Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Cuban citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition in part because the IJ and the BIA failed to provide reasoned consideration of petitioner's evidence of his well-founded fear of future persecution based on a pattern or practice of persecution toward dissident journalists in Cuba. However, the court denied the petition for review of petitioner's asylum claim based on past persecution because substantial evidence supports the BIA's conclusion that petitioner did not demonstrate that he suffered past persecution. View "Cabrera Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After an ATF reverse sting operation caught petitioner in the midst of an effort to commit armed robbery of a house he believed held the cocaine stash of a Colombian cartel, a jury convicted petitioner of both conspiring to use and using a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(o) and 924(c). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. Petitioner now appeals the district court's rejection of his section 2255 collateral attack on these convictions.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment because petitioner cannot overcome the procedural default of his claim and because even if he could, he suffered no harm from the inclusion of an invalid predicate offense, Hobbs Act conspiracy, in his indictment and jury instructions. The court explained that both conclusions follow from the same feature of petitioner's case: the Hobbs Act conspiracy was inextricably intertwined with petitioner's conspiracy and attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (Counts 2 and 3), convictions petitioner does not dispute are valid drug trafficking predicates for his Count 4 and Count 5 convictions. View "Parker v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to AMR in a Title VII action brought by plaintiff, alleging failure to accommodate his religious requirement, discrimination on the basis of religion, and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim. Plaintiff's action stemmed from AMR's refusal to allow him to work emergency transports with his goatee, which he grew as part of his practice of Rastafarianism.In regard to plaintiff's disparate-treatment claims based on religion, the court concluded that plaintiff forfeited any "convincing mosaic" argument in support of his traditional religious disparate-treatment discrimination claim. Furthermore, plaintiff made no other argument to support that version of his disparate-treatment discrimination claim. In regard to plaintiff's religious-discrimination claim based on AMR's alleged failure to provide plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation of his religious practice of wearing a beard, the court concluded that AMR offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation by providing him with an opportunity to maintain his beard and to work on the non-emergency-transport side of its operations, for which DeKalb County's facial-hair policy did not apply. The panel explained that his terms and conditions of employment would not have been affected by the accommodation AMR offered. In regard to the retaliation claim, the record indicates that the but-for cause of plaintiff's termination was AMR's belief that he had given an untrue answer on his employment application. Therefore, his retaliation claim necessarily fails. View "Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the Employment Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA) fee-shifting provision, 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1), cannot support a fee award against a party's counsel. The court explained that the function of this statute is not to sanction attorney misconduct. Rather, that role belongs to other provisions, such as 28 U.S.C. 1927 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).In this case, the district court relied exclusively on Section 1132(g)(1) when awarding fees. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the district court's fee award. The court did not address Liberty Life's argument that the district court should have imposed fees against Theresa E. Peer's counsel, Paul Sullivan. On remand, the district court may consider whether a fee award is appropriate against Peer under ERISA or against Peer or Sullivan under another statute, rule, or the district court's inherent authority. View "Sullivan v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a police officer, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Georgia state laws, alleging claims for unlawful entry, false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault, and battery. Plaintiff's claim arose from an August 4, 2016, interaction with defendant and other officers at his mobile home where defendant deployed his taser on plaintiff and plaintiff was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, obstruction, and simple battery, which were eventually dismissed.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the facts of this case are heavily disputed and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant lawfully entered plaintiff's home. Therefore, summary judgment was improper and the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on the unlawful entry claim. The court also concluded that disputed facts exist as to the remaining claims. Therefore, because genuine issues of material fact prevent finding for defendant as a matter of law, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, qualified immunity, and official immunity on all other claims. View "Hardigree v. Lofton" on Justia Law

After plaintiff seriously injured her knee while at work, Hospital Housekeeping told her nothing about her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), instead handling the injury solely as a workers' compensation claim. Hospital Housekeeping subsequently discharged plaintiff after she could not perform the essential-functions test before returning to work. Plaintiff filed suit for interference under the FMLA and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hospital Housekeeping.The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to FMLA rights; plaintiff demonstrated that Hospital Housekeeping denied her a leave benefit under the FMLA where it did not give her any FMLA notice whatsoever and thus failed to satisfy its notice obligations; and a material issue of fact exists over whether an uninterrupted twelve-week FMLA leave period would have made a difference to whether plaintiff could have passed her essential-functions test and returned to work. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ramji v. Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

A Florida conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a), is categorically an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii).The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the BIA's removal based on petitioner's Florida felon-in-possession conviction. The court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief based on exemplar prosecutions. In this case, petitioner does not assert that his own felon-in-possession conviction involved an antique firearm, but he does point to exemplar prosecutions that he says establish that Florida actually prosecutes felons for possession of federal antique firearms. However, petitioner does not point to exemplar prosecutions of felons for mere possession of federal antique firearms nor for possessing black-powder muzzleloaders. Furthermore, Florida's felon-in-possession statute is not broader than the federal statute on its face and thus petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the statutory language. View "Aspilaire v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Comcast, alleging that it had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Plaintiff claimed that when he called Comcast to inquire about pricing and services, a Comcast representative conducted a credit check and pulled his credit information without his permission.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Comcast's motion to compel arbitration, finding that plaintiff's FCRA claim relates to the Subscriber Agreement because of: the FAA's liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, the relevant provisions in the Subscriber Agreement applicable to plaintiff, and the fact that Comcast would not have access to plaintiff's personal information—and therefore could not have engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct—but for the pre-existing Agreement. The panel remanded for the district court to determine the merits of the parties' remaining arguments related to Comcast's motion to compel arbitration. View "Hearn v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

The required service of a "notice of a motion to vacate" under 9 U.S.C. 12 is not accomplished by emailing to opposing counsel a "courtesy copy" of a memorandum in support of that motion where, as here, the party to be served did not expressly consent in writing to service by email.In this contract dispute, Excel demanded arbitration with O'Neal, and DRT participated in the arbitration as a third-party respondent. Because of DRT's subsequent refusal to pay the attorney's fees part of the arbitration award, O'Neal filed a complaint in Georgia state court seeking confirmation of the award. The case was then removed to federal court. In a separate case, DRT filed a motion in district court to vacate part of the arbitration award for the $650,090.49 in attorney's fees. That night, DRT's counsel emailed O'Neal's counsel what he called a "courtesy copy" of DRT's signed and dated 20-page memorandum in support of the motion to vacate. Both cases were consolidated and the district court denied DRT's motion to vacate the attorney's fees part of the arbitration and confirmed the arbitration award. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that DRT did not serve in a proper and timely way notice of its motion to vacate and, as a result, that motion was due to be denied and the arbitration award confirmed. The court affirmed the district court's order and judgment insofar as it confirmed the arbitration award and denied the motion to vacate. The court dismissed the appeal from the district court's order and judgment awarding post-arbitration attorney's fees. View "O'Neal Constructors, LLC v. DRT America, LLC" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded on plaintiff's age discrimination and gender discrimination claims, affirming the Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims. Plaintiff sought rehearing, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in her case also undermined the court's Trask-based rejection of her Title VII retaliation claim and that an intervening 11th Circuit decision, Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020), gutted the precedent on which the court had relied in rejecting her hostile work environment claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in plaintiff's case undermined Trask v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016), to the point of abrogation and that the standard that the Court articulated there now controls cases arising under Title VII's nearly identical text. The court also held that Monaghan clarified the court's law governing what the court called "retaliatory-hostile-work-environment" claims, and that the standard for such claims is, as the court said there, the less onerous "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker" test articulated in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), and Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008), rather than the more stringent "severe or pervasive" test found in Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims and remanded for the district court to consider those claims under the proper standards. View "Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law