama v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2020) (TMAA I), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the outcome of a bench trial that ended in judgment for the City of Mobile on all counts. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part but remanded three counts for further consideration. The vacated and remanded claims consisted of (1) a substantial burden challenge under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); (2) a Free Exercise challenge under the First Amendment; and (3) a state law challenge under the Alabama Constitution’s Religious Freedom Amendment (ARFA). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all three counts, and this appeal followed.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. The court concluded that summary judgment was improper, for either party, on the RLUIPA claim; summary judgment was proper on the Free Exercise claim; and the City has failed to carry its burden to satisfy strict scrutiny on the ARFA claim. The court explained that the City is imposing a burden on TMAA’s religious freedom, and because it has failed to carry its burden to demonstrate a compelling government interest, TMAA is entitled to judgment on the ARFA claim. View "Thai Meditation Association of Alabama, Inc., et al. v. City of Mobile, Alabama" on Justia Law

The owners of a hotel that the City of Boynton Beach declared a “chronic nuisance property” complain that they were deprived of property without due process and that the municipal chronic nuisance property code violates their First Amendment rights and those of their hotel guests. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City because the City afforded the hotel owners due process and enforcing the municipal code did not violate rights protected by the First Amendment.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the hotel owners lack prudential standing to bring a First Amendment claim based on the rights of hotel guests, failed to present any evidence that the City otherwise violated the First Amendment, and failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court explained that the hotel owners’ claim lacks the causal connection between their injury and the third parties’ injuries that must be present for jus tertii standing. Moreover, the court wrote that the hotel owners’ complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. The hotel owners alleged that they were deprived of procedural protections during the administrative proceeding, but they did not allege in their complaint that there was no state process to remedy these procedural defects. View "Mata Chorwadi, Inc., et al. v. City of Boynton Beach" on Justia Law

This case arises out of a sober home’s battle to rezone its property. When its efforts came up short, the sober home sued the county in federal court, alleging disability discrimination. As discovery got underway, the sober home served a notice of deposition in which it sought to depose one of the county commissioners who voted down its rezoning request. The county opposed the deposition, arguing that the commissioner was shielded from discovery by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. But the commissioner never objected to the deposition request or otherwise appeared before the district court. The district court found that the immunity didn’t apply. At that point, the county and the commissioner appealed. Their sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying the commissioner quasi-judicial immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court first held that the county may not appeal because it lacks appellate standing under Article III. To appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the district court’s order. But it’s the commissioner—not the county—who has the (alleged) immunity. So the county has suffered no injury and cannot challenge the district court’s denial of the immunity on appeal. Second, the commissioner may not appeal because he was not a named party to this case and did not become a party through intervention, substitution, or third-party practice. While a nonparty may sometimes appeal when he has participated before the district court, the commissioner didn’t participate at all. View "Kimberly Regenesis, LLC, et al v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC (“Sabal Trail”), is a natural-gas company that has a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). Sabal Trail sued Defendants to condemn easements on two tracts of their land so it could build a natural-gas pipeline through two adjacent properties. After Sabal Trail filed the condemnation actions, the district court granted it immediate possession of the land. Sabal Trail and Defendants could not agree on compensation for the taking. Besides the severance damages, the district court also ruled that Defendants would be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, though it hadn’t yet awarded them. On remand to the district court, the parties briefed the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. Sabal Trail opposed awarding them, arguing again that the U.S. Constitution’s “just compensation” standard should apply and that that standard did not include attorney’s fees and costs. The district court rejected Sabal Trail’s position, instead concluding that “state substantive law governs the measure of compensation in eminent domain cases brought by private parties against private property owners under the [NGA].   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that state law provides the measure of compensation in proceedings that arise under Section 717f(h) of the NGA. The parties agree that under Florida law, Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs as part of their compensation. Sabal Trail offered no other reason that the district court’s award here should not be upheld. View "Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Co, et al" on Justia Law

In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law

At issue in this case are the terms of a recorded easement that runs with two beachfront lots in Walton County, Florida. After the County enacted an ordinance purporting to establish the public's right to use the dry-sand area of all beaches for recreational purposes, two beachfront property owners filed suit alleging that the ordinance triggered the easement's abandonment clause.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County, holding that the ordinance triggered the abandonment clause and that no other source of law—Florida common law, separate provisions in the easement, a Walton County resolution, or a consent judgment—forestalls or limits the abandonment clause's operation. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "A Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton County Florida" on Justia Law

In 1994, SGV bought 547 acres in Alabaster for $1.65 million. The master development plan, approved in 1995, zoned the land as R-2 (90-foot wide single-family residences), R-4 (60-foot wide garden homes), and R-7 (townhomes). Most of the development was completed by 2008, except the 142-acre Sector 16, zoned predominantly for R-4 and R-7 with a small part as R-2. In 2011, the city rezoned Sector 16 for R-2 lots only. SGV filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), and 1988, alleging that the rezoning “constitute[d] an unlawful taking” without just compensation and denials of procedural and substantive due process. The court rejected the due process claims. The city objected to evidence of the city’s motive and the “lot method” valuation and argued that the case was not ripe for adjudication, since SGV had not sought variances. The court found that a zoning ordinance was a final matter that could be adjudicated. A jury found that there was a regulatory taking without just compensation; that before the taking, the value of the property was $3,532,849.19; and after the taking, the value of the property was $500,000. The court added prejudgment interest and entered a final judgment of $3,505,030.65. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the just compensation claim was not ripe, that the district court improperly allowed evidence regarding the city’s motivation for enacting th ordinance, and concerning the admission and exclusion of certain other evidence. View "South Grand View Development Co., Inc. v. City of Alabaster" on Justia Law