Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Bruce Jacobs, a Florida foreclosure attorney, filed a qui tam action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., alleging violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). Jacobs claimed that JP Morgan Chase forged mortgage loan promissory notes and submitted false reimbursement claims to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He asserted that JP Morgan Chase used signature stamps of former Washington Mutual employees to endorse loans improperly, thereby defrauding the government by seeking reimbursement for loan servicing costs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Jacobs's initial complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). The court also noted that Jacobs needed to establish that he was an original source of the information under the FCA’s public disclosure bar. Jacobs amended his complaint, but the district court dismissed it again, this time with prejudice. The court found that Jacobs still failed to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements and that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied because the allegations had already been disclosed in three online blog articles, and Jacobs was not an original source of the information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the blog articles, which were publicly available before Jacobs filed his lawsuit, qualified as "news media" under the FCA. The court found that the allegations in Jacobs's complaint were substantially the same as those disclosed in the blog articles. Additionally, Jacobs did not qualify as an original source because his information did not materially add to the publicly disclosed allegations. Therefore, the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded Jacobs's lawsuit. View "Jacobs v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

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Sarah Ritchie, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ritchie had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). She argued that her trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise her that the facts of her case might not support a conviction if the law developed in a particular way.The district court, after reviewing Ritchie's motion, concluded that her lawyer's failure to advise her on a "novel and unsettled point of law" did not amount to deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that the existing legal precedent did not suggest that the facts of Ritchie's case were legally insufficient to support a conviction under § 2251(a). Consequently, the district court denied her motion and her request for an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Ritchie's lawyer was not constitutionally ineffective. The court noted that at the time of Ritchie's plea, there was no on-point decision suggesting that her conduct fell outside the scope of § 2251(a). The court emphasized that an attorney's failure to predict future legal developments does not constitute ineffective assistance. Given the state of the law at the time, the court found that it was not unreasonable for Ritchie's lawyer to advise her to accept the plea deal, which resulted in a significantly reduced sentence compared to the potential maximum.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Ritchie's lawyer's performance was not deficient and affirmed the district court's denial of her § 2255 motion. View "Ritchie v. United States" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Taxinet Corporation sued Santiago Leon, alleging various claims stemming from a joint effort to secure a government concession for a taxi-hailing app in Mexico City. The district court granted summary judgment for Leon on all claims except for a Florida-law unjust enrichment claim, which went to trial along with Leon’s counterclaims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. The jury awarded Taxinet $300 million for unjust enrichment and Leon $15,000 for negligent misrepresentation. However, the district court granted Leon’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the damages award was based on inadmissible hearsay and was speculative.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially allowed testimony regarding a $2.4 billion valuation by Goldman Sachs, which was later deemed inadmissible hearsay. The court concluded that without this evidence, there was insufficient support for the jury’s $300 million award. The court also noted that the valuation was speculative and not directly tied to the benefit conferred by Taxinet in 2015.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 50(b) order, agreeing that the valuation evidence was inadmissible hearsay and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the $300 million award. However, the appellate court exercised its discretion to remand for a new trial on the unjust enrichment claim. The court found that Taxinet had presented enough evidence to show that it conferred a benefit on Leon, which he accepted, and that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment. The court also noted that Taxinet could potentially present other evidence of damages in a new trial.The appellate court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on Taxinet’s other claims, ruling that the alleged joint venture agreement was subject to Florida’s statute of frauds, as it could not be completed within a year. Thus, any claims based on the existence of the joint venture agreement were barred. View "Taxinet Corp. v. Leon" on Justia Law

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Three owners and officers of a currency-exchange business, Sterling Currency Group, were involved in a scheme to defraud retail investors by promoting false rumors about the imminent revaluation of the Iraqi dinar. They also concealed their payments to advertise on dinar-discussion forums and falsely claimed plans to open currency-exchange kiosks. Two of the defendants lied to federal agents about their activities. The business sold over $600 million worth of currencies, and many investors lost significant amounts of money due to the fraudulent inducements.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia conducted a five-week trial, after which the jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and making false statements. The district court sentenced the defendants to prison terms ranging from 84 to 180 months. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary admissions, and one defendant's sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and the sentence of one defendant, except for the refusal to grant a downward departure, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the fraud convictions, as the misrepresentations about the revaluation and the airport plan went to the core of the bargain with investors. The court also found that the district court properly instructed the jury and did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings. The court upheld the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court, including those for sophisticated means, obstruction of justice, and substantial financial hardship. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Luis Fernandez and others conspired to rob a fictional cocaine stash house set up by law enforcement. They were arrested en route to the stash house with loaded firearms. Fernandez was indicted on multiple charges, including conspiracy and attempt to possess cocaine, conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury found him guilty of the Hobbs Act charges and the § 924(c) charge but acquitted him of the drug-related charges. He was sentenced to 360 months in prison.Fernandez's direct appeal was unsuccessful. In 2016, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his § 924(c) conviction was invalid under Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court denied the motion as untimely and procedurally defaulted. In 2020, Fernandez sought to file a second § 2255 motion based on United States v. Davis, which invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause. The Eleventh Circuit granted his motion, acknowledging that his conviction might be unconstitutional under Davis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed Fernandez's appeal. The court held that Fernandez could not prove that his § 924(c) conviction rested solely on the residual clause, as required by Beeman v. United States. The court noted that the jury's general verdict did not specify which predicate offense supported the § 924(c) conviction. Additionally, the court found that the legal landscape at the time of Fernandez's conviction did not clearly establish that only the residual clause could support his conviction. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Fernandez's § 2255 motion. View "Fernandez v. United States" on Justia Law

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Four registered voters and several non-profit organizations sued the Cobb County Board of Elections and Registration, alleging that the 2022 redistricting map for the Cobb County School Board was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. They claimed the map packed Black and Latino voters into certain districts to dilute their political power and maintain a majority white School Board. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the use of the 2022 map in future elections.The Cobb County School District intervened as a defendant and moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing it was not liable for any constitutional violation because the Georgia General Assembly, not the School Board, enacted the map. The district court granted the School District’s motion based on Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, but did not immediately enter judgment. The School District continued to participate in the case, prompting the court to formally terminate it as a party. The plaintiffs and the Election Defendants then entered a settlement, leading to a preliminary injunction against the 2022 map.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the School District’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the School District, as a nonparty, lacked standing to appeal the preliminary injunction. The court emphasized that only parties or those who properly become parties may appeal, and the School District had not sought to reintervene for purposes of appeal. The court also noted that the School District’s participation as an amicus did not grant it the right to appeal. View "Cobb County School District" on Justia Law

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A federal prisoner, LaQuan Johnson, filed a complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, seeking money damages from federal prison officials, doctors, a nurse, and a kitchen supervisor. Johnson alleged violations of his constitutional rights through excessive force, failure to protect him from other inmates, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The incidents occurred while Johnson was housed at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, from September 2015 to April 2019. He claimed that prison officials failed to separate pretrial detainees from convicted inmates, leading to multiple attacks on him, and that medical staff provided inadequate treatment for his injuries.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia initially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, finding that Johnson was denied access to the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) administrative remedy program. However, after further discovery, the district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Johnson's claims did not entitle him to a Bivens remedy because they would require recognizing new Bivens causes of action, which the court is generally forbidden to create.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that Johnson's failure to protect and deliberate indifference claims presented new Bivens contexts, as they were meaningfully different from the three contexts previously recognized by the Supreme Court in Bivens, Davis v. Passman, and Carlson v. Green. The court also found that special factors, including the existence of the BOP's administrative remedy program, counseled against extending Bivens to these new contexts. The court emphasized that the existence of an alternative remedial structure alone is sufficient to preclude the creation of a new Bivens remedy. View "Johnson v. Terry" on Justia Law

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The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by several minor children, through their legal guardians, against the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health. The plaintiffs challenged the Department's practices regarding the provision of skilled nursing services under the Medicaid Act. Specifically, they contested the Department's use of a scoresheet to determine the number of skilled nursing hours and the practice of reducing those hours as caregivers learn to perform skilled tasks.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court ruled that the Department's review process did not give appropriate weight to the recommendations of treating physicians and that the practice of reducing skilled nursing hours as caregivers learn skilled tasks violated the Medicaid Act. The district court issued permanent injunctions requiring the Department to approve the skilled nursing hours prescribed by the patients' treating physicians.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Department's review process, which includes the use of a scoresheet to determine a presumptive range of skilled nursing hours, complies with the Medicaid Act. The court also found that the practice of reducing skilled nursing hours as caregivers learn skilled tasks is reasonable and does not violate the Act. The court vacated the permanent injunctions and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court did not address the plaintiffs' challenge regarding the consideration of caregiver capacity, as the district court had ruled that issue moot. The appeal of the preliminary injunctions was deemed moot following the vacatur of the permanent injunctions. View "M.H. v. Commissioner, Georgia Dept. of Community Health" on Justia Law

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Jesse Guardado confessed to the Walton County Sheriff’s Office that he had robbed and murdered Jackie Malone. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement or counsel, and was later appointed counsel for the penalty phase. A jury recommended the death penalty, and the state trial court sentenced him to death. Guardado filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence and for not challenging biased jurors.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no prejudice from counsel's performance. The court determined that the additional mitigating evidence presented during postconviction proceedings was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. It also found no actual bias in the jurors that Guardado claimed should have been challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington by using a stricter "actual bias" standard instead of the reasonable probability standard for prejudice. However, upon de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Guardado failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome if the jurors had been challenged or if additional mitigating evidence had been presented. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Guardado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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Xavier Rashad Brooks, a felon, pled guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 100 months in prison by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Brooks appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining his base offense level, applying a two-level enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, and applying a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense.The district court determined Brooks's base offense level was 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) due to his prior convictions for armed robbery and robbery. Brooks argued that his 2008 robbery conviction was not a "crime of violence." The court found that the statute under which Brooks was convicted was divisible and that Shepard documents showed he was convicted of robbery by force, which qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).The district court also applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because Brooks possessed a stolen Smith & Wesson pistol in January 2021. Brooks contended that this possession was not relevant to his October 2020 conviction for possessing a Glock. The court found that the possession of the stolen Smith & Wesson was part of the same course of conduct as the possession of the Glock, thus qualifying as relevant conduct.Finally, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically theft by receiving stolen property. Brooks argued that the firearm did not facilitate the theft offense. The court held that the firearm, being the fruit of the theft, had the potential to facilitate the offense, thus justifying the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all counts, upholding Brooks's 100-month sentence. View "USA v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law