Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Kristina drugged her sons and put them, and herself, in a running car in a closed garage. Matthew died; Adam and Kristina survived. Kristina was convicted of second-degree murder and remained in prison until 2016. In 1999, Kristina had State Farm automobile and homeowners insurance policies. In 2001, Matthew’s estate, Adam, and their father (the Rotells) sued Kristina for wrongful death and bodily injury.Kristina tendered her defense to State Farm, which filed state court declaratory judgment actions, seeking determinations that her policies did not cover the incident. The Rotells allege that State Farm rejected a settlement offer even though Kristina wished to accept it. The state court then held that the policies did not cover the incident. State Farm withdrew from the wrongful-death lawsuit. The state court entered a default judgment against Kristina; a jury entered a $505 million verdict. Kristina was insolvent, so the Rotells petitioned for involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court entered an order subjecting Kristina’s assets (claims against State Farm for bad faith and malpractice) to its control and appointed Carapella as trustee. The verdict is Kristina’s only liability. Carapella sued State Farm in Florida state court. State Farm then sought to intervene, post-judgment, in the wrongful-death action and moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that the Rotells’ fifth amended complaint was untimely and that the default judgment was void.The district court and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The Bankruptcy Code’s “automatic stay” provision, 11 U.S.C. 362(a), precluded State Farm’s motion to intervene. View "State Farm Florida Insurance Co. v. Carapella" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in a Georgia state court, he brought suit against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. In regard to plaintiff's excessive force claim against the civilian bystander that assisted the police in subduing plaintiff, the court held that a civilian's rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a law enforcement officer is not state action, absent proof of a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of another. In regard to Deputy Thacker, the court applied the Graham factors and concluded that the deputy did not use excessive force where plaintiff suffered only de minimus injuries that were entirely consistent with a routine takedown. In regard to Deputy Brantley, the court again applied the Graham factors and concluded that the taser was not clearly excessive under the circumstances where two crimes were at issue by the time the taser was deployed: plaintiff had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and he had already begun his active and loud obstruction of the arrest. In regard to Sheriff Johnson, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. View "Charles v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Anderson, the lead plaintiff in a putative class action against her life insurance provider, Wilco, alleged that in 2011-2016, the company breached the terms of her universal life insurance policy by increasing her monthly rate for impermissible reasons. Her policy provides for a “guaranteed maximum monthly cost of insurance rate” and a “current monthly cost of insurance rate.” The guaranteed rate is calculated “based on” Anderson’s “age, sex, and premium class.” The current rate, by contrast, “will be determined by the Company” but cannot exceed the guaranteed rate. As a typical universal life insurance policy, Anderson’s policy was a hybrid investment vehicle and life insurance policy. As her policy aged, Wilco began to increase Anderson’s current rate sharply; her policy’s accumulation value (essentially the investment earnings from which Anderson could cover her monthly payments) was wiped out, and Anderson failed to make the monthly payments out-of-pocket. Her policy lapsed, and Anderson sued.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. The policy gave Wilco discretion to set Anderson’s current rate as long as that rate was less than the guaranteed rate and unambiguously gave Wilco discretion to set Anderson’s current monthly rate. View "Anderson v. Wilco Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Jackson was traveling in his wheelchair along a street near the Louisville Embassy Suites Hotel when he was hit by a hotel valet driver. He suffered severe injuries. Jackson sued, in Kentucky state court, several entities connected to the hotel, including Le Centre, the owner of the hotel property. Le Centre had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection before the suit was filed; its reorganization disclosure statement explained that Le Centre’s Chapter 11 plan included the release not only of Le Centre but also of related non-debtor parties. Jackson's attorney received an amended version of the disclosure statement and a copy of the plan. Le Centre did not serve Jackson with a specific form of notice required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, however.After the approved Chapter 11 plan went into effect, Le Centre and two other released entities moved to dismiss in the state court action as barred by the confirmation order. Jackson sought to proceed nominally against these entities to reach their insurers. The bankruptcy court denied this request. The district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Jackson received sufficient notice to satisfy due process and the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Jackson could not pursue the nominal claims. View "Jackson v. Le Centre on Fourth, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, following a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis (MS), Karantsalis sued the city under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by failing to make its facilities and infrastructure accessible to individuals with disabilities. He later voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit, believing that he lacked constitutional standing because his symptoms were mild and did not prevent him from accessing and using the city’s programs or services. By 2019, Karantsalis’s MS and his symptoms had progressed dramatically: he had started falling, developed a limp, and needed a disabled parking permit. His neurologist had prescribed a wheelchair.He again sued the city under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act alleging the sidewalks, municipal gymnasium, and parking at public facilities were inaccessible. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that it was barred by the four-year statute of limitations, which was triggered before or during 2008 when Karantsalis became aware of his MS diagnosis. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. From the face of his complaint, Karantsalis’s injury did not occur until at least 2017. Karantsalis could not have sued before he lost his mobility and his ready access to and use of the city’s public services. View "Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that relocation benefits provided by a railroad to its employees are exempt under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act as bona fide and necessary expenses incurred by the employee in the business of the employer, 26 U.S.C. 3231(e)(1)(iii). The court also held that, because no regulatory substantiation requirements apply, CSX is entitled to a refund. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States in regard to whether relocation benefits are exempt under section 3231(e)(1)(iii); reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in regard to CSX's need and failure to satisfy the Accountable Plan Regulation; and remanded for the district court to calculate the amount of CSX's refund and administer the notification process. View "CSX Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Winn-Dixie sells Bacardi’s Bombay Gin in its stores. According to Bombay’s marketing and labeling, the gin contains ten “hand-selected botanicals from exotic locations around the world,” including “grains of paradise.” Marrache filed a class action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and for unjust enrichment, alleging that the inclusion of grains of paradise violated Florida Statute 562.455.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. FDUTPA’s safe harbor provision exempts acts or practices required or specifically permitted by federal law. Under the Food Additives Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA had expressly identified grains of paradise as a substance “generally recognized as safe.” In addition, the complaint did not sufficiently allege any actual damages resulting from the purported unfair or deceptive act. Marrache’s amended complaint made no allegations of actual damages, but rather, alleged that he and the other class members were injured by purchasing an illegal product that he claimed was worthless. Marrache did not, however, allege that he could not or did not drink the gin, that he sought a refund of or complained about the Bombay, or that he suffered any side effect, health issue, or harm from the grains of paradise. View "Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit under 15 U.S.C. 53(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) against appellants, alleging that they had engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. 45(a) under the collective name of "On Point." On appeal, On Point challenges the district court's preliminary injunction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed parts of the preliminary injunction enjoining appellants from misrepresenting their services and releasing consumer information. However, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management that section 53(b) does not permit an award of equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement, leaving the asset freeze and receivership aspects of the preliminary injunction unsupported by law. Therefore, the court vacated parts of the preliminary injunction subjecting the remaining appellants at issue to the asset freeze and receivership to the extent the district court has not already provided relief. View "Federal Trade Commission v. On Point Capital Partners LLC" on Justia Law

Pupo first applied for supplemental security income (SSI) in June 2011, alleging that she was unable to work due to depression, body tremors, and high blood pressure. Her initial application was denied, but, in 2015, her case was remanded for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The district court affirmed the subsequent denial of Pupo’s application.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ erred by not addressing one of Pupo’s medical diagnoses, her incontinence when assessing her residual functional capacity and the Appeals Council erred by not considering the new medical evidence submitted by Pupo following the ALJ’s denial of her SSI claim. Pupo submitted medical records showing that she had surgery because of her stress urinary incontinence nine days before the ALJ issued his decision. The ALJ did not err in failing to consider Pupo’s borderline age situation because he did not apply the grids mechanically but instead relied on testimony due to Pupo’s non-exertional limitations. View "Pupo v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

A confidential source (CI) met Ramirez, a Colombian national who was a legal resident of the U.S., and discussed the demand for AK-47 style weapons in Colombia. In 2017-2018, Ramirez obtained 45 firearms using straw purchasers in Florida and sold them throughout Colombia; he knowingly sold six firearms to the National Liberation Army (ELN), an insurgent group that the U.S. State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization. Ramirez flew to Colombia to broker the weapons shipment with the CI and a known weapons broker for the ELN. Unbeknownst to Ramirez, two of the AK-style pistols contained hidden GPS trackers; those pistols were driven to an area controlled by the ELN and ultimately delivered to the ELN. Ramirez returned to Miami with $26,567.After additional transactions, Ramirez was arrested in the U.S., waived his Miranda rights, and admitted to using straw purchasers to buy firearms and smuggling them into Colombia. After pleading guilty, Ramirez received a 240-month sentence for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). Ramirez challenged the imposition of the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court failed to make the required fact findings for the terrorism enhancement. The government must show that the defendant’s offense was planned to influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct, even if that was not the defendant’s personal motive. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law