Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Stanfords, the debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, owned APC, another Chapter 11 debtor. Each had borrowed money from ServisFirst; each served as guarantor for the other’s debt. The Stanfords owed ServisFirst $5 million; APC owed $7.2 million. APC obtained a “roll-up loan” from ServisFirst to consolidate the debt and obtain working capital. The Stanfords had secured their loans from ServisFirst with real property. The bankruptcy court approved the sale of the property to ServisFirst “via a credit bid of $3.5 million,” 11 U.S.C. 363(k), stating that ServisFirst was “a good faith purchaser” and that the consideration “exceeds the liquidation value” of the property. The Stanfords then argued that APC’s roll-up loan converted ServisFirst’s pre-petition claims into post-petition administrative expense claims against APC alone and that because ServisFirst never required them to execute a guaranty of the roll-up loan, they had no remaining pre-petition obligations to ServisFirst, which no longer held a lien and could not make a credit bid.The bankruptcy court rejected their arguments, citing equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel, and law of the case but granted a stay conditioned on posting a $1.5 million supersedeas bond, which the Stanfords did not do. Ultimately, the Stanfords delivered an executed deed to ServisFirst, which was recorded. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Stanfords’ appeal as moot under 11 U.S.C. 363(m), citing its inability to undo a completed sale to a good faith purchaser under Section 363(m). View "Reynolds v. ServisFirst Bank" on Justia Law

VHV, a wholesale jewelry importer and the domestic counterpart of Khushi in India, filed a new-office petition and obtained L-1 nonimmigrant status for Vaidya, a citizen of India, to work as VHV’s CEO. VHV later sought to extend Vaidya’s L-1 classification for two years. After allowing VHV to submit additional information, USCIS concluded that the record was insufficient to prove that Vaidya was employed in an executive capacity in his foreign position and insufficient regarding his domestic position. USCIS found that Vaidya’s subordinates did not hold positions in a managerial capacity, Vaidya’s duties did “not make sense given the overall nature and organizational complexity of the foreign organization,” Vaidya apparently performed many non-qualifying duties, and the descriptions of his duties were overly generic.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. USCIS’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. For an employee to qualify for L-1 status as an executive, 8 U.S.C. 1361 requires that the employee bear a certain set of high-level responsibilities and that the employee primarily engages in those specified duties. New-office petitions additionally require evidence that the transferee was employed abroad “for one continuous year in the three-year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive or managerial capacity.” Neither Vaidya’s employment abroad nor his domestic position met these requirements. View "VHV Jewelers, LLC v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Georgia's November 6, 2018, general election was a bellwether of the national political mood. On November 5, Common Cause sued, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. 21082; the Georgia Constitution; and Georgia Code 21-2-211, claiming Georgia’s voter registration systems were vulnerable to security breaches, increasing the risk eligible voters would be wrongly removed from election rolls, or that information would be unlawfully manipulated to prevent eligible voters from casting a regular ballot.Common Cause sought an order preventing the final rejection of provisional ballots for voters who had registration problems until there was confidence in the voter registration database. The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 12 but determined the relief requested was “not practically feasible” and enjoined the Secretary from certifying the election results before 5:00 p.m. on November 16. The Secretary complied. In 2019, new Georgia voting laws changed procedures surrounding handling provisional ballots. The parties agreed that these provisions made further litigation unnecessary and stipulated to dismissal.Common Cause sought attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred through the issuance of the TRO and in preparing the fee motion. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the $166,210.09 award. Common Cause was a 42 U.S.C. 1988 prevailing party because, in obtaining the TRO, it succeeded on a significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefits the parties sought in bringing suit. The litigation was necessary to alter the legal relationship between the parties. View "Common Cause Georgia v. Secretary, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Under the 1982 Tax Treatment of Partnership Items Act, 26 U.S.C. 6221–6232, partnership-related tax matters are resolved in two stages. During the partnership-level proceedings, the IRS may adjust items relevant to the partnership as a whole and determine the “applicability of any penalty.” The partnership can challenge the adjustment. All partners are bound by any final decision in a partnership-level proceeding.On its 2001 partnership tax return, AHG reported a $25,618 total loss. Ginsburg’s individual 2001 tax return reported a $10,069,505 loss from AHG to offset his income. In 2008, the IRS sent Ginsburg notice that it was proposing adjustments to AHG’s returns, alleging that AHG “was formed . . . solely for purposes of tax avoidance.” For Ginsburg, the IRS “disallowed” the $10,069,505 loss and said it would impose a 40 percent penalty for “gross valuation misstatement.”Based on Ginsburg’s concessions that he was not entitled to deduct AHG’s losses because he was not at risk and the partnership’s transactions did not have a substantial economic effect., the tax court found that AHG must be “disregarded for federal income tax purposes,” and adjusted AHG’s 2001 tax return. The court denied Ginsburg’s petition concerning the penalty, rejecting his argument that the government did not get “written approval of the penalty by an immediate supervisor,” as required by 26 U.S.C. 6751(b)(1). The district court agreed that Ginsburg could not have reasonably relied on the advice of his tax, legal, and financial advisors and would not consider Ginsburg’s supervisory approval argument because he did not exhaust it in his IRS refund claim.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In partnership tax cases, the supervisory approval issue must be exhausted with the IRS before the partner files his refund lawsuit and must be raised during the partnership-level proceedings. View "Ginsburg v. United States" on Justia Law

New “Voice over Internet Protocol,” (VoIP) systems resulted in the 2008 New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act, 47 U.S.C. 222, 615a, 615a-1, 615b and 942.2 The “911 Fee Parity Provision” allows non-federal government entities to charge a fee to commercial phone services for the support of 911 services but specifies that, “[f]or each class of subscribers to IP-enabled voice services, the fee or charge may not exceed the amount of any such fee or charge applicable to the same class of subscribers to telecommunications services.”Alabama 911 Districts contended that the Provision authorized them to charge non-VoIP service providers per access line and VoIP service providers per 10-digit telephone number even if the total charges for a given class of VoIP subscribers exceed the total charges for the same class of non-VoIP subscribers for the same amount of burden each group imposes on the 911 system.The district court referred the matter to the FCC, which concluded that the Provision prohibits state and local governments from charging 911 fees to VoIP providers that are greater than those charged to non-VoIP providers for the same amount of burden imposed on the 911 system. The order precludes the 911 Districts from charging VoIP providers and non-VoIP providers the same base fee based on different units if the total fee charged for comparable 911 access is higher for VoIP service providers. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding Congress’s intent unambiguous. View "Autauga County Emergency Management Communication District v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Through a Form I-130, a U.S. citizen can seek to establish that an alien relative is eligible for an immigrant visa, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) & 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). Relatives residing outside the U.S. must apply for the visa at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate in their country of residence. Angela, a U.S. citizen married to Carlos, a Mexican citizen, filed a Form I-130. Carlos had resided in the U.S. without status for over a year; upon returning to Mexico to apply for a visa he would have been inadmissible for 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Carlos obtained a provisional unlawful presence waiver to return to Mexico. Following an interview, a consular official denied his visa application, alleging that Carlos had sought to obtain an immigration benefit by falsely misrepresenting a material fact, had falsely represented himself to be a U.S. citizen, and had unlawfully resided in the U.S. for over a year. The notice did not cite facts supporting those findings.Angela claimed mistaken identity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit for failure to state a claim. Consular officials are not required to identify facts underlying a visa denial when the statutory provision of inadmissibility sets out factual predicates. The doctrine of consular non-reviewability bars judicial review of a consular official’s decision regarding a visa application if the reason given is “facially legitimate and bona fide” but does not strip federal courts of their subject matter jurisdiction. View "Del Valle v. Secretary of State, United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Five co-defendants were charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy for their involvement in a telemarketing scheme to defraud stock investors. After an eight-week trial, during which the defendants made several motions for mistrial, the jury found each defendant guilty on all counts. At a post-trial hearing, the district court found that the prosecution had acted improperly in closing arguments but denied the defendants’ motions for mistrial. The court then granted judgments of acquittal based on insufficient evidence as to two defendants.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal granted to Wheeler and Long because there is a reasonable construction of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdicts. Sufficient evidence also supported the convictions of Sgarro, Smigrod, and Topping. The prosecution’s behavior did not rise to the level of misconduct. The theory-of-defense instruction explained that there is a “difference between deceiving and defrauding.” It is "cause for concern: that the prosecutor told the jury that this instruction was “not the law.” When considered in context, however, the prosecutor’s remarks were not -improper. The district judge repeatedly emphasized to the lawyers that the theory-of-defense instruction was not an instruction about the law and did not affect the legal elements for mail and wire fraud. Nor did any of the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions warrant reversal. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Foresters filed an interpleader action concerning the proper disbursement of about $3 million in life insurance proceeds arising from the death of the insured, Andrew. Cathleen, Andrew’s ex-wife, and David, Andrew’s son, advanced competing claims to the money. Cathleen filed a “counterclaim” against Foresters and David in the interpleader action, seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to the insurance proceeds under a Marital Settlement Agreement that required Andrew to purchase the life insurance at issue for alimony and child support purposes. The Florida state court that presided over the divorce ratified and adopted the Agreement when it dissolved Cathleen and Andrew’s marriage. David filed a state-court action asserting common-law and Florida state-law claims that Cathleen violated the Agreement. The district court stayed the federal action until resolution of the state-court action to interpret the Agreement and dismissed Cathleen’s declaratory-judgment claim against Foresters.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. After Foresters was dismissed from the federal litigation, both the federal and state proceedings involve the same two parties; the issues in both proceedings are substantially similar and will be effectively resolved in the state litigation. View "Independent Order of Foresters v. Gold-Fogel" on Justia Law

In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law

In 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored voting rights to ex-felons who had completed all of the terms of their sentences. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the "legal financial obligation" (LFO) requirement in Senate Bill 7066, which implemented the Amendment and required payment of all fines, fees, and restitution imposed as part of the sentence. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow the named plaintiffs to register and vote if they are able to show that they are genuinely unable to pay their LFOs and would otherwise be eligible to vote under Amendment 4.In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction with respect to the “wealth discrimination” claims. In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of an Equal Protection claim based on gender discrimination, on behalf of “low-income women of color who face unemployment, low wages, and difficulty paying off their financial debts at much higher rates than their male and white female counterparts.” The plaintiffs could prevail on their constitutional challenges only if they could “show that gender was a motivating factor in the adoption of the pay-to-vote system,” and they presented no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "McCoy v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law