Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. Defendants' convictions stemmed from three public housing repair contracts that their construction company procured following successful bids to the county. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud to constitute wire fraud, and knowingly and voluntarily engaged in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud. View "United States v. Estepa" on Justia Law

Statewide harvests and hauls fruit from about 1,500 fields for Florida farmers. It does not own any of the lands it harvests. In 2014-2017, Statewide employed mostly temporary foreign guest workers as its seasonal harvest workers, through the federal H-2A program, which requires a labor contractor to provide workers with housing, either three meals a day or “free and convenient cooking and kitchen facilities,” and other basic housing amenities including laundry facilities. Statewide provided its workers with cooking facilities instead of meals and with transportation from housing to a grocery store, laundromat, and bank. Statewide employed Ramirez and Santana as crew leaders during the harvest seasons; they also drove the workers to and from housing and the grocery store, laundromat, and bank. These weekly trips lasted approximately four hours. Ramirez and Santana worked up to 80 hours a week. Neither received overtime compensation.They sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, for unpaid overtime compensation for the driving trips. Statewide argued that those activities fell under the agricultural work exemption from the overtime requirements, section 213(b)(12). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in favor of the crew leaders. Statewide is not a farmer; it “did not own, lease, or control the farms or crops harvested. To be exempt from the overtime requirements, the driving trips must have been “performed . . . on a farm.” They occurred off a farm and were not physically tied to a farm. View "Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of an electronic search condition on defendant's conditions of supervised release and affirmed his above-guideline 30-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the special condition where, although the electronic search condition did not relate directly to defendant's firearm offense, it was reasonably related to his history as a recidivist and the statutory goals of deterring him from future potentially dangerous offenses. Furthermore, defendant was a chronic lawbreaker and the condition was neither vague nor overbroad.The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and placed heavy emphasis on the nature and circumstances of the offense in light of defendant's prior criminal history, promoting respect for the law, and deterring defendant from continued violations of the prohibition against him possessing a gun. In this case, it was defendant's seventh conviction for illegally possessing a gun and defendant received little to no jail time for his previous offenses. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government in an action challenging USCIS's decision determining that plaintiff was ineligible for adjustment of status due to his membership in a Tier III terrorist organization—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—and his personal engagement in terrorist activity.The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in determining that plaintiff's inadmissibility under the terrorism bar was not actually litigated during the asylum proceeding, and rejected the issue preclusion claim. The court held that an organization engages in terrorist activity for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) when its members perpetrate terrorist activity and its leadership authorizes such conduct expressly or tacitly. In this case, as applied to plaintiff and the BNP, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also concluded that plaintiff's vagueness challenge to 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) & (VI) fails at the outset, because he intentionally relinquished any challenge to the definition of "terrorist activity" in the district court. Finally, the court applied the "exceedingly deferential" standard of review under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and held that the USCIS's conclusion that the BNP authorized its members' terrorist activity—and thus qualified as a Tier III terrorist organization—is not arbitrary and capricious. View "Islam v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

In 2006, Potts pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846. In a consolidated case, Potts pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846; and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e). The court imposed three concurrent 240-month sentences. In 2019, Potts sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court found Potts was ineligible because he was not sentenced for a “covered offense” and that section 3553(a)'s factors indicate that a sentence reduction is unwarranted. In 2020, while Potts’ appeal was pending, the court granted Potts compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), after analyzing the 3553(a) factors and finding compelling reasons: Potts’ serious medical conditions rendered him uniquely vulnerable to COVID-19. The court imposed an additional 37-month supervised release term—the unserved portion of his original prison sentence—to be served on “home confinement” before serving his original, concurrent supervised release terms.The Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of his 2019 motion. The 2020 motion rendered the issue moot with respect to his incarceration but not with respect to supervised release. The court’s refusal to reduce Potts’ supervised release terms was not an abuse of its discretion. View "United States v. Potts" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for attempted enticement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity and traveling across a state line with the intent to engage in sexual activity with a person under the age of 12 years.The court concluded that there was no error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on outrageous conduct grounds; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress the child pornography on his computers; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence that defendant possessed child pornography, in overruling his objection on Fifth Amendment grounds, or in instructing the jury that it could consider his refusal to answer questions about his possession of child pornography in assessing his credibility; the district court did not abuse its discretion by not permitting one of defendant's expert witnesses to testify before the jury as irrelevant; and defendant's 35 year term of imprisonment was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court agreed with the government that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and that the district court erred in finding otherwise. However, notwithstanding the government's concession, the court must still decide whether the district court, in its alternative holding, abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction.The court held that the First Step Act does not require that the district court consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors when exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court explained that the district court's alternative ruling denying defendant's request to reduce or terminate his term of supervised release failed to provide a sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he was convicted of selling heroin and possessing a firearm as a felon. In this case, after agreeing to sell heroin and a firearm to a confidential informant, defendant sold the heroin as promised but failed to deliver the firearm on that date. Afterwards, he provided the firearm at the same time his associate provided more heroin for sale to the informant.The court upheld the district court's application of USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which increases the offense level by four if the defendant "used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense." The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that a sufficient connection existed between the first heroin sale and the later firearm sale. Therefore, the guidelines calculation was correct and defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Garcon pleaded guilty to attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute. Garcon faced a five-year statutory minimum sentence. His PSR recommended a three-point reduction for timely acceptance of responsibility and noted a previous three-point offense for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Garcon's Guidelines sentence range was 41–51 months but because of the five-year statutory minimum, the term was 60 months. The district court found Garcon eligible for the safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) because he had less than four criminal history points and did not have a prior two-point violent offense.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. Under the First Step Act's "safety valve," district courts “shall” sentence certain convicted drug offenders with little or no criminal history according to the Sentencing Guidelines “without regard to any statutory mandatory minimum sentence.” A defendant convicted of a specified drug offense is eligible for safety valve relief only if: (1) the defendant does not have— (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the guidelines. Section 3553(f)(1) is written in the disjunctive. Garcon is ineligible because he met one of the three disqualifying criteria with his prior three-point conviction. View "United States v. Garcon" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII retaliation claims against Bradley Arant and grant of summary judgment to Marion Bank on the Title VII retaliation claims. Bradley Arant is an Alabama law firm that represented the Bank in litigation related to this case. Plaintiffs are related to Ragan Youngblood, a former Bank employee who was hired in February 2008 and fired seven months later, in September 2008. Ragan was the personal assistant to the Bank's president and CEO, Conrad Taylor. After Ragan was fired, she filed an EEOC charge alleging that Taylor had sexually harassed her and retaliated against her for complaining about that harassment. Plaintiffs claim that the Bank and the law firm took adverse action against them in retaliation for Ragan's protected conduct.Pursuant to Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174–75 (2011), the court concluded that plaintiffs must meet two prerequisites to even get out of the starting gate on a third-party Title VII retaliation claim against the Bank. In regard to plaintiffs' retaliation claim based on litigation filed by the firm on the Bank's behalf, and assuming the viability of plaintiffs' claim, the court assumed without deciding that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs qualified under Thompson as proper third-party retaliation claimants. The court concluded that summary judgment is warranted for the Bank based on the McDonnell Douglas standard. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that but for Ragan's claim of sexual harassment, the Bank would not have engaged in the litigation that plaintiffs characterize as excessive.In regard to plaintiffs' claims based on the Bank's decision to stop referring legal work to Plaintiff Greg, the court assumed without deciding that his third-party claim can proceed. Analyzing the claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court concluded that the Bank articulated a neutral, nonretaliatory reason for no longer referring legal work to Greg based on a conflict of interest. Furthermore, Greg has failed to produce any evidence of pretext. Finally, in regard to plaintiffs' claims against the law firm, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where plaintiffs failed to allege an employment relationship between themselves and the firm. View "Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP" on Justia Law