Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal is whether several voters and organizations have standing to challenge a law that governs the order in which candidates appear on the ballot in Florida's general elections. The voters and organizations alleged that the law violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because candidates who appear first on the ballot—in recent years, Republicans—enjoy a "windfall vote" from a small number of voters who select the first candidate on a ballot solely because of that candidate's position of primacy. The district court permanently enjoined the Secretary from preparing ballots in accordance with the law.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of justiciability, holding that the voters and organizations lack standing to sue the Secretary, because none of them proved an injury in fact. Furthermore, any injury they might suffer is neither fairly traceable to the Secretary nor redressable by a judgment against her because she does not enforce the challenged law. Rather, the county officials independent of the Secretary (the Supervisors) are responsible for placing candidates on the ballot in the order the law prescribes. Therefore, the court held that the district court lacked authority to enjoin those officials in this action and it was powerless to provide redress. View "Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who has been convicted and sentenced to death for murder. The court held that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in rejecting petitioner's claim that he was provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his second trial by counsel's failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence. The court held that petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that his counsel's performance affected the outcome of his sentencing proceeding. View "James v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a motion for a stay of a preliminary injunction that enjoins certain applications of a public health order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Alabama. The public health order, published on March 27, 2020, mandated the postponement of all dental, medical, or surgical procedures. Plaintiffs, abortion providers in Alabama, sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing enforcement of the public health order as applied to pre-viability abortions. After the district court issued a TRO, the state filed a motion to dissolve the TRO and included clarifications. The district court subsequently adopted the state's clarifications and issued an April 3rd order, staying the TRO in part. The state later changed its interpretation again. Based on the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court determined that the medical restrictions, as read pursuant to the state's earlier interpretation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment.The court held that the state has not made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal or that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay. In this case, because of the state's shifting interpretations of the March 27th and April 3rd orders, the district court had ample authority to issue a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo and prevent the state from reverting to its initial and more restrictive interpretations.The district court considered Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Smith v. Avino, but read them together with cases holding that the Fourteenth Amendment generally protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Applying both the Jacobson framework and the Casey undue-burden test together, the district court concluded that the April 3rd order imposed a plain, palpable invasion of rights, yet had no real or substantial relation to the state's goals. The court held that the district court was permitted to reach this conclusion and to issue a status quo preliminary injunction to ensure that the state did not deviate from the Alabama State Health Officer's interpretation of the April 3rd order at the preliminary injunction hearing. View "Robinson v. Planned Parenthood Southeast Inc." on Justia Law

BBX filed suit challenging the FDIC's determination that the severance payments BBX sought to make to five former executives of the Bank were golden parachute payments and that it would approve payments of only twelve months of salary to each executive. The FDIC also concluded that BBT was required to seek and receive approval before making the reimbursement payments to BBX. The FRB subsequently approved the same payment amounts but took no action with respect to approving any payments over 12 months of salary because the FDIC had already prohibited any additional payments.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of BBX's action against FRB for lack of standing because BBX has not shown any injury it has sustained is fairly traceable to an FRB action or inaction. The court also held that the FDIC's decision to classify the proposed payments as golden parachute payments was not arbitrary or capricious, because the golden parachute statute, 12 U.S.C. 1828(k), covers the stock purchase agreement (SPA) and the proposed payments included therein. Furthermore, earlier agreements, such as severance contracts, are irrelevant because the proposed payments are being made under the SPA. The court held that the FDIC's denial of any payments in excess of 12 months' salary for each executive was not arbitrary and capricious where the explanations the FDIC offered for denying additional payments were reasonable and did not run counter to the evidence. Finally, the court rejected BBX's argument that the FDIC's requirement that BBT seek approval before reimbursing BBX was arbitrary and capricious. View "BBX Capital v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

After plaintiff asked her employer, Rural, for a temporary light-duty or dispatcher assignment for the duration of her pregnancy because her physician advised her to refrain from lifting more than 50 pounds while pregnant, Rural declined plaintiff's request for accommodation. Plaintiff filed suit against Rural, alleging discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of Rural's motion for summary judgment, holding that the district court erroneously factored into the "similar in their ability or inability to work" evaluation the distinct, post-prima-facie-case consideration of Rural's purported legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for treating plaintiff and the non-pregnant employees differently. The court explained that neither a non-pregnant EMT who is limited to lifting 10 or 20 pounds nor a pregnant EMT who is restricted to lifting 50 pounds or less can lift the required 100 pounds to serve as an EMT. Consequently, neither can meet the lifting requirement and are thus the same in their "inability to work" as an EMT. The court held that plaintiff's prima facie requirement to establish that she was similarly situated to other employees in their ability or inability to work was satisfied. The court remanded for the district court to determine the remaining issues in the first instance. View "Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a successful guitar maker and technician, designed a lightning storm graphic that originally appeared on the guitar of Darrell Abbott, late guitarist of the heavy-metal band Pantera. This copyright registration action relates to the lightning storm graphic. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant and several others, alleging copyright infringement, unfair competition, and false endorsement.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the district court properly concluded that plaintiff's copyright claim, primarily concerning copyright ownership, was time-barred; the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's false advertising and unfair competition claims because the statements he relies on were not false or misleading; and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's false endorsement claim, because plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of consumer confusion, mistake, or deception. View "Webster v. Guitars" on Justia Law

After plaintiff tripped over the leg of a lounge chair while she was walking through a narrow pathway on a Carnival cruise ship, she filed suit alleging that Carnival negligently failed to maintain a safe walkway and failed to warn her of that dangerous condition.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Carnival, holding that the district court, in concluding that the condition was open and obvious and that Carnival lacked notice, failed to draw all factual inferences in favor of plaintiff. Furthermore, even if the allegedly dangerous condition were open and obvious, that would only defeat the failure to warn claim, and would not bar the claim for negligently failing to maintain a safe walkway. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff presented evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Carnival negligently maintained an unsafe walkway. In this case, a reasonable jury could find that at least some chairs were in the lay-flat position and out of order, and thus conclude that Carnival negligently maintained an unsafe walkway that fell below industry standards. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Carroll v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting her and by unlawfully detaining her. Plaintiff also alleged state law claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff on the Monell claim related to plaintiff's detention. Because plaintiff was kept in custody pursuant to (and because of) the Sheriff's mandatory eight-hour hold policy after her two breathalyzer test results registered blood-alcohol readings of 0.000 and after she posted bond, the only remaining question is whether a reasonable jury could find that the hold policy, as applied to plaintiff violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that, following a warrantless DUI arrest based on probable cause, officers do not have an affirmative Fourth Amendment duty to investigate or continually reassess whether the arrestee is or remains intoxicated while in custody. The court held that where, as here, the officers seek and obtain information which shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrestee is not intoxicated—in other words, that probable cause to detain no longer exists—the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrestee be released. In this case, a reasonable jury viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff could find that her continued detention pursuant to the Sheriff's eight-hour hold policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Barnett v. MacArthur" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 46 month sentence for illegally reentering the United States and 21 month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that defendant's 67 month sentence, ordered to run consecutively to his undischarged state sentence, represented a significant period of time for defendant to spend in prison but that his actions warrant it in this instance. In this case, the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, including defendant's history of violence, including his sexual battery conviction, as well as his arrest for violating a domestic violence protective injunction. Furthermore, defendant's sentences were within their respective Guidelines ranges, and his sentence for illegally reentering the United States was at the low end of that range. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, one of more than 30 woman who were victimized by notorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey Epstein, sought mandamus relief, alleging that when federal prosecutors secretly negotiated and entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004. Specifically, petitioner alleged that federal prosecutors violated her rights to confer with the government's lawyers and to be treated fairly by them. In this case, Epstein entered into a non-prosecution agreement with federal prosecutors, and the prosecutors never conferred with the victims about the agreement or told them that such agreement was under consideration.The Eleventh Circuit denied mandamus relief and held that rights under the CVRA do not attach until criminal proceedings have been initiated against a defendant, either by complaint, information, or indictment. Because the government never filed charges or otherwise commenced criminal proceedings against Epstein, the court held that the CVRA was never triggered. View "In re: Courtney Wild" on Justia Law