Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two groups of patients who deposited tissue in a stem-cell bank appealed the district court's denial of their respective motions to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in an action between the corporation running the bank and the FDA. The district court concluded that the motions were premature and denied them without prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's order was not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the patients' appeal. View "Aitken v. US Stem Cell Clinic, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming the ALJ's denial of social security disability benefits, holding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that plaintiff is not disabled. In this case, the ALJ assigned little weight to the opinions of a physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist where the ALJ correctly understood that their statements were not dispositive. Furthermore, a vocational rehabilitation specialist is not a treating physician, and thus his opinion is not entitled to substantial or considerable weight, and the physician's opinion that plaintiff would be "permanently and totally disabled" conflicted with his own examinations of plaintiff, which showed no significant abnormalities. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's argument under Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2012). View "Walker v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a two-count superseding indictment with violating 18 U.S.C 1546(a) by allegedly using a fraudulent order of supervision to obtain a driver's license from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Florida DHSMV). Defendant moved to dismiss the superseding indictment for failing to state an offense under section 1546(a), arguing that the term "authorized stay" means "lawful presence" in the United States and that no federal statute or regulation expressly identifies an order of supervision as "evidence of authorized stay in the United States." The district court dismissed the superseding indictment after concluding that an order of supervision does not qualify as a document "prescribed by statute or regulation . . . as evidence of authorized stay . . . in the United States" as required by section 1546(a).Based on a review of the statutes and regulations, the Eleventh Circuit held that an order of supervision falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of section 1546(a)'s "other document" clause. The court explained that the Form I-220B, Order of Supervision, itself is a document prescribed by the federal immigration statutes and regulations as showing that an alien has legal permission to stay in the United States. Furthermore, separate and apart from the immigration statutes and regulations, an order of supervision is a document prescribed by certain federal entitlement regulations as evidence of legal permission to stay in the United States. The court also held that defendant's proposed statutory interpretations are not supported by section 1546's language and structure. The court explained that "authorize stay" as used in section 1546(a) is not defined by terms of art for immigration laws governing alien admissibility. Furthermore, section 1546(a)'s "other document" provision does not require an order of supervision to be expressly listed or otherwise identified as evidencing authorized stay in the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing the superseding indictment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ardon Chinchilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two prolife sidewalk counselors, filed a civil rights action against the City and Police Chief, alleging that defendants violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion through their application of the City's permit ordinance and the inclusion of a noise provision in their special-event permit.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim because the complaint failed to allege critical facts necessary to establish a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to plead necessary facts to support an inference that the noise provision violates their right to freedom of speech; the noise provision is not unconstitutionally vague; and the district court did not err by refusing to apply strict scrutiny to plaintiffs' free exercise claim. View "Henderson v. McMurray" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of producing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found on defendant's cell phone. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable where the district court did not err in applying three sentencing enhancements under USSG 2G2.1(b)(5), 2G2.2(b)(5), and 4B1.5(b)(1). Furthermore, defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Isaac" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that, even if the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable cause to justify the search, suppression of the fruits of the search would be inappropriate under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court explained that the police here did exactly what the Fourth Amendment required of them: they obtained a warrant in good faith from a neutral magistrate and reasonably relied on it; they had no reason to believe that probable cause was absent despite the magistrate's authorization; there is no evidence in this record that the affidavit supporting the warrant misled the magistrate or that it contained false information; the affidavit was not lacking in indicia of probable cause so as to render the executing officers' belief in its existence unreasonable; and the warrant was not facially deficient because it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized. Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that the district court lacked lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition charge, because such an omission is not a jurisdictional defect. View "United States v. Antonio Morales" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petition as second or successive, holding that a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) does not constitute a new, intervening judgment for purposes of the bar on second or successive section 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In this case, petitioner failed to obtain the required certification from this court before filing a second section 2255 petition, and the district court dismissed it as unauthorized. Without such authorization, the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. View "Armstrong v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PDQ, a restaurant he patroned, after a data breach that exposed PDQ customers' personal financial information. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice and held that plaintiff did not have standing to sue based on the theory that he and a proposed class of PDQ customers are now exposed to a substantial risk of future identity theft. The court explained that plaintiff failed to allege either that the data breach placed him in a "substantial risk" of future identity theft or that identity theft was "certainly impending." The court stated that evidence of a mere data breach does not, standing alone, satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, and thus plaintiff does not have standing here based on an "increased risk" of identity theft. In the alternative, the court held that plaintiff has not suffered actual, present injuries in his efforts to mitigate the risk of identity theft caused by the data breach. View "I Tan Tsao v. Captiva MVP Restaurant Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two police officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force when apprehending him. After a jury returned a verdict for the officers, the district court entered judgment in favor of them. Although represented by counsel, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 on January 26, 2018. The district court struck plaintiff's motion as an unauthorized pro se filing by a represented party on February 27, 2018, and subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff's counsel.The Eleventh Circuit held that a pro se motion for a new trial that is stricken because the movant is represented by counsel tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal of the judgment under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A). In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff's Rule 59 motion for a new trial tolled the time for him to file a notice of appeal, his notice of appeal was therefore timely, and the court has jurisdiction over his appeal. However, because plaintiff's claims are meritless, the court affirmed the judgment. The court rejected plaintiff's evidentiary challenges to the district court's admission of a hotel video; concluded that the admission of comments made by the officers' counsel during trial do not warrant a new trial; concluded that plaintiff failed to show plain error in the district court's questioning and commentary; concluded that the district court's summary denial did not warrant a new trial; and concluded that the district court did not err in striking plaintiff's pro se motion for new trial. View "Ruiz v. Wing" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant Cannon and Holton's convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a plan to rob a stash house containing 18 kilograms of cocaine. However, one participant was an undercover detective and the stash house was fake.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion for discovery on the claim of selective prosecution; Holton failed to show that the indictment was multiplicitious where the two conspiracy offenses have separate elements; and taken in its entirety, the government's conduct was not outrageous and did not violate due process. The court rejected defendants' challenges to the district court's refusal to give an entrapment defense. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a juror; Cannon's right to have all proceedings in open court transcribed was not violated; and defendants' challenge to their 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions on Count 3 fail. View "United States v. Cannon" on Justia Law