Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The FTC filed suit under 15 U.S.C. 53(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) against appellants, alleging that they had engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. 45(a) under the collective name of "On Point." On appeal, On Point challenges the district court's preliminary injunction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed parts of the preliminary injunction enjoining appellants from misrepresenting their services and releasing consumer information. However, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management that section 53(b) does not permit an award of equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement, leaving the asset freeze and receivership aspects of the preliminary injunction unsupported by law. Therefore, the court vacated parts of the preliminary injunction subjecting the remaining appellants at issue to the asset freeze and receivership to the extent the district court has not already provided relief. View "Federal Trade Commission v. On Point Capital Partners LLC" on Justia Law

Pupo first applied for supplemental security income (SSI) in June 2011, alleging that she was unable to work due to depression, body tremors, and high blood pressure. Her initial application was denied, but, in 2015, her case was remanded for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The district court affirmed the subsequent denial of Pupo’s application.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ erred by not addressing one of Pupo’s medical diagnoses, her incontinence when assessing her residual functional capacity and the Appeals Council erred by not considering the new medical evidence submitted by Pupo following the ALJ’s denial of her SSI claim. Pupo submitted medical records showing that she had surgery because of her stress urinary incontinence nine days before the ALJ issued his decision. The ALJ did not err in failing to consider Pupo’s borderline age situation because he did not apply the grids mechanically but instead relied on testimony due to Pupo’s non-exertional limitations. View "Pupo v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

A confidential source (CI) met Ramirez, a Colombian national who was a legal resident of the U.S., and discussed the demand for AK-47 style weapons in Colombia. In 2017-2018, Ramirez obtained 45 firearms using straw purchasers in Florida and sold them throughout Colombia; he knowingly sold six firearms to the National Liberation Army (ELN), an insurgent group that the U.S. State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization. Ramirez flew to Colombia to broker the weapons shipment with the CI and a known weapons broker for the ELN. Unbeknownst to Ramirez, two of the AK-style pistols contained hidden GPS trackers; those pistols were driven to an area controlled by the ELN and ultimately delivered to the ELN. Ramirez returned to Miami with $26,567.After additional transactions, Ramirez was arrested in the U.S., waived his Miranda rights, and admitted to using straw purchasers to buy firearms and smuggling them into Colombia. After pleading guilty, Ramirez received a 240-month sentence for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). Ramirez challenged the imposition of the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court failed to make the required fact findings for the terrorism enhancement. The government must show that the defendant’s offense was planned to influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct, even if that was not the defendant’s personal motive. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

A family-based immigrant is presumptively likely to become a public charge, ineligible for admission, but that presumption can be overcome if a sponsoring relative executes an “affidavit of support.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), (a)(4)(D). Kuznitsnyna and her daughter, Thomas, co-sponsored the immigration of Kuznitsnyna’s husband, Belevich, and signed Form I-864 affidavits, which that their obligation to support Belevich would terminate if he became a citizen, worked 40 quarters, no longer had lawful permanent resident status and departed the U.S., attained a new support affidavit, or died; “divorce does not terminate your obligations.” DHS granted Belevich a visa.Years later, while Belevich was visiting his mother in Russia, Kuznitsnyna sought a divorce. When Belevich returned to the U.S., Kuznitsnyna would not allow him into their home. She obtained an order of protection against him. Neither Thomas nor Kuznitsnyna subsequently provided Belevich with any financial support. Later, Belevich was charged with abusing Thomas’s six-year-old daughter and possessing child pornography. Belevich sued for breach of the support affidavits. The women raised the affirmative defenses of unclean hands, anticipatory breach, and equitable estoppel. The district court rejected those arguments, held that Belevich’s conduct relating to the pending criminal charges had “no relevance to the statute,” and granted Belevich summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The sponsors’ equitable defenses are foreclosed by the statute and regulation and by the text of the affidavit. View "Belevich v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Stanfords, the debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, owned APC, another Chapter 11 debtor. Each had borrowed money from ServisFirst; each served as guarantor for the other’s debt. The Stanfords owed ServisFirst $5 million; APC owed $7.2 million. APC obtained a “roll-up loan” from ServisFirst to consolidate the debt and obtain working capital. The Stanfords had secured their loans from ServisFirst with real property. The bankruptcy court approved the sale of the property to ServisFirst “via a credit bid of $3.5 million,” 11 U.S.C. 363(k), stating that ServisFirst was “a good faith purchaser” and that the consideration “exceeds the liquidation value” of the property. The Stanfords then argued that APC’s roll-up loan converted ServisFirst’s pre-petition claims into post-petition administrative expense claims against APC alone and that because ServisFirst never required them to execute a guaranty of the roll-up loan, they had no remaining pre-petition obligations to ServisFirst, which no longer held a lien and could not make a credit bid.The bankruptcy court rejected their arguments, citing equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel, and law of the case but granted a stay conditioned on posting a $1.5 million supersedeas bond, which the Stanfords did not do. Ultimately, the Stanfords delivered an executed deed to ServisFirst, which was recorded. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Stanfords’ appeal as moot under 11 U.S.C. 363(m), citing its inability to undo a completed sale to a good faith purchaser under Section 363(m). View "Reynolds v. ServisFirst Bank" on Justia Law

VHV, a wholesale jewelry importer and the domestic counterpart of Khushi in India, filed a new-office petition and obtained L-1 nonimmigrant status for Vaidya, a citizen of India, to work as VHV’s CEO. VHV later sought to extend Vaidya’s L-1 classification for two years. After allowing VHV to submit additional information, USCIS concluded that the record was insufficient to prove that Vaidya was employed in an executive capacity in his foreign position and insufficient regarding his domestic position. USCIS found that Vaidya’s subordinates did not hold positions in a managerial capacity, Vaidya’s duties did “not make sense given the overall nature and organizational complexity of the foreign organization,” Vaidya apparently performed many non-qualifying duties, and the descriptions of his duties were overly generic.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. USCIS’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. For an employee to qualify for L-1 status as an executive, 8 U.S.C. 1361 requires that the employee bear a certain set of high-level responsibilities and that the employee primarily engages in those specified duties. New-office petitions additionally require evidence that the transferee was employed abroad “for one continuous year in the three-year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive or managerial capacity.” Neither Vaidya’s employment abroad nor his domestic position met these requirements. View "VHV Jewelers, LLC v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Georgia's November 6, 2018, general election was a bellwether of the national political mood. On November 5, Common Cause sued, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. 21082; the Georgia Constitution; and Georgia Code 21-2-211, claiming Georgia’s voter registration systems were vulnerable to security breaches, increasing the risk eligible voters would be wrongly removed from election rolls, or that information would be unlawfully manipulated to prevent eligible voters from casting a regular ballot.Common Cause sought an order preventing the final rejection of provisional ballots for voters who had registration problems until there was confidence in the voter registration database. The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 12 but determined the relief requested was “not practically feasible” and enjoined the Secretary from certifying the election results before 5:00 p.m. on November 16. The Secretary complied. In 2019, new Georgia voting laws changed procedures surrounding handling provisional ballots. The parties agreed that these provisions made further litigation unnecessary and stipulated to dismissal.Common Cause sought attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred through the issuance of the TRO and in preparing the fee motion. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the $166,210.09 award. Common Cause was a 42 U.S.C. 1988 prevailing party because, in obtaining the TRO, it succeeded on a significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefits the parties sought in bringing suit. The litigation was necessary to alter the legal relationship between the parties. View "Common Cause Georgia v. Secretary, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Under the 1982 Tax Treatment of Partnership Items Act, 26 U.S.C. 6221–6232, partnership-related tax matters are resolved in two stages. During the partnership-level proceedings, the IRS may adjust items relevant to the partnership as a whole and determine the “applicability of any penalty.” The partnership can challenge the adjustment. All partners are bound by any final decision in a partnership-level proceeding.On its 2001 partnership tax return, AHG reported a $25,618 total loss. Ginsburg’s individual 2001 tax return reported a $10,069,505 loss from AHG to offset his income. In 2008, the IRS sent Ginsburg notice that it was proposing adjustments to AHG’s returns, alleging that AHG “was formed . . . solely for purposes of tax avoidance.” For Ginsburg, the IRS “disallowed” the $10,069,505 loss and said it would impose a 40 percent penalty for “gross valuation misstatement.”Based on Ginsburg’s concessions that he was not entitled to deduct AHG’s losses because he was not at risk and the partnership’s transactions did not have a substantial economic effect., the tax court found that AHG must be “disregarded for federal income tax purposes,” and adjusted AHG’s 2001 tax return. The court denied Ginsburg’s petition concerning the penalty, rejecting his argument that the government did not get “written approval of the penalty by an immediate supervisor,” as required by 26 U.S.C. 6751(b)(1). The district court agreed that Ginsburg could not have reasonably relied on the advice of his tax, legal, and financial advisors and would not consider Ginsburg’s supervisory approval argument because he did not exhaust it in his IRS refund claim.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In partnership tax cases, the supervisory approval issue must be exhausted with the IRS before the partner files his refund lawsuit and must be raised during the partnership-level proceedings. View "Ginsburg v. United States" on Justia Law

New “Voice over Internet Protocol,” (VoIP) systems resulted in the 2008 New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act, 47 U.S.C. 222, 615a, 615a-1, 615b and 942.2 The “911 Fee Parity Provision” allows non-federal government entities to charge a fee to commercial phone services for the support of 911 services but specifies that, “[f]or each class of subscribers to IP-enabled voice services, the fee or charge may not exceed the amount of any such fee or charge applicable to the same class of subscribers to telecommunications services.”Alabama 911 Districts contended that the Provision authorized them to charge non-VoIP service providers per access line and VoIP service providers per 10-digit telephone number even if the total charges for a given class of VoIP subscribers exceed the total charges for the same class of non-VoIP subscribers for the same amount of burden each group imposes on the 911 system.The district court referred the matter to the FCC, which concluded that the Provision prohibits state and local governments from charging 911 fees to VoIP providers that are greater than those charged to non-VoIP providers for the same amount of burden imposed on the 911 system. The order precludes the 911 Districts from charging VoIP providers and non-VoIP providers the same base fee based on different units if the total fee charged for comparable 911 access is higher for VoIP service providers. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding Congress’s intent unambiguous. View "Autauga County Emergency Management Communication District v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Through a Form I-130, a U.S. citizen can seek to establish that an alien relative is eligible for an immigrant visa, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) & 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). Relatives residing outside the U.S. must apply for the visa at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate in their country of residence. Angela, a U.S. citizen married to Carlos, a Mexican citizen, filed a Form I-130. Carlos had resided in the U.S. without status for over a year; upon returning to Mexico to apply for a visa he would have been inadmissible for 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Carlos obtained a provisional unlawful presence waiver to return to Mexico. Following an interview, a consular official denied his visa application, alleging that Carlos had sought to obtain an immigration benefit by falsely misrepresenting a material fact, had falsely represented himself to be a U.S. citizen, and had unlawfully resided in the U.S. for over a year. The notice did not cite facts supporting those findings.Angela claimed mistaken identity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit for failure to state a claim. Consular officials are not required to identify facts underlying a visa denial when the statutory provision of inadmissibility sets out factual predicates. The doctrine of consular non-reviewability bars judicial review of a consular official’s decision regarding a visa application if the reason given is “facially legitimate and bona fide” but does not strip federal courts of their subject matter jurisdiction. View "Del Valle v. Secretary of State, United States Department of State" on Justia Law