Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for seven counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance related to his prior medical practice. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for pre-indictment delay; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program because defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the prescriptions he wrote for his patients, and evidence of patient files stored at defendant's mother's home because the warrant was amply supported by facts establishing probable cause; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to exclude the government's expert witness under the Daubert standard; and there was no cumulative error.The court also held that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court properly calculated his Guidelines sentence and applied a two-level offense for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1. Finally, defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered mitigation evidence, sentenced defendant at the low end of his Guidelines range, and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to 235 months. View "United States v. Gayden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial based on an agent's rebuttal testimony; the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial where the weight of the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's verdict that the object of the conspiracy was to sell the confidential source five or more kilograms of cocaine; there was no Brady or Giglio error, plain or otherwise, let alone one that affected defendant's substantial rights; the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by failing to sua sponte grant defendant a new trial based on the government's alleged sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation; the district court did not err in calculating defendant's base offense level to be 30 under the sentencing guidelines; and defendant's resulting sentence of 120 months' imprisonment is procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm where the officers' investigatory stop was justified based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In this case, given the details of the 911 call, the time of day, and the high-crime area, the officers could reasonably suspect that defendant had engaged in criminal activity. The court also held that the facts do not show that defendant was within the curtilage of his home, or anyone's home, and thus defendant's contention that the police needed more than reasonable suspicion was unavailing. View "United States v. Bruce" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for attempted possession with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the three recorded phone calls as co-conspirator statements made during and in furtherance of the drug conspiracy; the district court correctly omitted the word "willfully" from the jury instruction and did not constructively amend the indictment by doing so; the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defendant's testimony and his cross-examination of the lead case agent; and assuming arguendo that the district court abused its discretion as to defendant's duress defense, any error was harmless. Finally, the court held that the record as a whole demonstrates that defendant not only waived his right to counsel, but also attempted to delay and manipulate the sentencing proceedings. View "United States v. Amede" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and rejected their claims under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019). In this case, neither defendant challenged his indictment before the district court and neither can establish that he did not know he was a felon. Furthermore, the district court correctly sentenced Defendant Jones under the Armed Career Criminal Act where defendant waived his challenge during the sentencing hearing and, even if invited error did not apply and the district court erred, the error was not plain. Accordingly, the court affirmed Jones' sentence. View "United States v. Innocent" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Anderson-Burdick framework when it enjoined the State defendants' enforcement of a long-standing Georgia absentee ballot deadline, which requires ballots to be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted. The district court, instead, manufactured its own ballot deadline so that the State is now required to count any ballot that was both postmarked by and received within three days of Election Day. Because the State defendants have met all four prongs of the Nken test, the court granted their motion to stay the injunction.The court concluded that the State defendants have shown that they will likely succeed on the merits of their claim because the district court did not properly apply the appropriate framework. The court explained that Georgia's decades-old absentee ballot deadline is both reasonable and nondiscriminatory, while its interests in maintaining that deadline (especially now that absentee voting has already begun) are at least "important"—as the district court itself recognized—and likely compelling. In this case, the district court erred by finding that Georgia's Election Day deadline severely burdened the right to vote, and by improperly weighing the State's interests against this burden. The court also concluded that Georgia will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay and a stay is in the public interest. Therefore, because Georgia's decades-old Election Day deadline for absentee ballots does not threaten voting rights, and is justified by a host of interests, the court stayed the district court's injunction of that deadline. View "The New Georgia Project v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law

After defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud was overturned based on insufficiency of the evidence, defendant petitioned the district court for a certificate of innocence, seeking to obtain compensation for the time she spent incarcerated.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the Unjust Conviction Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1495, 2513, requires defendant to allege and prove her actual innocence. Although the court's opinion in United States v. Willner, 795 F.3d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015), concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not by itself establish defendant's innocence under section 2315. Furthermore, given that defendant did not submit any other evidence supporting her claim of innocence, the court held that the district court did not err in denying her petition. View "United States v. Abreu" on Justia Law

The City of Miami moved to terminate a consent decree that regulated how the City of Miami treats its homeless residents twenty years after its adoption based on changed circumstances, fulfillment of its purpose, and substantial compliance with its requirements. The district court ruled that the City had not violated the consent decree, granted its motion for termination, and denied the opposing motion for contempt. The district court terminated the decree because the City had substantially complied with the core purpose of the settlement agreement, that is, to stop the criminalization of homelessness. Furthermore, the district court found no evidence that would negate a finding of substantial compliance. The district court also found changed circumstances in Miami, but did not rely on those findings as a basis for termination.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the termination of the consent decree and the denial of the contempt motion, holding that the district court correctly interpreted the decree and did not abuse its discretion by terminating the decree. Applying Florida contract law, the court held that, although the homeless identify one misinterpretation of the consent decree, they failed to identify any errors that establish noncompliance by the City. The court also held that the district court correctly applied the burden of proof on the City's motion for termination by bifurcating its analyses; did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion for termination; and did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for contempt. View "Peery v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions of law to the Florida Supreme Court: How does Florida law define the term "purchase" for purposes of Florida Statutes 893.135(1)? More specifically, does a completed purchase for purposes of conviction under section 893.135(1) require some form of possession—either actual or constructive—of the drug being purchased? View "United States v. Conage" on Justia Law

SEPH brought an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy, requesting that the bankruptcy court declare the debt to SEPH exempt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) because debtor fraudulently conveyed his property, thwarting SEPH's efforts to collect the debt. The bankruptcy court rejected SEPH's claims, granted debtor's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the adversary proceeding. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Water's Edge judgment debt is not exempt from discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A), because the debt existed long before debtor began transferring his assets and that debt is an ordinary contract debt that did not arise from fraud of any kind. Furthermore, SEPH presents no binding authority that supports its assertion that a debtor's fraudulent conveyance of assets in an attempt to avoid collection of a preexisting debt renders that preexisting debt exempt from discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A). The court also held that the Water's Edge debt is not exempt from discharge under section 523(a)(6), because the debt was not "for willful and malicious injury" to SEPH or its property. Finally, the court held that the bankruptcy court correctly denied leave to amend because of the futility of SEPH's proposed amendment under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Gaddy" on Justia Law