Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal is whether (despite agreeing to arbitrate any dispute with their employer) final-mile delivery drivers—drivers who make local deliveries of goods and materials that have been shipped from out-of-state to a local warehouse—are in a "class of workers engaged in foreign and interstate commerce" and, thus, exempt under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) from having to arbitrate their Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims. The district court concluded that they were exempt and refused to compel arbitration.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court misapplied Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 2005), and wrongly determined that the exemption applied. The court reversed the part of the district court's order denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration under the FAA and remanded for the district court to determine whether the drivers are in a class of workers employed in the transportation industry and whether the class, in general, is actually engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. The court dismissed the part of the appeal challenging the district court's denial of the employer's motion to compel arbitration under state arbitration law based on lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Hamrick v. Partsfleet, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1994, SGV bought 547 acres in Alabaster for $1.65 million. The master development plan, approved in 1995, zoned the land as R-2 (90-foot wide single-family residences), R-4 (60-foot wide garden homes), and R-7 (townhomes). Most of the development was completed by 2008, except the 142-acre Sector 16, zoned predominantly for R-4 and R-7 with a small part as R-2. In 2011, the city rezoned Sector 16 for R-2 lots only. SGV filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), and 1988, alleging that the rezoning “constitute[d] an unlawful taking” without just compensation and denials of procedural and substantive due process. The court rejected the due process claims. The city objected to evidence of the city’s motive and the “lot method” valuation and argued that the case was not ripe for adjudication, since SGV had not sought variances. The court found that a zoning ordinance was a final matter that could be adjudicated. A jury found that there was a regulatory taking without just compensation; that before the taking, the value of the property was $3,532,849.19; and after the taking, the value of the property was $500,000. The court added prejudgment interest and entered a final judgment of $3,505,030.65. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the just compensation claim was not ripe, that the district court improperly allowed evidence regarding the city’s motivation for enacting th ordinance, and concerning the admission and exclusion of certain other evidence. View "South Grand View Development Co., Inc. v. City of Alabaster" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the motion for panel rehearing, vacated its earlier opinion, and substituted in its place the following opinion.The court affirmed defendant's 108 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant alleged that the district court erred by imposing a term of imprisonment that was simply too long under the circumstances and by failing to adjust his sentence under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 5G1.3(b)(1) for time served on an undischarged term of state imprisonment.The court rejected defendant's challenges, concluding that the Sentencing Guidelines, though they are the starting point for all federal sentencing decisions, are no longer mandatory in whole, or even in part. The court explained that the district court needed to consider section 5G1.3(b)(1) when determining defendant's initial Guidelines recommendation, but after that was free to exercise its discretion to impose the sentence that seemed most appropriate. Furthermore, the choice the district court made here was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, any error in how the district court considered section 5G1.3(b)(1) was harmless and the final sentence it chose was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Puchalski, a Wisconsin citizen, took a cruise aboard an RCL ship. While the ship was docked in Juneau, Alaska, he experienced shortness of breath and went to the ship’s infirmary. The ship’s physician prescribed medications. Puchalski returned to his quarters, then collapsed. He was taken to a hospital and died days later. Puchalski’s estate sued RCL, a Liberian corporation headquartered in Florida, alleging negligent medical care and treatment. Florida law would have authorized non-pecuniary damages for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering. Wisconsin law would not. The parties agreed to address the issue only if a damages award made it necessary. A jury awarded $3,384,073.22 in damages, $3,360,000 of which represented non-pecuniary losses. The district court denied RCL’s Motion for Remittitur, finding that Florida law governed damages.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. General maritime law does not allow non-pecuniary damages for wrongful death, but the Supreme Court has held that state law may supplement general maritime law for damages in suits for deaths that occur within state territorial waters. In determining that Florida law applied, the court applied the “Lauritzen” factors: the place of the wrongful act, domiciles of the injured and of the defendant, place of contract, law of the forum, and location of the defendant’s base of operations. Wisconsin’s interests would not be served by applying Wisconsin law to this case. Applying Florida law, however, would further Florida’s interests in wrongful death suits involving its domiciliaries. View "Goodloe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD." on Justia Law

In mid-2017, Felton created an “offshore entity,” FLiK, for “developing [an] online viewing platform that [would] allow[] creatives to sell/rent their projects.” To raise funds, FLiK created cryptographic “FLiK Tokens” and represented that investors could redeem the tokens on its platform after it launched. FLiK never registered FLiK Tokens with the SEC but promoted FLik on social media and published a whitepaper with details about the company. FLiK announced that “T.I.,” an Atlanta-based rapper and actor (Harris), had joined Felton. The actor Kevin Hart tweeted a photograph of himself with Harris and wrote, “I’m Super Excited for [T.I.] and his new venture with @TheFlikIO! FLiK sold the tokens for about six cents each. The value of FLiK tokens soared and then crashed down. Felton largely ignored messages from token purchasers. None of FLiK’s services or projects came to fruition.Fedance, who had purchased $3,000 worth of FLiK Tokens, brought a putative class action under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77l(a)(1), 77o(a), alleging that Felton and Harris sold unregistered securities, that Harris acted as a “statutory seller” of unregistered securities, and that Felton and Harris were liable as controlling persons of an entity, The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely under a one-year statute of limitations. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint does not plausibly allege that Felton or Harris fraudulently concealed the facts necessary to assert claims under sections 12(a)(1) or 15(a) against them. View "Fedance v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, Alfa, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff contends that, although Alfa claims she was terminated because of automation of some of her job responsibilities, she was actually terminated because of the high costs to Alfa in treating her multiple sclerosis (MS).The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Alfa, concluding that plaintiff was denied full discovery. In this case, Alfa did not demonstrate a burden or abuse of process sufficient to justify such limitations on discovery, and especially in light of the relevant nature of the information sought by plaintiff. Therefore, the district court committed a clear error of judgment by denying plaintiff the opportunity to depose the then-Executive Vice President of Human Resources. View "Akridge v. Alfa Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

These appeals involve several issues related to the convictions of four drug smugglers under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. Defendants were caught by the Coast Guard off the coast of the Dominican Republic and 180 kilograms of cocaine were discovered. Defendants were convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the United States had jurisdiction over defendants' stateless vessel. Furthermore, no evidentiary hearing was required for that ruling, and any error in delaying it was harmless. The court also concluded that sufficient evidence supported defendants' convictions because their indictments did not obligate the government to prove that they knew the identity of the controlled substance they carried. Finally, the district court afforded them a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' convictions. View "United States v. Nunez" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming an IJ's discretionary denial of petitioner's application for asylum and grant of withholding of removal. The court concluded that when an asylum applicant is denied asylum but granted withholding of removal, 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(e) requires reconsideration anew of the discretionary denial of asylum, including addressing reasonable alternatives available to the petitioner for family reunification. And where the IJ has failed to do so, the BIA must remand for the IJ to conduct the required reconsideration.In this case, the IJ failed to consider petitioner's asylum claim under section 1208.16(e). Therefore, the BIA's failure to remand on this issue was manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. The court explained that it is clear that neither the IJ nor the BIA conducted the proper reconsideration because the record contained no information about petitioner's ability to reunite with his family, information that the agency must review under section 1208.16(e). Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for reconsideration of the discretionary denial of asylum. View "Thamotar v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for four counts of mail fraud, three counts of making false statements, and two counts of money laundering. In relevant part, a jury found defendant guilty of mailing U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) several forms, which falsely claimed large business expenditures from 2005 to 2007, as part of a scheme to acquire federal government subsidies under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Act of 2000 (CDSOA).The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred by asking defendant if he wanted to waive his right to testify. Rather, the court concluded that the district court did not err in requesting an on-the-record waiver of defendant's right to testify. The court explained that nothing in the framing of the two neutral, straight-forward questions by the district court undermined defendant's right to testify or improperly intruded into the attorney-client relationship by suggesting the district court's contrary leaning as to what defendant should decide.The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give defendant's requested jury instructions on the CDSOA because the absence of the CDSOA instruction in no way impaired the defense. The court declined to reverse defendant's conviction based on the district court's alleged Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) violation when it revised the mail-fraud jury instruction to correct a statement of the law or its refusal to give a curative instruction. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in giving a modified Allen charge similar to the pattern instruction. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In this appeal involving an alleged conspiracy by several state officials to violate a former physician's civil rights by pinning the blame for his patient's death on him, the district court dismissed the physician's claims involving actions taken within the scope of the receivership for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In this case, a pre-med student began working in the physician's medical practice and then later moved into his home. The physician started prescribing the student hydrocodone and increasingly stronger medications for headaches and abdominal pains. The student later died of a drug overdose.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to review the claims against the receiver for his acts taken within the scope of the receivership but that these claims fail because the receiver is entitled to judicial immunity. The court explained that, although the Barton Doctrine does not apply, Defendants Lambros, Ekonomou, and the Law Firms are entitled to judicial immunity. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1985 claims for failure to allege racial or class-based animus; the physician's remaining allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and he is not entitled to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and affirmed in part. View "Chua v. Ekonomou" on Justia Law