Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sentencing Guidelines' enhancements under subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3), for criminal convictions received before and after the defendant's previous deportation or removal, do not violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Nor do they cause unlawful double-counting in violation of due process or otherwise.Defendant was convicted of illegal reentry after the 2016 United States Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. Because he had committed other offenses both before his original deportation and after it, but before his current illegal-reentry offense, he received offense-level increases under both subsections USSG 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3).The Eleventh Circuit concluded that defendant's challenge to section 2L1.2(b)(2) is foreclosed by the court's binding precedent in United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 1992). The court explained that subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) do not apply to all noncitizens convicted of any crime in the United States; rather, they apply to only those noncitizens who both have illegally reentered the United States and have been convicted of other crimes. Furthermore, this is important because, through section 1326(b), Congress has determined that illegally reentering the United States after being deported following conviction on another crime is a more serious offense than simply illegally reentering the United States, and that conduct should be deterred. The court further explained that the challenged guidelines reflect the national interests that Congress permissibly has endorsed through its enactment and amendment of section 1326(b). The court also concluded that Congress has entrusted the Sentencing Commission with direct responsibility for fostering and protecting the interests of, among other things, sentencing policy that promotes deterrence and appropriately punishes culpability and risk of recidivism—the interests the Sentencing Commission cited in issuing the challenged guidelines. Finally, the court concluded that subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) are rationally related to the Commission's stated interests in issuing them. Therefore, the court upheld the guidelines at issue and affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Osorto" on Justia Law

This panel originally held that binding circuit precedent required that it conclude that nominal damages claims alone could not save appellants' otherwise moot constitutional challenges. On March 8, 2021, the Supreme Court reversed the panel's opinion.On remand from the Supreme Court, which held that an award of nominal damages by itself can redress a past injury, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal of appellants' First Amended Complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski" on Justia Law

In this libel case, the Eleventh Circuit held that New York's "fair and true report" privilege, codified as N.Y. Civ. Rights Law 74, applies to the fair and true publication of the contents of a document that was filed and sealed in a Florida paternity/child custody proceeding.Plaintiff filed suit against Gizmodo and Katherine Krueger, the author of an article published on the Splinter website owned by Gizmodo, over an article entitled "Court Docs Allege Ex-Trump Staffer Drugged Woman He Got Pregnant with 'Abortion Pill.'" The district court concluded that section 74 applied, and that the Splinter article was a fair and true report of the supplement because it was "substantially accurate." Plaintiff does not challenge the district court's finding that the Splinter article was a fair and true report, but he maintains that the section 74 privilege does not apply because the supplement was filed in a paternity/child custody proceeding and sealed. The court held that section 74's fair and true report privilege applies to the Splinter article written by Ms. Krueger about the supplement filed by the mother of plaintiff's child, and that the 1970 decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 261 N.E.2d 251, 256 (N.Y. 1970), does not preclude the application of section 74. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Miller v. Gizmodo Media Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A majority of the active judges of the Eleventh Circuit voted to rehear this case en banc.This petition for writ of mandamus arises under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Petitioner, one of more than 30 woman who were victimized by notorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey Epstein, sought mandamus relief, alleging that when federal prosecutors secretly negotiated and entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her rights under the CVRA. Specifically, petitioner alleged that federal prosecutors violated her rights to confer with the government's lawyers and to be treated fairly by them.The en banc court held that the CVRA does not provide a private right of action authorizing crime victims to seek judicial enforcement of CVRA rights outside the confines of a preexisting proceeding. The court explained that, while the CVRA permits a crime victim like Ms. Wild to move for relief within the context of a preexisting proceeding—and, more generally, to pursue administrative remedies—it does not authorize a victim to seek judicial enforcement of her CVRA rights in a freestanding civil action. In this case, because the government never filed charges against Epstein, there was no preexisting proceeding in which Ms. Wild could have moved for relief under the CVRA, and the Act does not sanction her stand-alone suit. View "In re: Courtney Wild" on Justia Law

After the district court construed defendant's pro se letter as a motion for a sentence reduction and, without giving him any opportunity to be heard, denied the motion, defendant filed a pro se motion for reconsideration. The district court also denied the motion for reconsideration.Applying the framework in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, but the court cannot tell whether the district court understood that it had the authority to reduce his sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders denying a sentence reduction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

After a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on his claim of First Amendment retaliation, he was awarded only one dollar in nominal damages because the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), as barring punitive damages for a prisoner's civil action where no physical injury is shown.The en banc court now recognizes that section 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages without a showing of physical injury. The en banc court explained that it did not conduct a textual interpretation of the statutory text and did not consider any non-physical injuries that were also not mental or emotional in nature. The en banc court misapprehended the text of the statute and the nature of the physical injury requirement when it comes to punitive damages. Therefore, in this case, plaintiff should be given an opportunity to obtain punitive damages too. In all other respects, the en banc court reinstated the panel opinion. View "Hoever v. Marks" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.In 2015, plaintiffs filed suit challenging Alabama's 2011 Photo Voter Identification Law passed by the Alabama legislature as House Bill 19 and codified at Ala. Code 17-9-30. The voter ID law took effect in June 2014 and requires all Alabama voters to present a photo ID when casting in-person or absentee votes. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Alabama's voter ID law, alleging that the law violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution; Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301; and Section 201 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. 10501.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, concluding that plaintiffs have failed to identify any genuine disputes of material facts and because no reasonable factfinder could find, based on the evidence presented, that Alabama's voter ID law is discriminatory. The court explained that the burden of providing a photo ID in order to vote is a minimal burden on Alabama's voters—especially when Alabama accepts so many different forms of photo ID and makes acquiring one simple and free for voters who lack a valid ID but wish to obtain one. Therefore, the Alabama voter ID law does not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution, nor does it violate the VRA. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possessing a firearm while being a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding out-of-court statements as hearsay when they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the danger of unfair prejudice carried by a third party's confession was enormous and the confession would almost certainly precipitate a trial within a trial on the adequacy of the Task Force investigation.The court also concluded that, although defendant's indictment was insufficient under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the insufficiency did not affect his substantial rights; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an unredacted copy of defendant's prior firearm conviction; and the Florida offense of armed robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). View "United States v. Elysee" on Justia Law

After a jury found that the manufacturer breached its duty to sell its products to certain customers exclusively through the distributor, the manufacturer appealed the denial of a directed verdict as to the status of two customers under the contract. The distributor cross-appealed a ruling that invalidated the contract's liquidated-damages clause and a ruling that prevented it from pursuing lost-profit damages.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, the closure of the clerk's office renders the office inaccessible and tolls the filing deadline, which makes the motion timely. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the manufacturer's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motions. The court also concluded that the district court did not err when it ruled that the liquidated-damages clause was unenforceable because $2 million a breach was grossly disproportionate to the foreseeable actual damages, and the disproportionality amounts to an unenforceable penalty. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding lost-profit damages because Circuitronix failed to disclose its computation of those damages. View "Circuitronix, LLC v. Kinwong Electronic (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a long-time customer with a visual disability who must access websites with screen reader software, filed suit against Winn-Dixie under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after he was unable to access Winn-Dixie's website with his software. The district court found that Winn-Dixie's website violated the ADA.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that plaintiff had Article III standing to bring the case where the difficulties caused by his inability to access much of the website constitute a concrete and particularized injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical and will continue if the website remains inaccessible; the websites are not places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA because, pursuant to the language of Title III, public accommodations are limited to actual, physical places; and Winn-Dixie's limited use website, although inaccessible by individuals who are visually disabled, does not function as an intangible barrier to an individual with a visual disability accessing the goods, services, privileges, or advantages of Winn-Dixie's physical stores (the operative place of public accommodation). The court explained that, absent congressional action that broadens the definition of "places of public accommodation" to include websites, the court cannot extend ADA liability to the facts presented here, where there is no barrier to the access demanded by the statute. View "Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." on Justia Law