Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for federal child sex crimes. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his long-term sexual abuse of two young girls. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant; the FBI's negligence does not justify excluding the New York or Kentucky evidence; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. View "United States v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Vital produces and sells energy-drink products. In 2019, Vital hired Alfieri, Perry, LaRocca, and Maros. All four signed employment agreements containing restrictive covenants, including an agreement not to work for a competing company and not to solicit Vital employees while employed by and for one year after leaving Vital and “never to disclose” or utilize any of Vital’s confidential information. All four left Vital in 2020. Vital sued, alleging that they violated their non-compete covenants by working for Elegance, which sells a cannabidiol-infused caffeinated drink, within a year after leaving Vital; that Alfieri violated the employee non-solicitation covenant by encouraging the others to join Elegance; and that Elegance and Alfieri engaged in tortious interference with Vital’s contractual relationships with the other former employees.The district court determined that the restrictive covenants were enforceable under Florida law, rejecting an argument that Vital was required to “identify specific customers” to establish a legitimate business interest in its customer relationships. The court entered a preliminary injunction. The two time-limited provisions in the preliminary injunction had expired; the prohibition against using Vital’s confidential information had no time limit. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed as moot the portions of the appeal that concerned the expired provisions. The court vacated with respect to the unexpired provisions because Vital failed to prove its entitlement to preliminary relief. View "Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Alfieri" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Butts County Sheriff’s Office deputies placed signs in the front yards of the residences of all 57 registered sex offenders within the County, warning “STOP” and “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.” The Sheriff also posted an explanation of the signs on Facebook, in order to associate the signs with the registrants who lived on the properties. Before Halloween 2019, three registered sex offenders living in Butts County sued, seeking to enjoin the Sheriff from placing the signs again. Contrary to the Sheriff’s initial assertions, Georgia law does not forbid registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The Sheriff’s warning signs are compelled government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner’s First Amendment rights. The forced display of a government message on private property violates the “right to refrain from speaking at all,” and the signs are not a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling government interest. The Sheriff’s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse is compelling but the Sheriff has not provided any evidence that the registrants actually pose a danger to trick-or-treating children or that these signs would serve to prevent such danger. View "McClendon v. Long" on Justia Law

Fees are collected under 28 U.S.C. 1930 in each quarter of a chapter 11 bankruptcy based on the amount of disbursements made. The U.S. Trustee collects the fees in most districts in the country, while an arm of the Judicial Conference does so in six. In 2017, 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6) increased the quarterly fee chargeable for the largest chapter 11 bankruptcies, those distributing $1 million or more in a given quarter.The bankruptcy court concluded that the increase applied to disbursements in a case pending at the time the law was enacted. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the 2017 legislation applied to pending bankruptcy cases without a due process violation and without offending the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause. Congress expressly prescribed the temporal reach of the 2017 Amendment and included disbursements in pending cases. The quarterly fees are assessed against the users of the chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee systems to reimburse the government for its costs; the fees are not subject to the constitutional uniformity requirement applicable to taxes. The 2017 Amendment is uniform in the sense contemplated by the Bankruptcy Clause. View "United States Trustee Region 21 v. Bast Amron LLP" on Justia Law

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices and was sentenced to the statutory maximum for his offense—120 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment in 2016. His supervised release has been revoked three times. Upon the third revocation, Moore was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and an additional 18 months’ supervised release. During the revocation proceedings, he was also sentenced to a consecutive term of six months’ imprisonment for criminal contempt. Moore argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the statute under which he was sentenced upon revocation, was unconstitutional because it allowed the district court to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found facts” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Although the district court plainly erred in imposing an additional term of supervised release because it failed to account for the terms of imprisonment that were imposed upon the prior revocations of his supervised release, section 3583(e) is not unconstitutional as applied to Moore; the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district court did not plainly err in convicting Moore of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Norton operated a pressure washer on a Tampa Convention Center dock that had no guardrails or barricades and was surrounded on three sides by water. Norton fell into the bay while working and drowned. He was wearing rubber boots and was not wearing a personal flotation device. During an investigation, an OSHA officer did not identify any incidents of employees falling off the dock before Norton’s accident, but did learn that two employees who had pressure washed the same dock voluntarily wore personal flotation devices. OSHA issued a citation to C&W for its failure to provide and require the use of a personal flotation device and proposed a $12,675 penalty.Eleventh Circuit precedents required proof either that the use of personal flotation devices was an industry custom or that C&W had “clear actual knowledge that personal protective equipment was necessary under the circumstances.” OSHA did not present any evidence of industry custom. An ALJ concluded that C&W had “clear actual knowledge" that personal protective equipment was necessary, given “an open and obvious hazard.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated the citation. The Commission misapplied the standard for actual knowledge in the absence of industry custom. A finding that C&W had actual knowledge of the requirement to provide and require the use of personal flotation devices for employees when they pressure washed the dock was not supported by substantial evidence. View "C&W Facility Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in part in favor of defendants and holding that James River has a duty to defend the insureds: Ultratec, MST, and Ultratec's employee. The underlying action stemmed from a pyrotechnic explosion at a work place that killed two employees and injured others. The employees filed suit against Ultratec, Ultratec's employee, and MST. James River is Ultratec entities' insurer.The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the appeal despite its lack of finality because of its injunctive qualities. The court applied Alabama's contract interpretation principles and case law before applying that law to the insurance policy at issue, holding that James River has a duty to defend defendants because the employer's liability exclusion in the policy is ambiguous. The court explained that, because the exclusion did not unambiguously exclude coverage, James River had a duty to defend the insureds. View "James River Insurance Co. v. Ultratec Special Effects Inc." on Justia Law

Smith, a software engineer, obtained the coordinates of artificial fishing reefs in the Gulf of Mexico from a website owned by StrikeLines, a Florida business. Smith remained in Mobile, Alabama while posting information about the reef coordinates on Facebook. Smith initially agreed to remove the posts and to assist Strikelines with its security issues in exchange for additional coordinates but communications broke down. StrikeLines contacted law enforcement. Officers executed a search warrant and found StrikeLines’s coordinates and other customer and sales data on Smith’s devices. Smith was charged in the Northern District of Florida with violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)(iii), theft of trade secrets, and transmitting a threat through interstate commerce with intent to extort. Smith argued that venue was improper because all the prohibited conduct occurred in the Alabama and the data that was accessed and obtained was in the Middle District of Florida.Smith was convicted on the trade secrets and extortion counts in the Northern District of Florida. The Eleventh Circuit vacated Smith’s trade secrets conviction and related sentencing enhancements for lack of venue, affirmed the extortion conviction and related sentencing enhancements, and remanded. Smith never committed any essential conduct for the trade secrets conviction in the Northern District of Florida. Sufficient evidence supported the extortion conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Mutual sold fractional investment interests in viatical settlements in which a terminally ill insured sold his life insurance policy to a third party for a lump-sum cash payment--a percentage of the policy’s face value. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Mutual for falsely representing that its life expectancy figures, “of paramount importance” for valuing the settlements, had been produced by independent physicians. The Mutual policies were put into receivership; investors were given the option of retaining their investments or directing the receiver to sell. Some of the "Keep" investors did not pay their share of premiums, leaving the policies at risk of lapse and the non-defaulting investors at risk of losing their investments. Acheron purchased fractional interests of defaulting investors from the receiver.In 2009, the district court approved the transfer and management of the Keep Policies—including some policies in which Acheron held fractional interests—from the receiver to a trustee. The trustee obtained court approval to sell the policies in the trust, including those in which Acheron held an interest. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Acheron’s appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The order is not a final decision, 28 U.S.C. 1291, and did not involve the refusal to wind up a receivership, section 1292(a)(2). View "Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal" on Justia Law

Mutua, a citizen of Kenya, was admitted into the U.S. as a non-immigrant temporary visitor for business. He did not depart as his visa required but married a U.S. citizen. Several years later, Mutua applied for adjustment of status. DHS denied Mutua’s application because he had criminal charges pending, arising from an alleged sexual assault of a child (his niece). Matua's trial resulted in a hung jury. The state dismissed the charge because the victim did not want another trial. Mutua was charged as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). The IJ recognized that Mutua was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status but denied his application because Mutua did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The BIA affirmed, rejecting an argument that the IJ required Mutua to prove his lack of criminal activity by a “clear and convincing” standard. The BIA declined to take administrative notice of Mutua’s criminal trial transcript.The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the IJ held Mutua to an improperly high burden of proof when considering whether he was entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion, that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review to the IJ’s determination and misinterpreted its own regulations on administrative notice, and that the BIA should have referred his appeal to a three-member panel because his case involved complex, novel, or unusual issues of law. View "Mutua v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law