Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TriNet in an action brought by TriNet, as the successor-in-interest of Gevity, a professional employer organization (PEO). Gevity claimed tax credits from 2004 to 2009 based on its payment of FICA taxes on the tip income of its client companies' employees. The IRS asserts that such credits were not allowed because Gevity was not the "employer" entitled to claim the credits as that term is defined in 26 U.S.C. 3401(d). The court concluded that, under the statutes applicable to the period at issue, Gevity was the statutory employer entitled to claim the FICA tip credit because it—not its client companies—controlled the payment of the wages subject to withholding. View "TriNet Group, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner. Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a certain juror's presence on the trial jury. Because the Warden concedes that counsel performed deficiently, the only issue is prejudice.The court held that the state habeas court's ruling that petitioner did not prove that the juror was actually biased against him was not based on an unreasonable determination of fact under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). In this case, the court cannot say for certain what the juror meant when he raised his hand in response to a question during voir dire regarding a murder prosecution involving a shooting, and, for that reason, the court cannot say the state court's finding was unreasonable. The court also held that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington when it held that petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that his appeal would have been decided differently had appellate counsel raised the presence of the juror. Finally, the court held that Georgia's juror non-impeachment statute is not an alternative basis for relief. View "Teasley v. Warden, Macon State Prison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Godiva chocolate stores had printed too many credit card digits on hundreds of thousands of receipts over the course of several years, and pointed out that those extra numbers were prohibited under a federal law aimed at preventing identity theft. After the parties agreed on a class settlement, the Supreme Court issued Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which held that a party does not have standing to sue when it pleads only the bare violation of a statute.The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff has no standing because he alleged only a statutory violation and not a concrete injury. In this case, plaintiff alleged that a cashier handed him a receipt containing some of his own credit card information printed on it. Although the receipt violated the law because it contained too many digits, the court explained that plaintiff has alleged no concrete harm or material risk of harm stemming from the violation. Therefore, this amounts to nothing more than a "bare procedural violation, divorced from concrete harm." Consequently, the court cannot evaluate the fairness of the parties' settlement and vacated the district court's order approving it. View "Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State, arguing that O.C.G.A. 45-5-3.2 violates the Georgia Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent it allows the State to cancel the November 2020 election for the office of district attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction that would require the State to hold the election, which the district court granted.Because the Eleventh Circuit is bound by the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision that O.C.G.A. 45-5-3.2, as challenged here, violates the Georgia Constitution, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiff established a substantial likelihood of success in her argument that O.C.G.A. 45-5-3.2 violates the Georgia Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury unless an injunction was granted, because the State's enforcement of O.C.G.A. 45-5-3.2 would deprive plaintiff of her right to vote in the November 2020 district attorney election. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the balance of harms and public interest weigh in favor of granting the injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction. View "Gonzalez v. Governor of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's four drug convictions and sentences for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and possessing with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress where defendant has shown no clear error in the district court's finding that the detective did not make any false statements and was able to see what he reasonably believed was contraband or evidence of a crime.The court also held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motions for a mistrial where there was no error in the prosecutor's opening remarks and the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the fentanyl evidence. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial based on defendant's brother's outburst. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting DNA testimony, as well as defendant's rental application and lease. The court denied defendant's claims of cumulative error. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and 63 month sentence for possession of an unregistered, sawed-off shotgun. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; there was more than sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew his shotgun was a weapon, not a collector's item, and that he further knew the shotgun, as modified, was less than 26 inches in overall length, or at least that its barrel was less than 18 inches in length; the district court's instruction to the jury regarding the knowledge element was consistent with court precedent; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress where defendant's traffic stop and arrest were both lawful, and the vehicle was properly searched under the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement; the court rejected defendant's assertions that the district court reversibly erred in failing either to appoint him competent substitute counsel or to sua sponte continue his trial until standby counsel could be present; and, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred in proceeding with the trial without standby counsel present, any error was harmless. Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err by calculating defendant's base offense level under USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that House Bill 836's district map violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. HB 836 reduced the size of the board from nine members to seven. Where all nine members previously had come from single-member districts, now only five would, and two would be drawn from at large seats. Plaintiff alleged that the new map would violate section 2 by diluting the strength of Black voters in Sumter County. The district court agreed and entered a remedial order removing the at-large seats and drawing a new map with seven single-member districts instead.The court reviewed the entire record and held that plaintiff adduced ample evidence supporting a finding of vote dilution. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff satisfied all three Gingles factors: first, the undisputed evidence showed that Sumter County's Black residents could form a majority in at least one additional single-member district (and probably in two); second, the Black voters in Sumter County were highly cohesive in ten of the twelve elections studied; and third, White residents vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable them usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. The court also held that plaintiff established that the totality of the circumstances results in an unequal opportunity for minority voters to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choosing. In this case, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the first, second, fifth, and seventh Senate factors weighed heavily in plaintiff's favor. The district court noted Georgia's, and Sumter County's, painful history of discrimination against its Black residents, emphasizing the high levels of racially polarized voting and observed the lack of success enjoyed by Black candidates in Sumter County. Furthermore, the special master report expressly found an easily achievable remedy available. View "Wright v. Sumter County Board of Elections and Registration" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for conspiring to violate, and of knowingly and willfully violating, the False Statements Act. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their ownership and operation of a second-tier subcontractor on a project to construct a building for a federal agency where they submitted to the agency certified payroll forms containing false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3).The court held that the payroll forms containing the false statements were made or used in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal agency. The court also held that the false statements were material. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal on materiality grounds. However, the court held that the district court, in determining defendants' guidelines ranges, failed to properly calculate the loss caused by their crimes. In this case, the district court erroneously applied the USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) enhancement based on gain even though there was no loss. Accordingly, the court vacated defendants' sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bazantes" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. The court held that the district court did not err by allowing defendant to proceed pro se after he invoked his right to self-representation. In this case, the waiver of defendant's right to counsel was clear, uncontested on appeal, and repeatedly reaffirmed after signs of uncertainty. The court also held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b) and, in any event, any error was harmless.The court further held that, to trigger the USSG 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement, at least in a case involving property held by a financial institution for a depositor, the financial institution (1) must be the source of the property, which the court interprets as having property rights in the property, and (2) must have been victimized by the offense conduct. The court held that the two-level enhancement was not erroneously applied to defendant's sentence where HSBC-Monaco, not defendant, was a source of the derived property; control over the property transferred directly from HSBC-Monaco to defendant; and the bank was not just a conduit for a transfer of property that resulted from criminal conduct directed elsewhere. The court explained that the bank was a victim of defendant's fraud. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Muho" on Justia Law

After Pine Mountain granted North American Land Trust conservation easements, Pine Mountain claimed tax deductions for the easements under I.R.C. 170. The IRS denied the deductions and the tax court held that the 2005 and 2006 easements were not "granted in perpetuity" within the meaning of section 170(h)(2)(C) because, although Pine Mountain had agreed to extensive restrictions on its use of the land, it had reserved to itself limited development rights within the conservation areas; that the 2007 easement complied with section 170(h)(5)(A)'s requirement that the easement's conservation purposes be "protected in perpetuity," notwithstanding its inclusion of a clause permitting the contracting parties to bilaterally amend the grant; and that the value of the 2007 easement is $4,779,500—which, it turns out, is almost exactly midway between the parties' wildly divergent appraisals.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the 2005 and 2006 easements satisfy section 170(h)(2)(C)'s granted-in-perpetuity requirement; that the existence of an amendment clause in an easement does not violate section 170(h)(5)(A)'s protected-in-perpetuity requirement; and that the tax court applied the wrong method for valuing the 2007 easement. View "Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v. Commissioner" on Justia Law