Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her complaint against Floridian, in an action alleging that Floridian violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) based on barriers to access she encountered at the hotel property (Count I) and deficiencies in its online reservation system (Count II). The district court dismissed Count II for improper claim splitting, given that plaintiff had made a claim in her first lawsuit about Floridian's online reservation system. The district court subsequently dismissed Count I with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that plaintiff did not have standing to seek injunctive relief.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count I for lack of standing, except to the extent that the district court dismissed the claim with prejudice. In this case, the totality of relevant facts simply do not support the conclusion that plaintiff faced a real and immediate threat of future discrimination at the Hotel. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to amend its judgment as to Count I. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count II for claim splitting because Count II and Floridian I arise from the same transaction and are based on facts that are sufficiently related in time, space, origin, and motivation. View "Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute over an illegal stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) policy, the district court found that the AIG Policy at issue lacked an insurable interest at its inception and was therefore void under Delaware Code Annotated Title 18, 2704(a), which, in relevant part, governs the purchase of a life insurance policy on the life of another person.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision allowing the Estate to recover the policy's proceeds under section 2704(b) and finding that the policy was void. However, the court reversed the district court's decision to strike Berkshire's counterclaims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations. The court deferred its decision on the remaining issues in this case pending certification of two questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware. The court stated that Berkshire may be entitled to the premiums it paid and the district court erred by striking its misrepresentation counterclaims. The court reserved judgment on the questions of whether the district court properly calculated prejudgment interest to which the Estate is entitled. View "Estate of Malkin v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district, claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act; interference with her Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights; and retaliation in violation of all three statutes. Principally, plaintiff alleged that, in ending her employment, the school district discriminated against her because she suffers from major depressive disorder and retaliated against her for asserting her statutory rights.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district. The district court concluded that the school district had terminated plaintiff's employment because of her conduct—the threats she made against her own life and the lives of others—not because she had major depressive disorder or because she had participated in statutorily protected activity. In regard to plaintiff's disability discrimination claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the court ultimately concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the school district's proffered reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual. In regard to plaintiff's retaliation claims, the court concluded that, besides the temporal proximity between when plaintiff asserted her ADA rights and when the school district asked her to resign, no evidence suggests that the school district's stated reasons for ending her employment were merely an excuse to cover up retaliation. In regard to the FMLA interference claim, the court concluded that plaintiff cites nothing from the record to show that the school district's decision to end her employment related in any way to her decision to take FMLA leave. View "Todd v. Fayette County School District" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. Defendants' convictions stemmed from three public housing repair contracts that their construction company procured following successful bids to the county. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud to constitute wire fraud, and knowingly and voluntarily engaged in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud. View "United States v. Estepa" on Justia Law

Statewide harvests and hauls fruit from about 1,500 fields for Florida farmers. It does not own any of the lands it harvests. In 2014-2017, Statewide employed mostly temporary foreign guest workers as its seasonal harvest workers, through the federal H-2A program, which requires a labor contractor to provide workers with housing, either three meals a day or “free and convenient cooking and kitchen facilities,” and other basic housing amenities including laundry facilities. Statewide provided its workers with cooking facilities instead of meals and with transportation from housing to a grocery store, laundromat, and bank. Statewide employed Ramirez and Santana as crew leaders during the harvest seasons; they also drove the workers to and from housing and the grocery store, laundromat, and bank. These weekly trips lasted approximately four hours. Ramirez and Santana worked up to 80 hours a week. Neither received overtime compensation.They sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, for unpaid overtime compensation for the driving trips. Statewide argued that those activities fell under the agricultural work exemption from the overtime requirements, section 213(b)(12). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in favor of the crew leaders. Statewide is not a farmer; it “did not own, lease, or control the farms or crops harvested. To be exempt from the overtime requirements, the driving trips must have been “performed . . . on a farm.” They occurred off a farm and were not physically tied to a farm. View "Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of an electronic search condition on defendant's conditions of supervised release and affirmed his above-guideline 30-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the special condition where, although the electronic search condition did not relate directly to defendant's firearm offense, it was reasonably related to his history as a recidivist and the statutory goals of deterring him from future potentially dangerous offenses. Furthermore, defendant was a chronic lawbreaker and the condition was neither vague nor overbroad.The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and placed heavy emphasis on the nature and circumstances of the offense in light of defendant's prior criminal history, promoting respect for the law, and deterring defendant from continued violations of the prohibition against him possessing a gun. In this case, it was defendant's seventh conviction for illegally possessing a gun and defendant received little to no jail time for his previous offenses. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government in an action challenging USCIS's decision determining that plaintiff was ineligible for adjustment of status due to his membership in a Tier III terrorist organization—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—and his personal engagement in terrorist activity.The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in determining that plaintiff's inadmissibility under the terrorism bar was not actually litigated during the asylum proceeding, and rejected the issue preclusion claim. The court held that an organization engages in terrorist activity for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) when its members perpetrate terrorist activity and its leadership authorizes such conduct expressly or tacitly. In this case, as applied to plaintiff and the BNP, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also concluded that plaintiff's vagueness challenge to 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) & (VI) fails at the outset, because he intentionally relinquished any challenge to the definition of "terrorist activity" in the district court. Finally, the court applied the "exceedingly deferential" standard of review under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and held that the USCIS's conclusion that the BNP authorized its members' terrorist activity—and thus qualified as a Tier III terrorist organization—is not arbitrary and capricious. View "Islam v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

In 2006, Potts pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846. In a consolidated case, Potts pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846; and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e). The court imposed three concurrent 240-month sentences. In 2019, Potts sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court found Potts was ineligible because he was not sentenced for a “covered offense” and that section 3553(a)'s factors indicate that a sentence reduction is unwarranted. In 2020, while Potts’ appeal was pending, the court granted Potts compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), after analyzing the 3553(a) factors and finding compelling reasons: Potts’ serious medical conditions rendered him uniquely vulnerable to COVID-19. The court imposed an additional 37-month supervised release term—the unserved portion of his original prison sentence—to be served on “home confinement” before serving his original, concurrent supervised release terms.The Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of his 2019 motion. The 2020 motion rendered the issue moot with respect to his incarceration but not with respect to supervised release. The court’s refusal to reduce Potts’ supervised release terms was not an abuse of its discretion. View "United States v. Potts" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for attempted enticement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity and traveling across a state line with the intent to engage in sexual activity with a person under the age of 12 years.The court concluded that there was no error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on outrageous conduct grounds; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress the child pornography on his computers; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence that defendant possessed child pornography, in overruling his objection on Fifth Amendment grounds, or in instructing the jury that it could consider his refusal to answer questions about his possession of child pornography in assessing his credibility; the district court did not abuse its discretion by not permitting one of defendant's expert witnesses to testify before the jury as irrelevant; and defendant's 35 year term of imprisonment was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court agreed with the government that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and that the district court erred in finding otherwise. However, notwithstanding the government's concession, the court must still decide whether the district court, in its alternative holding, abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction.The court held that the First Step Act does not require that the district court consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors when exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court explained that the district court's alternative ruling denying defendant's request to reduce or terminate his term of supervised release failed to provide a sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stevens" on Justia Law