Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tinker, a federal prisoner serving a 180-month sentence for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, argued that his medical conditions—obesity, hypertension, a congenitally narrowed spinal canal, and mental illness—increased his risk of developing a severe illness should he contract Covid-19 and that such increased risk qualified him for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Assuming that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for early release, as required by section 3582, the district court, after considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and the requirements of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, denied Tinker’s motion.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not procedurally err when it assumed, without explicitly finding, that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” before denying his motion based on section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors and section 1B1.13’s policy statement. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the section 3553(a) factors; the court emphasized Tinker’s extensive criminal history and the need to protect the public, which was within its discretion to do. The court acknowledged the parties’ filings, which discussed at length the factors that Tinker contends were ignored. View "United States v. Tinker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for rehearing, vacated its previous opinion and judgment, substituted this opinion in its place, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court two related questions about the nature of the Florida assault statutes: 1. Does the first element of assault as defined in Fla. Stat. 784.011(1) -- "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another" -- require specific intent? 2. If not, what is the mens rea required to prove that element of the statute? View "Somers v. United States" on Justia Law

The estates of some of the murder victims from the Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016, along with some of the injured, filed suit in federal court in Michigan against social media companies. The lawsuit was unsuccessful. A second action, this case, was filed in federal court in Florida against the same social media companies by different victims of the Pulse shooting. Here, plaintiffs alleged in part that the companies aided and abetted Omar Mateen, the shooter, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) by facilitating his access to radical jihadist and ISIS-sponsored content in the months and years leading up to the shooting. Plaintiffs also alleged claims against the companies under Florida law for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ATA and state law claims with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim that the Pulse massacre was an act of "international terrorism" as that term is defined in the ATA. Consequently, the companies—no matter what the court may think of their alleged conduct—cannot be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATA. In regard to the state law claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to adequately brief proximate cause under Florida law, and have therefore abandoned their challenge to the district court's ruling. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting under the ATA and for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death under Florida law. View "Colon v. Twitter, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the United States after Steve Smith and his daughter, Sydney, were killed when their car struck two mailboxes. Plaintiffs claim that the Postal Service is liable because it failed to warn the mailboxes' owners that the mailboxes did not comply with various safety regulations.The court concluded that, even assuming plaintiffs are correct—about both the regulatory infractions and the Postal Service's duty to provide warnings about those infractions—the United States cannot be held liable. The court explained that the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the acts or omissions of a federal employee only when a private person would be liable under state tort law for those same acts or omissions. In this case, plaintiffs pointed to no state law duty where the duty plaintiffs allege, negligence per se based on the Postal Service's requirement to notify homeowners if their mailboxes did not conform to various safety standards, would spring only from federal guidance—the Postal Operations Manual. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

A California court awarded Elie a $14,814,107.48 judgment against his former partner, Cutuli. Separately, Cutuli pleaded guilty to conspiracy to fraudulently transfer or conceal property in contemplation of bankruptcy. Cutuli filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Florida. His agreement with counsel did not include “defense of adversary proceedings.” Elie filed an adversary proceeding, seeking a declaration that the California Judgment debt was non-dischargeable. Cutuli was personally served with the summons and complaint in prison within FRCP 4(m)’s 90-day limit and the 28-day local limit.Cutuli failed to respond. Elie moved for default. Cutuli’s attorney appeared and objected. Elie then served the summons and complaint on Cutuli’s attorney on December 14. The summons Elie mailed had been issued in September; Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(e) requires service within seven days after the summons issues. The bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss, citing the fee disclosure indication that counsel would not represent Cutuli in adversary proceedings and noting that Cutuli’s counsel had received a copy of the complaint. Cutuli declined to answer the complaint and stated he did not intend to object to the entry of default. The bankruptcy court granted Elie default judgment.The district court reversed. On remand, the bankruptcy court granted Elie’s motion to extend the time for service of process, finding that good cause existed and citing its discretion under Rule 4(m). Elie obtained a fresh summons and properly served Cutuli and his attorney. Again, Cutuli did not answer or defend. The district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed the extension. Cutuli’s failure to defend the action suggests that the initial failure to serve a fresh summons upon Cutuli’s attorney did not cause Cutuli any prejudice. View "Cutuli v. Elie" on Justia Law

Smith, a Muslim serving a life sentence, sued the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, claiming that GDOC’s grooming policy, which prohibits inmates from growing facial hair over a half-inch in length, placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The district court rejected Smith’s RLUIPA claim, finding that “GDOC ha[d] offered logical and persuasive reasons to show that allowing untrimmed beards would be unmanageable for GDOC” and that “it is plausible that allowing a close security inmate like Smith an untrimmed beard could be dangerous for prison security.” Rather than rule in favor of GDOC, the district court fashioned a remedy that neither party had requested: it held that RLUIPA entitled Smith to grow a three-inch beard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s determination that it was reasonable for GDOC to conclude that allowing Smith to grow an untrimmed beard would be both unmanageable and dangerous was not clearly erroneous but its ruling requiring GDOC to allow Smith to grow a three-inch beard was improper and contrary to the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, Holt v. Hobbs, that courts should consider only the plaintiff’s proposed alternatives in deciding whether there is an available less restrictive means for the government to further its compelling interests under RLUIPA. View "Smith v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeals the district court's order affirming the ALJ's denial of his application for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1383(c). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by ruling that he could perform a job with level 3 reasoning after finding that his residual functional capacity limited him to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, and by basing the number of available jobs on unreliable vocational expert testimony.The Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and held that there is an apparent conflict between a limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and the demands of level 3 reasoning. Because the ALJ did not address that apparent conflict—as required by precedent—and because the court cannot say that the error was harmless, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Viverette v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Beach Blitz sued the City and individuals, asserting that the City’s enactment and enforcement of ordinances regulating the sale of liquor and requiring businesses selling liquor to obtain licenses violated its substantive and procedural due process rights and that the City’s closure of its store one day after it met with a City attorney constituted retaliation for Beach Blitz’s protected First Amendment conduct. The district court dismissed the due process claims on the merits, without prejudice, and without leave to amend, and the First Amendment retaliatory claim on the merits, without prejudice but with leave to amend. Beach Blitz did not amend its that claim by the stated deadline. The district court found the City to be the prevailing party on all five claims, determined that each of them was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” and awarded attorney fees for each.The Eleventh Circuit upheld the prevailing party determination because the City rebuffed Beach Blitz’s efforts to effect a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties and affirmed frivolity determination concerning the procedural and substantive due process claims. The court vacated in part. There was sufficient support in precedent for Beach Blitz’s position that its retaliation claim was not so groundless on causation as to be frivolous. View "Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law

DeJesus claims that in 2016, he was sexually assaulted by a prison official, Lewis. DeJesus had an attorney to represent him in court, but shortly before trial, the district court allowed counsel to withdraw. DeJesus was ill-prepared for trial because he had not been provided discovery materials. He was not given transcripts of the depositions taken in discovery until the morning of his trial and tried to read through them—for the first time—during the morning break. Ultimately DeJesus presented only his own testimony. The jury ruled in favor of the defendants.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. When a prisoner proves that a prison official, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological justification, engages in a sexual act with the prisoner, and that act was for the official’s own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner, the prison official’s conduct amounts to a sexual assault in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Here, the jurors should have been instructed that the only fact they had to find was whether the sexual assault occurred. On the record, however, DeJesus has not established that any errors made during the trial were likely to have resulted in an incorrect verdict. View "DeJesus v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the sheriff's department and deputies involved in plaintiff's second arrest based on mistaken identity. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him, overdetaining him, and failing to institute policies and train deputies to prevent these things from happening.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on the false arrest and Monell claims. The court concluded that the mistaken arrest of plaintiff on the wanted warrant of someone by the same name was reasonable within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, and the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim. However, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the overdetention claim because plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts establishing that defendants failed to take any action for three days and nights after they learned of information that raised significant doubts about defendant's identity. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Sosa v. Martin County" on Justia Law