Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for knowingly possessing with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance (approximately 2 kilograms of cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and conspiring to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846.The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational jury to infer that she knew the package contained a controlled substance. The court also concluded that the district court acted within its discretion by admitting text messages showing that defendant illegally sold prescription pills and by instructing the jury on a deliberate ignorance theory. The court explained that the district court admitted evidence of defendant's prior drug deals to show that her involvement in a different drug-related crime was not a mistake, and any error in instructing the jury on a deliberate ignorance theory was harmless because the jury heard sufficient evidence of actual knowledge. View "United States v. Colston" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for crimes related to sexual misconduct with a minor. For two months, defendant, who was 33 years old, pretended to be a 17 or 18 year old girl as he communicated online with a 14 year old boy. Defendant sent sexually explicit videos of women to the boy and requested sexually explicit videos of him in return. Defendant was convicted for charges that he: (1) did knowingly and intentionally use, persuade, induce, and entice a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e); (2) did knowingly receive, and attempt to receive, material containing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1); and (3) did knowingly possess, and attempt to possess, material containing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2).The court concluded that neither section 2251(a) nor the indictment required the government to prove that defendant knew the victim's age in order to convict on Count I. Because the jury instruction was both a correct statement of the law and a correct statement of the charge, the district court did not constructively amend his indictment. However, the district court erred in convicting defendant of both possession and receipt of child pornography because a defendant cannot be punished twice for the same crime. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction for Count I and II, vacated his conviction on Count III, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

After falling during a dance competition on a cruise ship, plaintiff filed suit against NCL for negligence, alleging that her partner in the competition—a professional dancer and cruise ship employee—released her hands as she leaned away from him during a dance move, causing her to fall backward and hit her head on the deck. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NCL because NCL did not have actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition on the ship.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that when a passenger makes a maritime negligence claim against a shipowner based on an employee's negligence under a theory of vicarious liability, the passenger need not establish that the shipowner had actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong standard in this case. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Yusko v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a yacht club member, filed suit against the club for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Florida Civil Rights Act after the club refused plaintiff's request to bring her service dog into the clubhouse and expelled her from its membership.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the club on plaintiff's ADA claims because the record does not establish that the club is a "private club" exempt from the ADA or the Florida Civil Rights Act. The court explained that the record contains substantial evidence that the club fails to ensure the seclusion of its members on much of its property and often fails to do so even in its clubhouse. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim because plaintiff failed to rebut the club's nondiscriminatory justifications for expelling her. In this case, plaintiff failed to rebut the club's liveaboard justification for her suspension and expulsion. View "Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant contends that his indictment was defective for two reasons: it failed to charge a complete criminal offense and it did not inform him that he needed to know his status as a convicted felon.The court rejected defendant's Rehaif-based contentions and held that the indictment did enough to charge an offense against the United States where 18 U.S.C. 922(g) is by itself a criminal offense. The court also held that an indictment that does not clearly set out the knowledge element does not warrant an automatic presumption of prejudice to the defendant. The court explained that this kind of error is not the sort of structural infirmity that infects the entire trial, and thus the court reviewed it using the same harmless-error inquiry that applies to most other types of errors, including constitutional ones. In this case, any potential error in the indictment was harmless to defendant. Furthermore, the court found no other errors in the conviction or sentence regarding the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reopen, the veracity of the search warrant affidavit, any alleged cumulative error, and defendant's sentence as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Khoury lives near the school’s baseball field and complained about parking, noise, lights, and the influx of people. Khoury took photos of cars that she believed were illegally parked. Khoury and a parent had a verbal confrontation. Williams, a Miami-Dade Public School police officer, told Khoury the cars were not illegally parked and told the parents there was nothing he could do about Khoury filming. Other residents told Williams that Khoury took photos of their children and that they were “afraid of her.” Khoury claims Williams “charged” her because she was recording him and twisted her arm behind her back. Williams and the parent claim that Khoury “pushed” Williams, then threw herself on the ground,” yelling “false arrest.” After handcuffing Khoury, Williams detained her under the Baker Act for mental health observation and took her to a hospital for treatment of her dislocated elbow. She was transferred to Miami Behavioral Health Center, which found no evidence of "psychosis.” Khoury was released two days later and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the School Board had an unwritten policy of improperly detaining people under the Baker Act to reduce crime statistics.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, noting the lack of evidence establishing a pervasive practice. The court reversed as to Williams, noting the many disputed facts. Williams concluded Khoury was “not mentally well” simply because she didn’t believe that the cars were parked legally; Khoury was not violating the law or harming anyone by filming, and other eyewitnesses testified that Khoury was not a threat—her response was simply irrational. That alone does not form a basis under which a reasonable officer would conclude that Khoury was a danger to herself or others View "Khoury v. Miami-Dade County School Board" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 57-month sentence for making false statements to a firearms dealer. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(a)(3), for an offense involving a semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. In this case, the court found no basis in the record on which to overturn the district court's factual findings regarding the close proximity of a large capacity magazine to the rifle defendant attempted to purchase, nor in its legal conclusion that the offense conduct met the standard for the Guidelines enhancement. Furthermore, the application of the large-capacity magazine enhancement in this context—the attempted purchase of a semiautomatic rifle by an individual subject to a restraining order—furthers the policy rationale behind section 2K2.1 of punishing firearm crimes involving "dangerous types of weapons." Finally, the court upheld the district court's determination that defendant's prior conviction for Florida felony battery constitutes a crime of violence. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, challenging his sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Petitioner contends that two of the four convictions underlying the ACCA enhancement can no longer support it after the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).The court concluded that, at best for petitioner, it is unclear from the record whether the sentencing court relied on the residual clause or the elements clause or the enumerated offenses clause, or all three of them, when it found that his 1978 California conviction for robbery with a firearm was a violent felony under the ACCA. The court explained that, when it is unclear what role, if any, the residual clause played, the movant loses because if the evidence is silent or in equipoise, then the party with the burden fails. The court need not determine whether the 1982 California robbery conviction also qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA because petitioner has three underlying convictions supporting the ACCA enhancement. View "Pitts v. United States" on Justia Law

An abortion facility (RHS) and its owner filed suit against the Attorney General of Alabama and the District Attorney of Montgomery County, challenging some of the amendments to Alabama's Parental Consent Act, Ala. Code 26-21-4, which regulates an unemancipated minor's ability to obtain an abortion. Ruling on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the district court held that some of the challenged provisions were unconstitutional, severed those provisions from the rest of the Act, and entered a declaratory judgment that rendered the severed provisions unenforceable.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court correctly held that RHS had Article III standing to challenge Alabama's Parental Consent Act. In this case, plaintiffs have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement and they have demonstrated causation and redressability. The court also concluded that the district court correctly held that the Attorney General and the District Attorney are proper defendants under Ex parte Young. The court explained that the criminal-enforcement link here establishes the necessary connection between defendants and the challenged provisions. The court stated that Ex parte Young provides an avenue for a civil lawsuit so plaintiffs do not need to subject themselves to criminal prosecution to challenge unconstitutional laws. That civil avenue is particularly important here, where the law involves the inherently serious time-sensitive issue of minors' access to abortion and violating the law could cause medical professionals to lose their licenses.On the merits, the court agreed with the district court that several provisions of the Act create an undue burden under Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016), and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). The court agreed with the district court that the Act constitutes an undue burden because it places a substantial obstacle on a "large fraction" of unemancipated minors who seek to obtain a court order authorizing an abortion without the consent of their parent or guardian. The court considered the benefits and burdens of the challenged regulation, concluding that although the state has an interest in providing guidance and assistance to minors who seek an abortion without parental consent, the challenged provisions provide, if anything, marginal benefit. Instead, the provisions created substantial obstacles and were therefore impermissible means of serving legitimate ends. The court was confident that the Act as amended creates an undue burden under Whole Woman's Health by placing a substantial obstacle each year for a handful of unemancipated minors who would seek to obtain a judicial bypass from the parental/guardian consent requirements of the Act. For these minors, the Act would either (a) unduly interfere with the minors' ability to demonstrate maturity or best interest by adding additional (and possibly adversarial parties) in the bypass proceeding, or (b) deter them from trying to obtain a court order through a judicial bypass proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reproductive Health Services v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiffs' action alleged that Centra Tech and some of its principals violated the Securities Act of 1933 in their efforts related to the initial coin offering of Centra Tokens.The court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, including the near omnipresence of an automatic discovery stay imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) whenever a motion to dismiss is pending -- in effect for just under fifteen of the eighteen months between the initial complaint and plaintiffs' certification motion -- the district court's timeliness holding was an abuse of discretion. The court also concluded that the district court erred when it denied certification on the alternative ground that plaintiffs had not established an administratively feasible method for identifying class members. The court explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 implicitly requires that a proposed class be ascertainable. However, the court's recent decision in Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2021), clarified that to meet this ascertainability requirement, the party seeking certification need not establish its ability to identify class members in a convenient or administratively feasible manner. The court noted that considerations of administrative feasibility may still be relevant to Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability analysis. View "Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc." on Justia Law