Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for sex trafficking three women, two of whom were minors when he recruited them. The district court sentenced defendant to more than five terms of life imprisonment and ordered that he pay restitution to his victims, returning the years of their prostitution earnings that he pocketed. The court concluded that defendant's convictions for his horrific crimes were supported by the evidence, the restitution was both correctly calculated and lawfully imposed, and the sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 brought by petitioner, alleging that the district court erred when it held that he was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object to the introduction of hearsay evidence and it erred when it denied his Confrontation Clause claim.The court agreed with the district court that the conclusion of the Rule 3.850 state court that petitioner could not show prejudice under the Strickland standard was neither an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. Undertaking the section 2254(d)(2) inquiry first, and applying that deferential standard of review, the court cannot conclude that the Rule 3.850 court's statement that the witness identified petitioner as the perpetrator was an unreasonable determination of fact in light of the evidence presented in state court. In regard to the Confrontation Clause claim, the court could not conclude that petitioner has met his burden under Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 135 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011), to show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Finally, the court rejected claims of cumulative error, because the court could not conclude that petitioner can satisfy his burden of avoiding the preemptive effect of the state court decisions and of establishing prejudice. View "Tarleton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sentencing enhancement to defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The court concluded that the district court did not err in considering the prosecutor's factual proffer from defendant's state plea colloquy concerning the dates of his prior offenses when conducting the ACCA's different-occasions inquiry because defendant implicitly confirmed the factual basis for his plea. In this case, the district court did not err in relying on the prosecutor's factual proffer in defendant's plea colloquy to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the three qualifying prior convictions for Alabama assault occurred on three separate, distinct occasions. The court also concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief on his Rehaif-based challenge where he cannot establish that the error affected his substantial rights for purposes of plain error review. View "United States v. Dudley" on Justia Law

The Association sought to recover for the damage caused by Hurricane Irma from its insurer, Rockhill. After Rockhill denied coverage and the parties went to trial before a jury, the Association received a little over $2.6 million—a fraction of the $16 million it initially asked for. Both parties appealed, Rockhill challenged the final judgment entered in favor of the Association, and the Association challenged the damages award.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that it need not discuss the merits of Rockhill's summary judgment challenge because the court's precedent clearly bars review of an order denying summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits. In regard to the three remaining issues on appeal, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Rockhill's expert; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rockhill's Daubert motion; and Rockhill did not preserve its challenge to the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.In regard to the Association's cross-appeal, the court concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's preexisting damage finding. The court also concluded that Rockhill's failure to comply with Florida Statute 627.701(2) does not render the hurricane deductible unenforceable. View "St. Louis Condominium Association, Inc. v. Rockhill Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The en banc court held that interlocutory appeals may not be taken under the collateral order doctrine from the denials of so-called "state-action immunity" under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943), and its progeny. The court concluded that, insofar as the reviewability condition of the collateral order doctrine is concerned, Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1986), wrongly equated a Parker defense with an immunity from suit. Therefore, the en banc court dismissed this appeal by the members of the Georgia Board of Dentistry for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Battle" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that sexual harassment—both hostile housing environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment—is actionable under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, provided the plaintiff demonstrates that she would not have been harassed but for her sex.In this case, plaintiff filed suit against the property manager and the property's owner, alleging sexual harassment claims under the Act and state law. The district court found no guidance from the court on this question and therefore dismissed the complaint based on the ground that plaintiff's claims were not actionable under the Act. The court vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint and remanded for reconsideration. View "Fox v. Gaines" on Justia Law

Spencer sued Sheriff Benison under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Benison violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by ordering him to remove cones and vehicles that were preventing Spencer’s neighbor from completing construction that Spencer claimed encroached on his property. The district court found that Benison acted outside the scope of his discretionary authority and was not entitled to qualified immunity on Spencer’s individual capacity claims and that Spencer had presented adequate evidence of a constitutional violation to sustain his section 1983 claims against Benison in both his individual and official capacities.The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Benison was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles. It was a legitimate job-related function for Benison, an Alabama sheriff, to seek the removal of cones and vehicles for the purposes of achieving public safety, given that traffic was backing up and customers were unable to access a business. Benison properly carried out his duties by verbally commanding Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles and by threatening arrest should he fail to comply. Spencer failed to present adequate evidence of a constitutional violation; he did not demonstrate that Benison’s actions caused him to be deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest. View "Spencer v. Benison" on Justia Law

Assuming without deciding that a general default judgment can be the basis of collateral estoppel under Florida law in an 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) proceeding as to each of the claims asserted in a multi-count complaint, the Eleventh Circuit held that estoppel does not apply here. The court explained that each of the claims that could have satisfied the requirements of section 523(a)(2)(A) contained alternative factual allegations that did not do so. In such a scenario—one so far not addressed by Florida law—the court predicted that Florida courts would not afford preclusive effect to a general default judgment that does not specify its grounds.In this case, defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation claim cannot serve as the basis for collateral estoppel against debtor under section 523(a)(2)(A), because the default judgment as to this claim could have been based on a "should have known the falsity" theory, as opposed to an "actual knowledge of falsity" theory. Furthermore, because neither negligence nor constructive fraud suffices under section 523(a)(2)(A), the default judgment on the negligent misrepresentation claim does not have collateral estoppel effect under Florida law. Investment fraud under Fla. Stat. 517.301 also does not have collateral estoppel effect under section 523(a)(2)(A). Nor does the conspiracy to defraud claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Harris v. Jayo" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 60-month sentence for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Although the court agreed with defendant that the district court committed a Jones error, the court concluded that the record is sufficient to permit appellate review of the sentencing issue he raises.On the merits, the court acknowledged that there is daylight between the standards under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) and USSG 5C1.2(a)(2), and that application of a firearm enhancement does not necessarily preclude safety-valve relief. However, the court affirmed the sentence because, on this record, the district court's factual findings under section 2D1.1(b)(1) foreclosed relief under section 5C1.2(a)(2). The court remanded for the sole purpose of correcting a clerical error. View "United States v. Sanchez Carrasquillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sixt on behalf of a putative class of Sixt customers, alleging that Sixt breached its own contract with him and violated two state consumer-protection statutes. In this case, plaintiff had used Orbitz.com to book a rental car from Sixt. When plaintiff picked up the rental car from Sixt, he signed an entirely separate agreement with Sixt which did not contain an arbitration provision.The Eleventh Circuit explained that a customer making an airline, hotel, or car-rental reservation on Orbitz.com agrees to a contract that includes an arbitration provision, and that provision requires the customer to arbitrate disputes related to, among other things, "any services or products provided." At issue is whether that phrase refers to services and products provided by Orbitz or by anyone.Reading the "any services or products provided" clause in the light of neighboring provisions and the larger contractual context—and applying a dose of common sense—the court concluded that it refers only to services and products provided by Orbitz. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Sixt's motion to compel arbitration because the underlying dispute does not relate to services or products provided by Orbitz. Rather, it relates only to those provided by Sixt, a company that does business through Orbitz. View "Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC" on Justia Law