Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mitchell was a Duval County Jail pretrial detainee. Detective Simpson told a jail official to “obtain,” “seize,” and “confiscate and review” all of Mitchell’s incoming and outgoing mail. A mail clerk, Perkins, delivered a letter from Mitchell’s attorney marked “Legal Mail” that had already been opened. When Perkins later asked Mitchell specific questions about his case, Mitchell concluded that she had read at least part of the letter. During the next year, Mitchell continued to experience issues with his mail. Perkins switched an outgoing letter to Mitchell’s family with another inmate’s letter. Sergeant Clark, the mailroom supervisor, tried to “intimidate” Mitchell, intercepting his grievances and warning him to stop filing complaints.Mitchell filed a pro se complaint alleging that Simpson, Perkins, and Clark, violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: A simple rule has governed prison mail procedures in our Circuit for nearly 50 years: a prison official may not open an inmate’s properly marked legal mail outside of his presence. The defendants’ conduct violated Mitchell’s First Amendment right to free speech; it was clearly established that the officials’ conduct was unlawful. View "Mitchell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the underlying action, a citrus grove owner filed suit against defendant in Florida state court, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and an equitable accounting. Almost a year later, and two days after finding out that defendant had an insurance policy issued by Travelers, the owner moved to amend the complaint to add a claim for negligence. After the motion was granted, Travelers disclaimed coverage. In state court litigation, the owner and defendant entered into a settlement agreement.Travelers filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that, based on the insurance policy's provision, it had not duty to defend or indemnify defendant against the owner's claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Travelers. The court concluded that, because the insurance policy excluded coverage for the damages alleged in the owner's amended state court complaint, Travelers had no duty to defend or indemnify, and the Coblentz agreement is unenforceable for that reason. View "The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. Richard McKenzie & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002, Hayes, age 20, violently attacked his 60-year-old neighbor without provocation or apparent motive, causing her to lapse into a coma. Hayes was later seen burning items in his backyard. Clothing recovered from the burn pile contained the victim’s blood. Charged with attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon and armed trespassing, Hayes was found incompetent to proceed and transferred to a state mental health facility. After months of treatment, the psychology department and two court-appointed psychiatrists concluded that Hayes was competent to proceed Counsel filed a notice of intent to rely on an insanity defense and renewed his objection to the competence finding but never obtained an expert opinion regarding Hayes’ sanity at the time of the attack. On the first day of trial, defense counsel withdrew the insanity defense, allegedly at Hayes' request. Defense counsel did not call witnesses but attempted to present a misidentification defense through cross-examination. At sentencing, new defense counsel presented extensive evidence of Hayes’ mental illnesses. The court called Hayes “mentally disturbed” but sentenced him to life imprisonment.Hayes argued that trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning the insanity defense. The Eleventh Circuit reversed a grant of federal habeas relief. To establish prejudice, Hayes must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The district court instead relied on a prejudice test that was rejected by the Supreme Court. Under the clear and convincing standard required by Florida law, Hayes cannot show a reasonable probability that his insanity defense would have been successful if presented to the jury View "Hayes v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Murugan, a member of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, claims that he left Sri Lanka and entered the U.S. without authorization because of incidents involving the Sri Lankan Army. One incident involved overnight detention and questioning. Another incident, involving four days of detention and interrogation while tied to a chair included kicking and slapping. After his release, Murugan was hospitalized and attended mental health counseling. Murugan did not report his arrest to the police or any other government authority. Finally, soldiers came to Murugan’s home, arrested him, and threatened to take him to an army torture camp. After six hours of detention, Murugan was released. Murugan’s parents told him that his life was in danger and that people who had been previously arrested with him had been re-arrested and sent to the torture camp.In removal proceedings, Murugan applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief. He alleged past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution based on an imputed political opinion and membership in the particular social groups of Tamils and returned asylum seekers. He testified that he feared he would be arrested at the airport, tortured, and killed. The IJ and BIA rejected his claims. The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for relief, noting that Murugan had not exhausted some of his arguments before the BIA and that the agency applied the correct legal standards. The factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Murugan v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

After Jeffrey West died shortly after he was released from the prison where he was being held as a pre-trial detainee, West's estate filed suit under federal and Alabama law against Escambia County and the Escambia County Sheriff, as well as multiple fictitious defendants, initially identified only as prison guards, medical professionals, doctors, and nurses. In this case, West had a staph infection, and after inconsistent medical attention that did not address his underlying symptoms, he died from complications related to the infection. The district court ultimately entered an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and dismissed all claims with prejudice. After the Estate moved to reopen and the district court agreed, the district court found that it had jurisdiction over the Estate's claims because it could reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) but granted summary judgment to defendants because the Estate's claims were time-barred.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order purporting to reopen the case because the parties' filing of the stipulation of dismissal left the district court without jurisdiction over the Estate's claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Furthermore, the district court could not reopen the case under Rule 60(a). View "Estate of Jeffrey West v. DeFrancisco" on Justia Law

Property owners filed suit after the Town of Redington Beach passed an ordinance that granted the public certain access to the dry sand beaches. After the lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff Fields was asked to resign from her position on the Board of Adjustment (which reviews requests for variances from the Town's zoning code), because she had filed this suit against the Town.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment to the property owners on their claims that the ordinance violated Florida law and constituted an unlawful taking. The court concluded that the district court erred in declaring the ordinance void under Florida Statute 163.035; the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the property owners on the Town's customary use defense; and the district court erred in finding a facial and an as-applied taking. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff Fields on the First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Buending v. Town of Redington Beach" on Justia Law

In 2012, LaTele, a Venezuelan television corporation, acting through its president, Fraiz, sued the American television network Telemundo, claiming that Telemundo infringed LaTele’s copyrighted telenovela. While the lawsuit was pending in Miami, a Venezuelan criminal court appointed a governmental board, “La Junta” to displace Fraiz and manage the affairs of LaTele. Fraiz asked the district court to determine that he was the proper representative of LaTele and that La Junta should be excluded from participating in the lawsuit. In 2018, the district court lifted its stay, removed Fraiz’s attorneys from participation in the case, and affirmed that La Junta’s attorney was counsel of record.The Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal after holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Under the collateral order doctrine, the district court’s order can be treated as final for purposes of appeal. The order conclusively determined an important issue that was completely separate from the merits of the copyright claim, and would otherwise be unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. However, La Junta and Telemundo challenged Fraiz’s standing to bring the appeal on behalf of LaTele. The district court correctly determined, based on its review of four foreign court orders, that La Junta has the lawful authority to manage the affairs of LaTele and this lawsuit. View "Latele Television, C.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and this is the decision of the en banc court vacating the panel opinion and remanding the case to the panel for further proceedings.The en banc court held that Supreme Court precedent requires the use of the preponderance standard of predictive proof in ultimate discovery exception cases. Even if the court were not to do so, the court held that the preponderance standard must be used because of the advantages it has over the reasonable probability standard when it comes to finding whether evidence ultimately would have been discovered through lawful means if the constitutional violation had not taken place. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the tax court's memorandum opinion upholding adjustments contained in five notices of deficiencies (NODs) issued by the IRS against petitioner for the tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001, as well as the tax court's adoption of the Commissioner's computations under Tax Court Rule 155 and its denial of several of petitioner's post-trial motions.In regard to jurisdiction issues, the court concluded that the Commissioner did not need to comply with the requirement of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) that it issue Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAAs) to GG Capital to notify petitioner of adjustments to partnership items. The court explained that GG Capital's attempted TEFRA election on its 1997 return was not valid; GG Capital was required to attach a statement signed by all of its partners in order to elect into the TEFRA procedures under I.R.C. 6231(a)(1)(B)(ii); but GG Capital did not do so for either 2000 or 2001 and was therefore not subject to the TEFRA regime. The court also concluded that the tax court did not err in finding the 2004 NOD was timely mailed on October 15, 2004 adjustments; because the limitations period for making assessments against petitioner related to the converted items was suspended by virtue of the pendency of the AD Global case, the 2009 NOD was timely as to the 1999 tax year; and the court rejected petitioner's remaining jurisdictional claims.The court concluded that the tax court properly upheld the Commissioner's adjustments to the NODs. In this case, the court declined to look behind the 2009 NODs in assessing their validity; the tax court did not fail to impose the proper burden of proof and the tax court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen the record to allow petitioner to introduce new evidence so late into the action; and there was no error in the tax court's post-trial rulings. View "Greenberg v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Turner, a Wisconsin resident, filed a putative class action against Costa, an Italian cruise operator, and its American subsidiary, alleging that their negligence contributed to an outbreak of COVID-19 aboard the Costa Luminosa during his transatlantic voyage beginning on March 5, 2020. The Luminosa had evacuated a passenger, who subsequently died of COVID-19, from a cruise immediately preceding Turner’s cruise. Costa told passengers that the ship was safe. It did not hire any experts to verify that the ship had been sufficiently cleaned and allegedly failed to refuse boarding to individuals who had COVID-19 symptoms or had traveled to high-risk areas. On March 8, the Luminosa had docked to transport passengers with COVID-19 symptoms to the hospital but did not inform passengers of those circumstances, When passengers disembarked on March 19, 36 of the 75 passengers tested positive for COVID-19. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Turner’s complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. Turner's passage ticket contract included a forum selection clause requiring that all claims associated with his cruise be litigated in Genoa, Italy. Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable; Turner failed to defeat the presumption by showing that the clause was induced by fraud or overreaching, that he would be deprived of his day in court because of inconvenience or unfairness, the chosen law would deprive him of a remedy or enforcement of the clause would contravene public policy.’ View "Turner v. Costa Crociere S.P.A." on Justia Law