Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that, even if the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable cause to justify the search, suppression of the fruits of the search would be inappropriate under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court explained that the police here did exactly what the Fourth Amendment required of them: they obtained a warrant in good faith from a neutral magistrate and reasonably relied on it; they had no reason to believe that probable cause was absent despite the magistrate's authorization; there is no evidence in this record that the affidavit supporting the warrant misled the magistrate or that it contained false information; the affidavit was not lacking in indicia of probable cause so as to render the executing officers' belief in its existence unreasonable; and the warrant was not facially deficient because it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized. Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that the district court lacked lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition charge, because such an omission is not a jurisdictional defect. View "United States v. Antonio Morales" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petition as second or successive, holding that a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) does not constitute a new, intervening judgment for purposes of the bar on second or successive section 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In this case, petitioner failed to obtain the required certification from this court before filing a second section 2255 petition, and the district court dismissed it as unauthorized. Without such authorization, the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. View "Armstrong v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PDQ, a restaurant he patroned, after a data breach that exposed PDQ customers' personal financial information. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice and held that plaintiff did not have standing to sue based on the theory that he and a proposed class of PDQ customers are now exposed to a substantial risk of future identity theft. The court explained that plaintiff failed to allege either that the data breach placed him in a "substantial risk" of future identity theft or that identity theft was "certainly impending." The court stated that evidence of a mere data breach does not, standing alone, satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, and thus plaintiff does not have standing here based on an "increased risk" of identity theft. In the alternative, the court held that plaintiff has not suffered actual, present injuries in his efforts to mitigate the risk of identity theft caused by the data breach. View "I Tan Tsao v. Captiva MVP Restaurant Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two police officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force when apprehending him. After a jury returned a verdict for the officers, the district court entered judgment in favor of them. Although represented by counsel, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 on January 26, 2018. The district court struck plaintiff's motion as an unauthorized pro se filing by a represented party on February 27, 2018, and subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff's counsel.The Eleventh Circuit held that a pro se motion for a new trial that is stricken because the movant is represented by counsel tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal of the judgment under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A). In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff's Rule 59 motion for a new trial tolled the time for him to file a notice of appeal, his notice of appeal was therefore timely, and the court has jurisdiction over his appeal. However, because plaintiff's claims are meritless, the court affirmed the judgment. The court rejected plaintiff's evidentiary challenges to the district court's admission of a hotel video; concluded that the admission of comments made by the officers' counsel during trial do not warrant a new trial; concluded that plaintiff failed to show plain error in the district court's questioning and commentary; concluded that the district court's summary denial did not warrant a new trial; and concluded that the district court did not err in striking plaintiff's pro se motion for new trial. View "Ruiz v. Wing" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant Cannon and Holton's convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a plan to rob a stash house containing 18 kilograms of cocaine. However, one participant was an undercover detective and the stash house was fake.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion for discovery on the claim of selective prosecution; Holton failed to show that the indictment was multiplicitious where the two conspiracy offenses have separate elements; and taken in its entirety, the government's conduct was not outrageous and did not violate due process. The court rejected defendants' challenges to the district court's refusal to give an entrapment defense. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a juror; Cannon's right to have all proceedings in open court transcribed was not violated; and defendants' challenge to their 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions on Count 3 fail. View "United States v. Cannon" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiff's second amended complaint with prejudice because it was a shotgun pleading. After reviewing the second amended complaint, the court agreed with the district court that it was "a rambling, dizzying array of nearly incomprehensible pleading." Therefore, plaintiff, who was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, repeatedly failed to file a proper pleading. View "Barmapov v. Amuial" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against ATS, a red light camera vendor, alleging three counts of unjust enrichment after ATS charged plaintiff a fee for processing his payment of a traffic ticket issued through an ATS red light photo enforcement system used in the City of North Miami Beach.The Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: (1) Did ATS violate Florida law when it imposed a five percent fee on individuals who chose to pay their red light traffic ticket with a credit card? In particular: a. Does the challenged fee constitute a "commission from any revenue collected from violations detected through the use of a traffic infraction detector" under Fla. Stat. 316.0083(1)(b)(4)? b. Was the fee assessed under Chapter 318 and therefore subject to section 318.121's surcharge prohibition? c. Was ATS a "money transmitter" that was required to be licensed under Fla. Stat. 560.204(1)? (2) If there was a violation of a Florida statute, can that violation support a claim for unjust enrichment? In particular: a. Does plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim fail because the statutes at issue provide no private right of action? b. Does plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim fail because he received adequate consideration in exchange for the challenged fee when he took advantage of the privilege of using his credit card to pay the penalty? View "Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Putative class representatives do not have to prove the existence of an administratively feasible method to identify absent class members as a precondition for certification of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Plaintiffs, owners of allegedly defective refrigerators manufactured by Dometic Corporation, as putative class representatives, moved to certify a class of similarly situated owners. The district court denied certification based on plaintiffs' failure to prove administrative feasibility, and dismissed the action because, in its view, the denial of class certification divested it of subject matter jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order denying class certification and dismissing the action, holding that the doctrines of invited error and forfeiture do not bar the court's consideration of the issue of administrative feasibility; administrative feasibility is relevant under Rule 23(b)(3) but is not a prerequisite of certification; and jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act does not depend on class certification. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry v. Dometic Corporation" on Justia Law

This appeal involves AC-USA's and Silikal's dispute over a shared trade secret consisting of the formula for 1061 SW, a flooring resin Silikal manufactured and sold (along with other flooring resins). AC-USA filed suit alleging that Silikal breached the agreement by selling 1061 SW without its written permission. A jury awarded AC-USA damages on each of its claims for common law breach of contract and for violation of the Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990 (GTSA) for misappropriation of the shared trade secret. The district court also awarded punitive damages on the misappropriation claim. The district court then denied Silikal's post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on the misappropriation and contract claims, entering a final judgment for AC-USA for $5,861,415.The Eleventh Circuit rejected Silikal's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction over its person, and thus affirmed the district court's denial of Silikal's motion to dismiss. However, the court concluded that AC-USA failed to prove its misappropriation claim because the evidence that Silikal misappropriated the trade secret is insufficient as a matter of law. Furthermore, AC-USA failed to prove that it sustained cognizable damages on its contract claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment on the misappropriation claim and vacated the damages awarded on the contract claim. Finally, the court held that AC-USA is entitled to nominal damages and attorney's fees on its contract claim in a sum to be determined by the district court on remand. View "Acrylicon USA, LLC v. Silikal GMBH" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Neurocare and remanded in an action where Emory University seeks indemnification from Neurocare, whose technologists were found to be 60 percent at fault for the death of the deceased. The court explained that the term "affiliate" in Section 9.1 of the Sleep Diagnostic Services Agreement embodies the term's well-established common meaning, and that common meaning includes a superior, grandparent corporation. In light of Emory University's direct control and entire ownership of Wesley Woods's parent, which directly controls and owns Wesley Woods, the court concluded that Emory University is Wesley Woods's affiliate.The court applied Georgia case law and also concluded that the indemnification bar doctrine does not operate in the unique facts of this case. The court explained that the bar is a narrow exception to an otherwise proven claim for indemnification based in a string of Georgia cases, starting with GAF Corp. v. Tolar Constr. Co., 246 Ga. 411, 411, 271 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1980). The court read these cases as only applying to the scenario in which the underlying defense is a complete defense in that it would have defeated the underlying action—that is, the entire action and any liability arising therefrom for which the indemnitor would then be liable. Therefore, being a limited exception to indemnification, the court concluded that the bar does not extend to this case—a scenario in which, had the defense in question been asserted in the underlying action to protect Emory University, Neurocare's indemnification obligation would remain, and Neurocare would remain obligated to indemnify Wesley Woods. View "Emory University, Inc. v. Neurocare, Inc." on Justia Law