Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling as he demonstrated that he exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his rights and he further demonstrated extraordinary circumstances—his counsel's abdication of her duty of loyalty to petitioner so she could promote her own interests—that prevented the filing of his petition. The court explained that counsel's interests were so adverse to those of her client that counsel effectively abandoned petitioner. In this case, counsel sacrificed petitioner's guaranteed opportunity of federal habeas review in order to pursue her own novel—and ultimately meritless—constitutional argument against the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitations period.On the merits of the habeas petition, the court concluded that the district court correctly ruled that petitioner procedurally defaulted on his first two claims and the state court reasonably denied relief on his third claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying habeas relief on the merits. View "Thomas v. Attorney General, State of Florida" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order of removal of petitioner as an alien convicted of aggravated felonies after his admission to the United States. In this case, petitioner was a citizen when he was convicted. At issue is whether a denaturalized alien is removable as an aggravated felon based on convictions entered while he was an American citizen.The court explained that, by its plain terms, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to aliens who were citizens when convicted. Therefore, the court held that the plain meaning of section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) forecloses the BIA's interpretation. Furthermore, binding precedent, Costello v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 376 U.S. 120 (1964), forecloses treating petitioner's denaturalization as retroactive for removal purposes. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hylton v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NCL, alleging that its medical staff failed to diagnose and properly manage his status and failed to evacuate him from a cruise ship he was aboard. The district court granted NCL's motion for a directed verdict and the jury found NCL negligent, awarding non-economic damages, future medical expenses, and lost services.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and concluded that the cruise-line medical negligence claims are cognizable in admiralty jurisdiction; the district court did not err by excluding testimony from plaintiff's expert economist and granting a directed verdict on loss earning capacity where the testimony was unreliable and plaintiff failed to prove the amount of his loss-earning-capacity damages; NCL is not entitled to a new trial where the district court correctly instructed the jury and sufficient evidence supported the verdict against NCL. View "Buland v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

McKiver is serving a mandatory 25-year sentence for a crime he committed shortly after he graduated high school. He admitted to stealing oxycodone pills from his neighbor; the state never disputed that he consumed those pills within 48 hours of acquiring them. A state postconviction court granted McKiver a new trial based on allegations of ineffective assistance. An appellate court reversed in a one-sentence order. McKiver filed a federal habeas petition that argued his trial counsel failed to investigate and present certain witnesses who would cast doubt on the state’s case and the criminal history of a key state witness.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court did not unreasonably apply "Strickland" in rejecting the witness-testimony claim. The only evidence before that court was McKiver’s own conclusory testimony about what the witnesses would have said and whether they would have been available and willing to testify. Fair-minded jurists could agree that McKiver’s evidentiary presentation failed to establish that he met Strickland’s test, especially with respect to its prejudice prong. McKiver cannot surmount the procedural default of his criminal-history claim. There is no reasonable probability that McKiver’s trial would have reached a different conclusion if his trial counsel had investigated the criminal history of the witness. View "McKiver v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Morrison in Alabama state court in 2006, alleging common-law fraud and Alabama Securities Act violations, later adding claims under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, alleging that Morrison had given property to his sons to defraud his creditors. Morrison filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the Alabama case to proceed but stayed the execution of any judgment. Plaintiffs initiated a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding, seeking a ruling that their state-court claims were not dischargeable. The bankruptcy court entered Morrison’s discharge order with the adversary proceeding still pending. In 2019, the Alabama trial court entered judgment ($1,185,176) against Morrison on the common-law fraud and Securities Act claims but rejected the fraudulent transfer claims.In the adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court held that the state-court judgment was excepted from discharge, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19), as a debt for the violation of state securities laws, and later ruled that the discharge injunction barred appeals against Morrison on the fraudulent transfer claims. The court found the "Jet Florida" doctrine inapplicable because Morrison would be burdened with the expense of defending the state-court suit. The district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the fraudulent transfer suit is an action to collect a non-dischargeable debt (securities-fraud judgment) or that Plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed against Morrison as a nominal defendant, to seek recovery from the fraudulent transferees. The bankruptcy court has discretion in deciding whether to allow a suit against a discharged debtor under Jet Florida. View "SuVicMon Development, Inc. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this court's and the Florida state courts' precedent are clear that petitioner's amended state-court motion for postconviction relief relates back to his initial postconviction motion, tolling the statute of limitations for the time in between his initial motion was dismissed and his amended motion was filed. In this case, petitioner's amended rule 3.850 motion relates back to his initial motion, tolling the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitations period for the time in between. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely and remanded for further proceedings. View "Morris v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. Petitioner argues that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of the online state court dockets without providing him an opportunity to be heard. However, the court concluded that petitioner himself provided all the information needed to show that his filing was late, and he was given a chance to argue that the district court erred. In this case, when petitioner admitted untimeliness and provided the dates to prove it, he eliminated any need for the district court to look elsewhere before dismissing his petition. Furthermore, petitioner had an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice here and simply did not take advantage of it. View "Turner v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for five counts of armed robbery and carrying a firearm in furtherance of the robberies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to continue the trial date; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss Juror 20 for cause based on her employment with the Department of Community Supervision because she did not qualify as a member of a police department; even assuming without deciding that the Google geo-location data should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree," any error in admitting that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the robberies; the special agent's testimony does not warrant vacatur of the convictions; and, even assuming error, cumulative error does not warrant vacatur of the convictions. View "United States v. Pendergrass" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's entry of summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims. Likewise, the court reached the same conclusion about the one employee's sex-based hostile work environment claim. However, after summary judgment was entered in this case, Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S. Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2020), clarified that retaliatory hostile work environment claims are not governed by the "severe or pervasive" standard applied by the district court here. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order as to that claim and directed the district court to analyze the claim in light of Monaghan. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the tax court's denial of taxpayer's request to sever her liability for unpaid tax liabilities from joint tax returns for the 2008, 2009, and 2010 tax years based on the innocent spouse doctrine. The court concluded that the tax court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the factors for determining equitable relief and concluding that the knowledge or reason-to-know factor weighed strongly against relief. In this case, taxpayer signed the couple's returns, was aware of their shared financial troubles, and knew of their prior problems with the IRS. Furthermore, the tax court did not abuse its discretion by placing too much weight on this factor. View "Sleeth v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law