Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former sex offenders and currently homeless residents of the County, filed suit alleging that County Ordinance No. 05-206, which restricts certain sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of a school, violates the ex post facto clauses of both the federal and state constitutions because the residency restriction amounted to an impermissible retroactive criminal punishment.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 motion to conform their pleadings to the evidence. The court explained that Rule 15(b) allows parties to add unpled issues to a case if those issues have been tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, but one must comply with the notice demands of procedural due process before an unpled issue can be added. In this case, plaintiffs failed to give fair notice to the County of their as-applied theory of relief, and the County says it would have defended the Ordinance differently had it known that plaintiffs sought this relief. View "John Doe #6 v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, collection agencies, appealed the district court's dismissals with prejudice of their claims against defendants, seeking double damages against defendants under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act and alleging that actors within the Medicare Advantage system, including Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) and various "downstream actors" that contracted with MAOs, had assigned their Medicare Secondary Payer Act claims to plaintiffs for collection.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissals of plaintiffs' claims based on assignments from downstream actors, holding that the district court erred by narrowly construing 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(3)(A) to categorically exclude claims by downstream actors. The court explained that both the text and the objective of section 1395y(b)(3)(A) support allowing downstream actors to bring suit, or assign their right to bring suit, against primary payers. Therefore, the court remanded these claims for further proceedings.The court found that the district court erred insofar as it dismissed MSPRC's HFAP claims with prejudice, and ordered that the district court's dismissal be without prejudice. The court also found that the district court erred in dismissing MSPA's FHCP and IMC claims based on the purported cancellation and validity of MSPA's assignments. Finally, defendants' alternative claims are without merit. The court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims in case number 18-12149. In case number 18-13049, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims but modified the dismissal of these claims to be without prejudice. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Ace American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its original opinion in this appeal and substituted in its place the following opinion.At issue is whether several voters and organizations may challenge in federal court a law that governs the order in which candidates appear on the ballot in Florida's general elections. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because candidates who appear first on the ballot enjoy a "windfall vote" from a small number of voters who select the first candidate on a ballot solely because of that candidate’s position of primacy. The district court permanently enjoined the Secretary—and the 67 county Supervisors of Elections, none of whom were made parties to this lawsuit—from preparing ballots in accordance with the law.The court held that the voters and organizations lack standing to sue the Secretary because none of them proved an injury in fact. In this case, any injury they might suffer is neither fairly traceable to the Secretary nor redressable by a judgment against her because she does not enforce the challenged law. Rather, the Supervisors—county officials independent of the Secretary—are responsible for placing candidates on the ballot in the order the law prescribes. However, the district court lacked authority to enjoin those officials in this suit, so it was powerless to provide redress. The court also held, in the alternative, that the voters and organizations' complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question. The court explained that complaints of unfair partisan advantage based on the order in which candidates appear on the ballot bear all the hallmarks of a political question outside the court's competence to resolve. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jacobsen v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

After Robert Earl Lawrence was shot and killed by a police officer while trying to return a stray dog to an animal shelter, the executor of his estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and asserting a state law claim for assault and battery.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officer, holding that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the officer violated Lawrence's clearly established constitutional rights by shooting him. In this case, Lawrence was not committing a dangerous felony, or even a non-dangerous one. Rather, he was just trying to drop off at an animal shelter a stray dog he had found in a parking lot earlier that day. The court explained that the underlying crime for which he was being arrested was, at worst, driving without a license, the maximum punishment for which is a $100 fine; the only flight he engaged in was running around his car on two occasions when he managed to break loose from the officers who were trying to handcuff him; he did resist being handcuffed and arrested, but not violently; while being held by an officer who outweighed him by 75 pounds, another officer tased him at least twice in the abdomen; when he grabbed at the taser in an attempt to avoid being tased again, he and two of the three officers struggled over it, but Lawrence never gained control of it; and, at that point, the officer who had been tasing him let go of the taser, drew her firearm, and fatally shot him without warning, all in the space of three seconds. Therefore, the officer that shot Lawrence is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity or based on state agent immunity. View "Cantu v. City of Dothan" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Shkelzen Berisha, the son of the former Prime Minister of Albania, who alleges that he was defamed in a book that accused him of being involved in an elaborate arms-dealing scandal in the early 2000s. Guy Lawson wrote the book at issue, called Arms and the Dudes: How Three Stoners from Miami Beach Became the Most Unlikely Gunrunners in History, which tells the supposedly true story of three young Miami, Florida, men who became international arms dealers. Lawson also sold the movie rights to Warner Brothers, which turned the story into the 2016 major motion picture War Dogs, starring Jonah Hill and Miles Teller.After determining that the district court correctly applied the heightened defamation standard for claims brought by public figures, the court held that the district court did not err in finding that there was insufficient evidence to support Berisha's claim that defendants acted with actual malice. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Berisha's motion to compel where the employee-equivalent doctrine, which extends the attorney-client privilege beyond individuals who control the corporation to include other employees with whom the lawyer must consult in order to advise the company, would likely shield from discovery the communications between Lawson and Simon & Schuster's attorneys. Finally, the court held that Berisha presents no grounds upon which the court could conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying him an additional and last-minute extension of the discovery deadline. View "Berisha v. Lawson" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against their accounting firm for negligence, the firm settled the case by paying plaintiffs $800,000. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government as to plaintiffs' deduction of litigation expenses as a business expense, because the litigation between plaintiffs and the firm was personal in its character and origin. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government as to plaintiffs' $1.4 million deduction for a purported loss, because the settlement agreement bars plaintiffs from deducting any fraction of the settlement for the covered transactions.With respect to the $800,000 settlement payment exclusion, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the government. Assuming that Clark v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), was correctly decided, and that its rationale applies in a case like this one where the accounting malpractice related not to the preparation of a tax return but to the structuring of an underlying transaction, the court held that plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that the $800,000 settlement was excludable. In this case, plaintiffs failed to meet their burdens of showing their entitlement to the exclusion and the amount of that exclusion. The court explained that the IRS' tax deficiency notice was presumed correct, and plaintiffs did not overcome that presumption. View "McKenney v. United States" on Justia Law

Hepatitis C (HCV) is a bloodborne virus. Only about 1% of the general population suffers from HCV; its prevalence among prison inmates is much higher. HCV primarily attacks the liver, causing scarring, or “fibrosis,” which is measured from F0 (no fibrosis) to F4 (cirrhosis). Many people “spontaneously clear” HCV without treatment. HCV patients were previously prescribed weekly injections of Interferon, which caused unpleasant side effects, and succeeded in eradicating HCV only about 30% of the time. In 2013, a new HCV treatment became available—direct-acting antiviral (DAA) pills, with few side effects and a 95% cure rate. DAAs are very expensive.Chronic-HCV inmates incarcerated in Florida prisons filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. Florida then hired Dr. Dewsnup, who had developed and implemented an HCV-treatment plan for the Oregon prison system. Florida adopted Dewsnup's proposal of providing DAAs for all inmates at level F2 and above and monitoring F0- and F1-level inmates and treating them with DAAs under certain circumstances. Ultimately, the court ordered DAA treatment of all F0s and F1s within two years of their initial staging. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The state’s plan to monitor all HCV-positive inmates, including those who have not exhibited serious symptoms, and provide DAAs to anyone with an exacerbating condition, showing signs of rapid progression, or developing even moderate fibrosis, satisfies constitutional requirements. View "Hoffer v. Secretary, Florida Department Corrections" on Justia Law

In 1996, when she was an infant, Cynthia's family moved to the "Acreage" in Palm Beach County, Florida, about 10 miles from undeveloped land that Pratt used for tests that contaminated the soil. By 1993, most of the soil at the site required removal. Cynthia’s parents allege that in 1993-2000, Pratt excavated contaminated soil that was sold as “fill” for the Acreage and that runoff from the contaminated soil leached into the Acreage’s water supply. In 2009, the Florida Department of Health found a cluster of pediatric brain cancer cases in the Acreage. In 2009, doctors diagnosed Cynthia with ependymoma brain cancer, which metastasized to her spine. Doctors detected thorium-230 in Cynthia’s spine hundreds of times higher than would normally be expected. Cynthia turned 18 in 2014 and filed suit, alleging she was unaware of the contamination until 2014. Cynthia died in 2016. Her Florida law wrongful death by negligence and trespass claims were untimely under Florida's four-year limitations period. With respect to claims under the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210(n)(2), her parents cited the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, which tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff knows (or reasonably should have known) her injury was caused by a hazardous substance, or until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit CERCLA’s discovery-tolling provision applies only to actions “brought under State law.” Actions under the Price-Anderson Act borrow from the state where the incident occurred, so Florida’s four-year statute of limitations governs. View "Santiago v. Raytheon Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that four officials at the Georgia Institute of Technology played a role in creating a report that falsely accused him of stealing resources from the Institute, which then led to his arrest and prosecution for racketeering and theft. Plaintiff filed suit against the officials in the district court for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the officials' motion to dismiss the complaint.The Eleventh Circuit held that a dismissal for untimeliness qualifies as a favorable termination in a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that, because plaintiff's complaint alleges that the prosecution against him formally terminated and does not allege that he was convicted or that he admitted his guilt to each charge that justified his seizure, he has alleged that he received a favorable termination. The court also held that plaintiff has alleged that two of the officials violated his clearly established constitutional rights by initiating the warrant proceedings without probable cause and with malice; the officials caused his seizures; and the officials violated plaintiff's clearly established rights to not be seized based on intentional and material misstatements in a warrant application. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Laskar v. Hurd" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to amend the decision, vacated the previous opinion, and issued this opinion with the government's requested amendment.After determining that it has jurisdiction to consider the petition for review, the court held that the BIA erred by retroactively applying the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court held that neither IIRIRA section 309(a) nor 309(c)(5) mandates retroactivity, and that the BIA's interpretation of the stop-time rule does not warrant Chevron deference. In this case, by pleading guilty, petitioner gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. The court explained that applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law