Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Willie Hayden pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin and possession with intent to distribute heroin. After serving a prior term of imprisonment for drug trafficking, Hayden was released and began supervised release. Within a year, he was found selling heroin, leading to his arrest and the discovery of 29 bags of heroin in his home. The probation office's presentence investigation report calculated a guideline range of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment, considering Hayden's career offender status and criminal history. The report also detailed Hayden's mental health challenges, learning disabilities, and substance abuse history.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Hayden to 170 months of imprisonment and imposed a three-year term of supervised release with standard conditions. The district court did not orally describe each standard condition but included them in the written judgment. Hayden's counsel objected to the career-offender guideline application and the sentence's length but did not object to the standard conditions' oral pronouncement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Hayden's sentence was substantively reasonable, as the district court considered all relevant factors, including Hayden's neurological issues, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range. The court also held that the district court did not err in imposing the standard conditions of supervised release without orally describing each one, as Hayden had notice and an opportunity to object. The court affirmed Hayden's sentence. View "USA v. Hayden" on Justia Law

Joseph Lusk was convicted in Florida state court in 2018 for traveling to meet a minor after soliciting a guardian. Less than a month after his release from prison in 2021, Lusk engaged in sexually explicit conversations with an undercover investigator posing as a 15-year-old girl. He was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted enticement of a minor and committing a felony involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Lusk's motion to dismiss Count 2, which argued that his conduct did not involve an actual minor. Lusk pled guilty to both charges but contested the application of a sentencing enhancement for being a "repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors" based on his prior Florida conviction. The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Lusk to 355 months' imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in applying the "repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors" enhancement because the Florida statute under which Lusk was previously convicted is broader than the federal statute, thus not qualifying as a predicate offense. The court vacated Lusk's sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. However, the court affirmed Lusk's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, citing binding precedent that a conviction under this statute does not require the involvement of an actual minor. View "USA v. Lusk" on Justia Law

Loren Read was indicted for attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity after he exchanged online messages with an undercover federal agent posing as the father of young girls. Read expressed his desire to perform sexual acts on the girls and agreed to meet the undercover agent. Upon arrival, he was arrested with three condoms in his pocket. Read pled guilty in exchange for the government not charging him with other offenses and recommending a downward adjustment to his offense level. As part of his plea agreement, Read waived his right to appeal his sentence with three exceptions, including if the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Read to 180 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The court imposed seven special conditions of supervised release and referenced the standard conditions adopted by the Middle District of Florida without detailing them. Read did not object at the time. The written judgment included 13 standard conditions that matched the district's standard conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Read argued that the district court violated his due process rights by not detailing the standard conditions during the oral pronouncement of his sentence. The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on Read's appeal waiver. The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's motion, holding that Read's appeal was barred by his waiver. The court determined that Read's challenge to the oral pronouncement of his sentence constituted an appeal of his sentence, which he had waived. The court also found that the exception for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum did not apply, as Read did not argue that the conditions violated statutory requirements. View "U.S. v. Read" on Justia Law

The case involves Bradley Rodriguez, who applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income, claiming a disability due to a traumatic brain injury, bipolar disorder, and depression. His application was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Appeals Council also denied his request for review. Rodriguez then filed a federal lawsuit challenging the denial of benefits, raising several constitutional issues regarding the appointment of SSA ALJs, Appeals Council members, and the Commissioner of the SSA. He also argued that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the SSA. The court found that the ALJ was properly appointed, the Appeals Council members were not principal officers requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, and the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable. The court also held that Rodriguez was not entitled to a new hearing because he did not show that the unconstitutional removal provision caused him any harm. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Commissioner had the statutory authority to appoint SSA ALJs and properly exercised that authority through ratification in July 2018. The Appeals Council members were deemed inferior officers, not principal officers, and thus did not require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. The court also agreed that the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable, and Rodriguez did not demonstrate entitlement to retrospective relief. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including medical records and vocational expert testimony. View "Rodriguez v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

The case involves John Holland, William Moore, and Ed Cota, who were accused of participating in an illegal healthcare kickback scheme. The government alleged that Holland and Moore, hospital executives for Tenet Healthcare, paid the Cotas to refer Medicaid or Medicare-covered pregnant women to Tenet hospitals. The payments were purportedly disguised as contracts for translation services. Tracey Cota, Ed Cota's wife, pleaded guilty to violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by participating in this scheme. However, the other defendants argued that their business relationship did not violate the AKS because they lacked the requisite mental state or mens rea.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held a pretrial "paper" hearing to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by the defendants' alleged coconspirators. The district court concluded that the government needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' conduct was illegal to admit the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The court found that the government failed to prove the defendants' knowledge of illegality and thus excluded the coconspirator statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in requiring proof of an illegal conspiracy to admit coconspirator statements. The court clarified that under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), it is sufficient to show that the statements were made during and in furtherance of a joint venture, regardless of the venture's legality. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Holland" on Justia Law

John Moore, Jr., and Tanner Mansell, who worked as boat crew for a shark encounter company in Jupiter, Florida, were involved in an incident on August 10, 2020. During a trip with the Kuehl family, they found a long fishing line attached to a buoy, which they believed was illegal. They hauled the line into the boat, cut sharks free from the hooks, and reported the incident to a Florida Fish and Wildlife Officer. However, the line was legally placed by Scott Taylor, who had the proper permits for shark research. Moore and Mansell were later indicted for theft of property within special maritime jurisdiction, as the line and gear belonged to Taylor.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Moore and Mansell requested a jury instruction that required the jury to find they stole the property for their own use or benefit to convict them under 18 U.S.C. § 661. The district court rejected this request, instead instructing the jury that to steal means to wrongfully take property with the intent to deprive the owner of its use. The jury found both defendants guilty, and they were sentenced to one year of probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed jury instruction. The appellate court found that the term "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 661 does not require the intent to convert the property for personal use, aligning with the broader interpretation of theft under federal law. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Transgender residents of Alabama sought to change the sex designation on their driver’s licenses without undergoing sex-change surgery, as required by Alabama’s Policy Order 63. This policy mandates that individuals wishing to change the sex on their driver’s license must submit either an amended birth certificate or a letter from the physician who performed the reassignment surgery. Plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring Policy Order 63 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court found that the policy classified individuals by sex and applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding that Alabama had not provided an adequate justification for the policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Policy Order 63 does not impose a sex-based classification and therefore does not trigger heightened scrutiny. Instead, the policy was subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court found that the policy rationally advances Alabama’s legitimate interest in maintaining consistent requirements for amending sex designations on state documents.The appellate court also rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and First Amendment claims. It held that the policy does not violate the right to informational privacy or the right to refuse medical treatment, as it does not force individuals to undergo surgery to obtain a driver’s license. Additionally, the court determined that the policy does not compel speech, as the information on driver’s licenses constitutes government speech, not private speech. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and upheld the constitutionality of Policy Order 63. View "Corbitt v. Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Julia McCreight and Rebecca Wester, were long-term employees of AuburnBank, each with over twenty years of service. McCreight, a mortgage loan originator, and Wester, a loan closer, were both terminated by Michael King, the mortgage department manager. McCreight was fired for sending an unauthorized loan approval letter to a borrower who did not qualify, while Wester was terminated for failing to verify a borrower’s employment status before closing a loan. Both women, over sixty years old at the time of their termination, claimed they were fired due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for their complaints about King’s behavior.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of AuburnBank and King on all counts. The court found that neither McCreight nor Wester provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of age and sex discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that McCreight and Wester failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that their terminations were due to illegal discrimination. The court clarified that mixed-motive theories of liability do not need to be explicitly pleaded in the complaint but must be raised by summary judgment. The court found that McCreight did not raise a mixed-motive theory at the district court level and failed to provide sufficient evidence for her single-motive theory. Similarly, Wester’s evidence was insufficient to support her claims. The court also held that both plaintiffs failed to show causation for their retaliation claims, as there was no evidence that the decision-makers knew about their discrimination complaints. View "McCreight v. AuburnBank" on Justia Law

Andrew Butler III was convicted by a jury of knowingly and intentionally possessing five grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Butler appealed, arguing that the district court wrongly revoked his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.Initially, the district court appointed Assistant Federal Public Defender Elizabeth Vallejo to represent Butler, but he expressed dissatisfaction, leading to her replacement by Robert A. Morris. Butler continued to file pro se motions disparaging Morris, resulting in Morris’s replacement by Richard A. Greenberg. Butler then requested to represent himself, and after a Faretta hearing, the court allowed it, appointing Greenberg as standby counsel. However, Butler’s disruptive behavior, including refusing to attend hearings and threatening not to attend the trial, led the court to revoke his self-representation right and appoint Mutaqee Akbar as his counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in revoking Butler’s right to self-representation due to his repeated and serious obstructionist misconduct, which spanned months and disrupted the trial schedule. The court emphasized that the right to self-representation is not a license to disrupt court proceedings and that the district court had given Butler multiple warnings and opportunities to comply.Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence presented at trial, including the methamphetamine found in the safe in Butler’s hotel room and his incriminating post-arrest recorded call, was sufficient to support the conviction. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Butler’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Butler" on Justia Law

Robert Turner, a property owner in Suwannee County, Florida, claimed that his homestead property was sold at an impermissibly low amount under Florida law, which deprived him of any surplus after back taxes and costs were deducted. Turner had a homestead exemption on his property, which was automatically renewed until 2015. After failing to pay property taxes, a tax certificate was issued, and a tax deed sale was conducted in 2015. Turner alleged that the sale was unlawful because it did not account for the homestead exemption, and he did not receive proper notice of the sale.Turner initially sought relief in state court, challenging the removal of his homestead exemption, but his complaint was dismissed as untimely. He then filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights, including First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment illegal seizure, and due process violations. The federal district court dismissed his complaint, finding that abstention was warranted under the comity doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with state tax administration when state remedies are adequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the relief Turner sought would disrupt Florida's administration of its ad valorem property tax scheme. The court found that Florida provided plain, adequate, and complete state remedies, including the ability to challenge tax deed sales and homestead exemption removals in state court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the comity doctrine. View "Turner v. Jordan" on Justia Law