Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Akal, a government contractor, repatriates persons ordered removed from the U.S., transporting detainees on airplanes. Akal staffs it flights with air security officers (ASOs). Once the detainees have been transported to their respective destinations, the ASOs are required to return to the U.S. aboard the same aircraft. Because return flights carry no detainees, the ASOs have few affirmative duties during them. On arrival, the ASOs unload and clean the plane and perform other minor administrative duties to prepare for the following day. Akal acknowledges that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207it has to pay its ASOs for overtime spent on the Returns. For Returns lasting longer than 90 minutes, Akal automatically deducts one hour from each shift as a “meal period” and instructs ASOs to disengage from work duties during meal periods.ASOs sued Akal under the FLSA for unpaid wages. The district court granted the ASOs summary judgment, holding that Akal’s automatic “meal period” deductions violated the Act but that Akal had acted in good faith and had not willfully violated the FLSA. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Akal was not entitled to make the challenged meal-period deductions from otherwise compensable work. The district court correctly found that Akal acted in good faith and not willfully. View "Gelber v. Akal Security, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the statutory phrase "same disease or condition" contained in the Orphan Drug Act is not ambiguous. This case arose from Catalyst's lawsuit against the FDA alleging multiple violations of the Administrative Procedure Act related to its approval of Ruzurgi, which Catalyst claims violated the company's exclusivity of its own drug, Firdapse, to treat Lambert-Eaton Myasthenic Syndrome. Jacobus intervened shortly afterwards. The court concluded that the district court erred by finding this statutory phrase ambiguous and then deferring to the FDA's interpretation of it. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and Jacobus and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Catalyst. View "Catalyst Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Defendants Perry and Ragin were indicted with seven other co-defendants on numerous charges related to their involvement in a substantial multi-year, multi-state drug distribution organization operating primarily in southern Georgia. In consolidated appeals, Perry challenges his convictions and Ragin challenges his sentence.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the DEA task force officer was properly qualified as an expert in interpreting code words for drugs, and that Perry failed to establish that he was substantially prejudiced by any offending comments the task force officer offered. Furthermore, Perry's other arguments similarly do not warrant reversing his convictions. The court also concluded that Ragin's challenges to his sentence are without merit. In this case, because the district court found that the drugs and firearms were part of a single course of conduct and were not an isolated, unrelated event, it did not err when it concluded that they were relevant for the purposes of determining Ragin's proper Guidelines range. Furthermore, the district court did not plainly err in sua sponte granting a two-level minor role reduction. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

A member of Sons of Confederate Veterans applied to participate in the Old Soldiers Day Parade, a pro-American veterans parade funded and organized by the Alpharetta, Georgia, and was informed that the organization could participate if it agreed not to fly the Confederate battle flag.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court held that the Parade constituted government speech and entered summary judgment against the Sons. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Governments “are not obliged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to permit the presence of a rebellious army’s battle flag in the pro-veterans parades that they fund and organize.” In 2015, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, the Supreme Court clarified that, “[w]hen [the] government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” View "Leake v. Drinkard" on Justia Law

Tinker, a federal prisoner serving a 180-month sentence for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, argued that his medical conditions—obesity, hypertension, a congenitally narrowed spinal canal, and mental illness—increased his risk of developing a severe illness should he contract Covid-19 and that such increased risk qualified him for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Assuming that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for early release, as required by section 3582, the district court, after considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and the requirements of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, denied Tinker’s motion.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not procedurally err when it assumed, without explicitly finding, that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” before denying his motion based on section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors and section 1B1.13’s policy statement. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the section 3553(a) factors; the court emphasized Tinker’s extensive criminal history and the need to protect the public, which was within its discretion to do. The court acknowledged the parties’ filings, which discussed at length the factors that Tinker contends were ignored. View "United States v. Tinker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for rehearing, vacated its previous opinion and judgment, substituted this opinion in its place, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court two related questions about the nature of the Florida assault statutes: 1. Does the first element of assault as defined in Fla. Stat. 784.011(1) -- "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another" -- require specific intent? 2. If not, what is the mens rea required to prove that element of the statute? View "Somers v. United States" on Justia Law

The estates of some of the murder victims from the Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016, along with some of the injured, filed suit in federal court in Michigan against social media companies. The lawsuit was unsuccessful. A second action, this case, was filed in federal court in Florida against the same social media companies by different victims of the Pulse shooting. Here, plaintiffs alleged in part that the companies aided and abetted Omar Mateen, the shooter, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) by facilitating his access to radical jihadist and ISIS-sponsored content in the months and years leading up to the shooting. Plaintiffs also alleged claims against the companies under Florida law for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ATA and state law claims with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim that the Pulse massacre was an act of "international terrorism" as that term is defined in the ATA. Consequently, the companies—no matter what the court may think of their alleged conduct—cannot be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATA. In regard to the state law claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to adequately brief proximate cause under Florida law, and have therefore abandoned their challenge to the district court's ruling. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting under the ATA and for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death under Florida law. View "Colon v. Twitter, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the United States after Steve Smith and his daughter, Sydney, were killed when their car struck two mailboxes. Plaintiffs claim that the Postal Service is liable because it failed to warn the mailboxes' owners that the mailboxes did not comply with various safety regulations.The court concluded that, even assuming plaintiffs are correct—about both the regulatory infractions and the Postal Service's duty to provide warnings about those infractions—the United States cannot be held liable. The court explained that the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the acts or omissions of a federal employee only when a private person would be liable under state tort law for those same acts or omissions. In this case, plaintiffs pointed to no state law duty where the duty plaintiffs allege, negligence per se based on the Postal Service's requirement to notify homeowners if their mailboxes did not conform to various safety standards, would spring only from federal guidance—the Postal Operations Manual. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

A California court awarded Elie a $14,814,107.48 judgment against his former partner, Cutuli. Separately, Cutuli pleaded guilty to conspiracy to fraudulently transfer or conceal property in contemplation of bankruptcy. Cutuli filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Florida. His agreement with counsel did not include “defense of adversary proceedings.” Elie filed an adversary proceeding, seeking a declaration that the California Judgment debt was non-dischargeable. Cutuli was personally served with the summons and complaint in prison within FRCP 4(m)’s 90-day limit and the 28-day local limit.Cutuli failed to respond. Elie moved for default. Cutuli’s attorney appeared and objected. Elie then served the summons and complaint on Cutuli’s attorney on December 14. The summons Elie mailed had been issued in September; Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(e) requires service within seven days after the summons issues. The bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss, citing the fee disclosure indication that counsel would not represent Cutuli in adversary proceedings and noting that Cutuli’s counsel had received a copy of the complaint. Cutuli declined to answer the complaint and stated he did not intend to object to the entry of default. The bankruptcy court granted Elie default judgment.The district court reversed. On remand, the bankruptcy court granted Elie’s motion to extend the time for service of process, finding that good cause existed and citing its discretion under Rule 4(m). Elie obtained a fresh summons and properly served Cutuli and his attorney. Again, Cutuli did not answer or defend. The district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed the extension. Cutuli’s failure to defend the action suggests that the initial failure to serve a fresh summons upon Cutuli’s attorney did not cause Cutuli any prejudice. View "Cutuli v. Elie" on Justia Law

Smith, a Muslim serving a life sentence, sued the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, claiming that GDOC’s grooming policy, which prohibits inmates from growing facial hair over a half-inch in length, placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The district court rejected Smith’s RLUIPA claim, finding that “GDOC ha[d] offered logical and persuasive reasons to show that allowing untrimmed beards would be unmanageable for GDOC” and that “it is plausible that allowing a close security inmate like Smith an untrimmed beard could be dangerous for prison security.” Rather than rule in favor of GDOC, the district court fashioned a remedy that neither party had requested: it held that RLUIPA entitled Smith to grow a three-inch beard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s determination that it was reasonable for GDOC to conclude that allowing Smith to grow an untrimmed beard would be both unmanageable and dangerous was not clearly erroneous but its ruling requiring GDOC to allow Smith to grow a three-inch beard was improper and contrary to the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, Holt v. Hobbs, that courts should consider only the plaintiff’s proposed alternatives in deciding whether there is an available less restrictive means for the government to further its compelling interests under RLUIPA. View "Smith v. Dozier" on Justia Law