Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1996, when she was an infant, Cynthia's family moved to the "Acreage" in Palm Beach County, Florida, about 10 miles from undeveloped land that Pratt used for tests that contaminated the soil. By 1993, most of the soil at the site required removal. Cynthia’s parents allege that in 1993-2000, Pratt excavated contaminated soil that was sold as “fill” for the Acreage and that runoff from the contaminated soil leached into the Acreage’s water supply. In 2009, the Florida Department of Health found a cluster of pediatric brain cancer cases in the Acreage. In 2009, doctors diagnosed Cynthia with ependymoma brain cancer, which metastasized to her spine. Doctors detected thorium-230 in Cynthia’s spine hundreds of times higher than would normally be expected. Cynthia turned 18 in 2014 and filed suit, alleging she was unaware of the contamination until 2014. Cynthia died in 2016. Her Florida law wrongful death by negligence and trespass claims were untimely under Florida's four-year limitations period. With respect to claims under the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210(n)(2), her parents cited the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, which tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff knows (or reasonably should have known) her injury was caused by a hazardous substance, or until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit CERCLA’s discovery-tolling provision applies only to actions “brought under State law.” Actions under the Price-Anderson Act borrow from the state where the incident occurred, so Florida’s four-year statute of limitations governs. View "Santiago v. Raytheon Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that four officials at the Georgia Institute of Technology played a role in creating a report that falsely accused him of stealing resources from the Institute, which then led to his arrest and prosecution for racketeering and theft. Plaintiff filed suit against the officials in the district court for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the officials' motion to dismiss the complaint.The Eleventh Circuit held that a dismissal for untimeliness qualifies as a favorable termination in a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that, because plaintiff's complaint alleges that the prosecution against him formally terminated and does not allege that he was convicted or that he admitted his guilt to each charge that justified his seizure, he has alleged that he received a favorable termination. The court also held that plaintiff has alleged that two of the officials violated his clearly established constitutional rights by initiating the warrant proceedings without probable cause and with malice; the officials caused his seizures; and the officials violated plaintiff's clearly established rights to not be seized based on intentional and material misstatements in a warrant application. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Laskar v. Hurd" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to amend the decision, vacated the previous opinion, and issued this opinion with the government's requested amendment.After determining that it has jurisdiction to consider the petition for review, the court held that the BIA erred by retroactively applying the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court held that neither IIRIRA section 309(a) nor 309(c)(5) mandates retroactivity, and that the BIA's interpretation of the stop-time rule does not warrant Chevron deference. In this case, by pleading guilty, petitioner gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. The court explained that applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendants, three foreign nationals in a foreign vessel in the territorial waters of Jamaica, were arrested by the United States Coast Guard with the consent of the foreign country and prosecuted in the United States for drug-trafficking crimes under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Defendants pleaded guilty and preserved their right to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress.The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's convictions, holding that the MDLEA is unconstitutional and exceeded Congress's authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The court also held that, as applied to defendants, the MDLEA was not a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate the subsequently enacted 1989 Convention Against Illicit Traffic Treaty and the 1997 Jamaica Bilateral Agreement between the United States and Jamaica. View "United States v. Davila-Mendoza" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions of law to the Alabama Supreme Court under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18: (1) Can property owned by a solid waste disposal authority "belong[] to" a county or municipality for purposes of section 6-10-10? (2) If so, what factors should courts consider when making such a determination? (3) If section 6-10-10 can apply to property owned by a solid waste disposal authority, is such property "used for county or municipal purposes" when the authority has not used the property but is holding it for a future use? (4) Does Alabama continue to recognize a common law exemption from execution for property used for public purposes as described in Gardner v. Mobile & N.W.R. Co., 15 So. 271 (Ala. 1894)? (5) If so, does that exemption apply to public corporations like the Authority, and what standards should courts employ in applying this common law exemption? View "WM Mobile Bay Environmental Center, Inc. v. The City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The gun fell from defendant's waistband as he complied with a police order to get on the ground and crawl out of a room during the execution of fugitive task force arrest warrants.The court held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the hotel room to execute the arrest warrants, because they reasonably believed that the hotel room was the dwelling of two gang members. Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent, Summers v. Michigan, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), foreclosed defendant's argument that requiring him, an innocent bystander who was not sought by police, to crawl out of the hotel room was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Rather, requiring defendant to lower himself to the ground allowed officers to peer over him and look for any emerging threats from the room. Finally, the court held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him where the questions he wished to ask would not have been probative of any bias or lack of truthfulness; they would have confused the issues; and the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion by restricting cross-examination on these topics. View "United States v. Mastin" on Justia Law

After plaintiff bought a puppy from Petland and the puppy died a week later, plaintiff filed suit under the civil provisions contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that the puppy's death was the result of a nationwide racketeering conspiracy. Plaintiff alleged that defendants are involved in a conspiracy to sell sick puppies for premium prices and engaged in a campaign of obfuscation after the sale to aid Petland in avoiding its warranties.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's RICO complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the complaint failed to plead facts that plausibly support the inference that defendants shared a common purpose to commit the massive fraud she alleges. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to allege with particularity that each defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. The court also held that plaintiff adequately alleged in her complaint that the Class Action Fairness Act vested the district court with original jurisdiction over her Georgia RICO claim. Therefore, the court vacated the portion of the district court's order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiff's state-law RICO claim with prejudice. View "Cisneros v. Petland, Inc." on Justia Law

The trustee objected to the modification of debtor's Chapter 13 modification plan, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata barred debtor's modification. The bankruptcy court confirmed the modified plan, finding that 11 U.S.C. 1329 creates an exception to the finality of confirmed Chapter 13 plans, and that debtor's modified plan satisfied the express requirements of section 1329.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that section 1329 does not impose a change-of-circumstances requirement on debtors. Therefore, debtor need not make any threshold showing of a change in circumstances before proposing a modification to a confirmed plan under section 1329. View "Whaley v. Guillen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit against AAP and several other defendants. Under the Federally Supported Health Care Assistance Act of 1999 (FSHCAA), 42 U.S.C. 233, the government removed the case to federal district court. The government sought to have the United States substituted as the defendant and the suit converted to an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Then the government acknowledged that its section 233 scope-of-employment certification was in error, withdrew the certification, and stipulated to the remand of the case to state court. The district court then remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants Dr. Tolliver and AAP Healthcare appealed, seeking review of the district court's order remanding the case.The Eleventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) precludes the court from reviewing the district court's order remanding this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Thomas v. Albany Area Primary Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for conspiracy to commit immigration-document fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. Defendant's convictions arose out of a scheme to obtain fraudulently an employment-based visa for "multinational executives and managers," called an EB-1C visa. Defendant recruited and paid U.S. businesses to enter into a fictitious joint venture with a Chinese business, and then defendant filed an employer I-140 Petition for Immigrant Worker in the U.S. business's name on behalf of a named Chinese-national beneficiary to classify that beneficiary as an EB-1C multinational executive or manager, even though defendant knew that beneficiary would not work for the U.S. business or the joint venture.The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the fraud-conspiracy offense because the I-140 petitions and certain related documents contained false statements and were required by immigration laws or regulations, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's two money laundering convictions because the immigration-document fraud was an underlying "specified unlawful activity" for purposes of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law