Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision upholding the Commissioner's determination that petitioner owes an income tax deficiency for 2011. The court concluded that the Tax Court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed net operating loss (NOL) deduction in 2011. The court also concluded that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by overruling petitioner's objections to the Commissioner's deficiency computations under Rule 155, which included the income, but not the deductions, from petitioner's late-filed 2011 tax return. Finally, the court could not say that the Tax Court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case to litigate an issue that petitioner never attempted to raise. View "Barker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that a Florida statute, Fla. Stat. 375.251(2)(a), which speaks in broad and unqualified terms, means exactly what it says—that an owner incurs no ordinary duty of care to, and no duty to warn, any entrant, regardless of his common-law status or reason for entry.In this case, plaintiff and his wife filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after plaintiff slipped and fell at a public shower at Tables Beach. The federal government operates Patrick Air Force Base on a large parcel of land in Brevard County, and that land encompasses Tables Beach, which fronts the Atlantic Ocean and which the government has opened to the public. The United States claimed that it was immune from suit because the FTCA, which waives sovereign immunity in specified instances, authorizes only those tort actions that can be brought against private persons under state law. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Florida's recreational-use statute eliminated the government's ordinary duty of care and duty to warn as to plaintiff and his wife.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that because the recreational-use statute protects a qualifying landowner against a suit alleging a breach of its ordinary duty of care and duty to warn as to all entrants, regardless of their reason for entry, the government has not waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA. Therefore, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this action against the United States. View "Fisher v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition in a case where petitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death.The court concluded that petitioner's trial attorneys were not prejudicially ineffective by failing to further investigate and present to the jury evidence of his mental illness, cognitive deficits, and brain damage, and by failing to investigate and present evidence of additional mitigating family background and social history. The court concluded that the state court's rejection of these claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The court was similarly unpersuaded regarding petitioner's procedural and substantive claims of incompetency to stand trial. Furthermore, petitioner's due process rights were not violated when he was required to wear a stun belt at trial. The court rejected petitioner's several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, the court concluded that it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law for the Georgia Supreme Court to have concluded, on direct review, that the prosecutor's violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on his failure to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Raheem v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

The Government filed suit to enforce the IRS assessment of a penalty against defendant for failing for the year 2007 to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5321. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government and enforced the IRS assessment of a penalty for a willful violation.The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding defendant's willfulness or recklessness where the evidence was overwhelming that defendant sought to hide his overseas accounts from the United States government. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the maximum penalty is established by the 2004 amendment to 31 U.S.C. 5321, not by the regulation in 31 C.F.R. 1010.820(g)(2). The court also concluded that defendant's several arguments that the IRS factfinding proceedings were so insufficient as to warrant de novo review—in departure from the usual arbitrary and capricious review—are wholly without merit; the IRS's actions were not arbitrary and capricious; and defendant's arguments regarding the imposition of interest and late fees are without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rum" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its previous opinion and substituted it with the following opinion.The court affirmed defendant's conviction for five counts of armed robbery and carrying a firearm in furtherance of the robberies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to continue the trial date; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss Juror 20 for cause based on her employment with the Department of Community Supervision because she did not qualify as a member of a police department; even assuming without deciding that the Google geo-location data should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree," any error in admitting that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence sufficiently supported defendant's convictions on all five robberies; the special agent's testimony does not warrant vacatur of the convictions; and, even assuming error, cumulative error does not warrant vacatur of the convictions. View "United States v. Pendergrass" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Intuitive for injuries following a surgical procedure, seeking money damages. After a two-day Daubert hearing, the district court agreed with Intuitive's position and excluded the testimony of plaintiff's expert.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in its application of the Daubert test and thus improperly entered summary judgment in favor of Intuitive. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in finding that perceived deficiencies in the expert's testimony rendered him unqualified to provide expert testimony in this case. In light of Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1342 (11th Cir. 2003), the court concluded that the expert is qualified to perform a differential etiology on a patient who suffered a thermal injury during a hysterectomy performed with a da Vinci robot not because of his familiarity with the robot, but because of his familiarity with differential etiologies in the context of gynecological procedures. As such, the district court applied the incorrect legal standard, and thus abused its discretion.Even if the court were to ignore the district court's manifestly erroneous ruling that conflated the reliability and qualifications prongs, the court would still be obliged to reverse, as the district court imposed an admissibility standard on expert qualifications that was "too high." The court concluded that the district court improperly based its evidentiary determinations on the weight and persuasiveness of the evidence, and that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 does not impose any such requirements. Therefore, the expert was qualified to testify regarding the standard of care in hysterectomy procedures and the cause of plaintiff's injuries. On remand, the court directed that the case be assigned to a different judge. View "Moore v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against USAA on behalf of himself and a putative class for declaratory judgments that USAA's method to calculate insurance payments was inconsistent with Florida law and the insurance policy.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective relief on the off chance that he might total a car again in the future. The court further concluded that plaintiff's request for supplemental relief does not change the standing analysis for a declaratory judgment claim. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff does not have standing to bring his declaratory judgment claims, vacated the district court's order of dismissal, and remanded to the district court with instructions that the district court remand the case back to state court. View "Mack v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After a debt collector electronically transmitted data concerning a consumer's debt to a third-party vendor, the third-party vendor then used the data to create, print, and mail a "dunning" letter to the consumer. The consumer then filed suit alleging that, in sending his personal information to the vendor, the debt collector had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692c(b), which, with certain exceptions, prohibits debt collectors from communicating consumers' personal information to third parties "in connection with the collection of any debt." The district court dismissed the action.The Eleventh Circuit held that a violation of section 1692c(b) gives rise to a concrete injury in fact under Article III. The court also concluded that the debt collector's transmittal of the consumer's personal information to its dunning vendor constituted a communication "in connection with the collection of any debt" within the meaning of section 1692c(b). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a deputy in the sheriff's office, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the deputy seized his iPhone after plaintiff took photos and videos of a car accident crash scene from an interstate median. The district court granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims except for one, which plaintiff prevailed at trial.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order, holding that plaintiff's First Amendment claim is barred by qualified immunity because defendant did not violate clearly established law at the time; plaintiff's false-arrest claims fail because defendant had probable cause to arrest him because plaintiff's car was parked on a limited-access facility in violation of Florida law; and plaintiff's excessive-force claim fails on the merits and, in any event, is barred by qualified immunity. The court noted that, whether it analyzed plaintiff's excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment, the court would reach the same result. View "Crocker v. Beatty" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Because two intervening decisions changed the law applicable to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims and retaliatory hostile work environment claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court with the instruction that it analyze the claims consistent with the intervening decisions. Because the intervening decisions did not, in the court's judgment, affect the resolution of the sex-based hostile work environment claim in this case, the court considered that claim alone and affirmed the district court's decision to enter summary judgment for the Secretary.In this case, the court concluded as an initial matter that most of the named co-worker's conduct lacks the necessary sexual or other gender-related connotations to be actionable sex discrimination. The court explained that nothing in the record allows the conclusion that the coworker's conduct had anything to do with plaintiff's sex; the context surrounding the coworker's inappropriate touching of plaintiff shows that the touching was not sex based; and there is no evidence suggesting that the angry looks, harsh words, and silent treatment that the coworker gave plaintiff were influenced by plaintiff's sex. Even if the coworker's conduct was based on plaintiff's sex, her claim would still fail because the conduct is insufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law