Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal agents in Florida posted fake online advertisements for underage girls on a website known for sex trafficking. Ralph Tovar responded to one of these ads, persistently contacting the number provided and expressing interest in meeting two girls, aged thirteen and fifteen, for sex. He negotiated the terms, including additional illegal acts for extra payment, and arranged to meet at a hotel, where he paid $550 to an undercover agent for a room key. Tovar was arrested immediately after the transaction. He was indicted on two counts of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and one count of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity. At trial, Tovar claimed he intended to “save” the girls, not exploit them, but the jury found him guilty on all counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Tovar’s motions for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence that he knowingly attempted to engage in sex trafficking of minors. The court also rejected his arguments regarding the sufficiency of the government’s proof on the interstate-commerce element, the propriety of the jury instructions, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed Tovar’s new arguments. The court held that the interstate-commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) is not jurisdictional but a substantive element, and thus reviewed for plain error. The court found no error, holding that Tovar’s use of the internet and a cell phone to arrange the transaction satisfied the “in or affecting interstate commerce” requirement. The court also found the jury instructions proper and no prosecutorial misconduct. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Tovar’s conviction. View "United States v. Tovar" on Justia Law

Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation and Venequip Machinery Sales Corporation Miami entered into an inventory loan agreement governed by Tennessee law, under which Venequip Miami could borrow funds by executing promissory notes. Venequip Miami executed six such notes, totaling approximately $4.77 million. The agreement specified that default would occur if Venequip Miami failed to repay principal or interest when due, or if there was a material adverse change in its financial condition. After a related affiliate defaulted on a separate loan in Curaçao, Caterpillar Financial declared an event of default under the inventory loan agreement, accelerated the debt, and demanded repayment. Venequip Miami did not repay, and Caterpillar Financial alleged that the outstanding amount exceeded $10 million.Caterpillar Financial filed a breach of contract suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Venequip Miami moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Caterpillar Financial failed to specify which provision of the inventory loan agreement was breached. The district court agreed, finding the complaint insufficient because it did not identify the specific provision breached among several possible events of default, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Caterpillar Financial’s subsequent motion to amend the judgment and file an amended complaint was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that under federal pleading standards, a breach of contract plaintiff is not required to identify the specific contractual provision breached, but must plausibly allege nonperformance. The court found that Caterpillar Financial’s complaint sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract, nonperformance by Venequip Miami, and resulting damages. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. v. Venequip Machinery Sales Corp." on Justia Law

An American accountant and financial executive, who worked extensively in Russia, was investigated for failing to timely file U.S. tax returns and for concealing substantial assets in Swiss bank accounts. He received millions of dollars in compensation, which he deposited in Swiss accounts held under nominee names. After being notified by Swiss banks of compliance requirements, he transferred accounts and listed his then-wife as the beneficial owner. He did not file timely tax returns or required Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBARs) for several years, later attempting to participate in the IRS’s Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures by certifying his failures were non-willful. However, he omitted at least one account from his 2014 FBAR.A grand jury in the Middle District of Florida indicted him on multiple tax-related charges. At trial, the jury convicted him on four counts: failure to file income tax returns for 2013 and 2014, making false statements on his Streamlined certification, and failure to file a compliant 2014 FBAR. The district court sentenced him to 86 months’ imprisonment and ordered over $4 million in restitution to the IRS.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in tolling the statute of limitations for the 2013 and 2014 failure-to-file tax return charges because the government’s application for tolling did not specifically identify those offenses, nor did the court make the required findings. As a result, the convictions on those counts were reversed as time-barred. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence from the email search, finding no abuse of discretion in deeming the motion untimely. The court also found no constructive amendment or material variance regarding the FBAR charge. The sentence and restitution order were vacated and remanded for resentencing and further findings on restitution. View "United States v. Gyetvay" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner diagnosed with a painful uterine fibroid sought medical treatment, including surgery, while incarcerated. Despite recommendations from two outside physicians for surgical intervention, prison medical staff repeatedly denied her requests for surgery. The prisoner followed the Bureau of Prisons’ four-step administrative grievance process: she attempted informal resolution, filed a formal written request, appealed to the regional director, and then submitted a final appeal (BP-11 form) to the Bureau’s General Counsel. Although she properly completed and mailed the BP-11 form, prison officials claimed they never received or logged it, and the tracking system showed no record of its receipt.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama initially dismissed her Federal Tort Claims Act claims but allowed her to amend her complaint to pursue Eighth Amendment claims against individual medical staff. After further proceedings, the district court dismissed her amended complaint, concluding that she failed to exhaust administrative remedies because her BP-11 form was never logged as received and because she filed her lawsuit before the General Counsel’s response period had expired.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the prisoner satisfied her obligation to exhaust administrative remedies by properly completing and mailing the BP-11 form, even though prison officials failed to log or process it. The court further held that the administrative remedy process was unavailable to her due to the lack of guidance on how to proceed when officials fail to file a properly submitted grievance, making the process “prohibitively opaque.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McGuire-Mollica v. Griffin" on Justia Law

A married couple, both citizens of Mexico, have lived in the United States for over twenty years without legal status. They have two U.S.-born children, one of whom, I.L., has a learning disability, ADHD, and requires ongoing medical and educational support. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple, who conceded inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that deportation would cause their son an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to his special needs and the alleged lack of adequate services in Mexico.An immigration judge found both parents credible and agreed they met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal, but concluded they did not satisfy the hardship requirement. The judge acknowledged the difficulties I.L. would face but determined these did not rise to the high threshold set by the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decisions in separate, but materially identical, rulings, agreeing that the hardship standard was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the substantial-evidence standard, as clarified by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, given the record showed that some medical and educational services were available in Mexico and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The court denied the petitions for review, holding that the Board’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reviewable for substantial evidence, and that the Board’s decisions in these cases met that standard. View "Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Stanley Watson, a former county commissioner, accused Sheneeka Bradsher and Zarinah Ali of stealing his wallet at a bar. Despite no evidence, he repeatedly demanded their arrest and threatened police officers who did not comply. Bradsher was arrested for disorderly conduct, but later released when Watson's wallet was found in his car. Bradsher and Ali sued Watson for slander, battery, and false imprisonment, winning a $150,500 judgment.Watson filed for bankruptcy, and Bradsher and Ali sought to except their judgment from discharge. The bankruptcy court found Watson genuinely believed the women stole his wallet, discharging the slander and battery debts but ruling the false imprisonment debts nondischargeable. The district court affirmed the nondischargeability of the false imprisonment debts but remanded for further clarification on the slander claim. On remand, the bankruptcy court found the slander debt dischargeable, attributing two-thirds of the damages to false imprisonment and one-third to slander.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding Watson willfully and maliciously caused the women’s confinement, making the false imprisonment debts nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The court also upheld the bankruptcy court’s allocation of damages, finding it supported by the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgments in favor of Bradsher and Ali. View "Watson v. Bradsher" on Justia Law

Perfection Bakeries Inc. paid into the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union’s Industry Pension Fund for its employees in Michigan and Indiana. The company later ceased contributions, first in Michigan and then in Indiana, incurring "withdrawal liability" under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. The Fund calculated this liability using a four-step formula outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1381. Perfection Bakeries challenged the Fund's calculation, arguing that a specific calculation was performed at the wrong step.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund, holding that the statutory text unambiguously required the credit to be applied as part of the second adjustment step.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Fund correctly applied the partial-withdrawal credit at step two of the four-step formula. The court concluded that the statute's language and structure supported the Fund's interpretation, which incorporated all of section 1386, including the credit for previous partial withdrawals, at step two. The court found that this interpretation was consistent with the statutory context and the repeated cross-references to section 1386 throughout the four-step formula. The court rejected Perfection Bakeries' arguments, including the contention that the partial-withdrawal credit should be applied after all four steps, and upheld the Fund's calculation method. View "Perfection Bakeries Inc v. Retail Wholesale & Dept Store International Union" on Justia Law

A transgender prisoner, Robert Bayse, who identifies as a woman named Robbin, is serving two concurrent life sentences in a Georgia prison. Bayse suffers from gender dysphoria and borderline personality disorder and receives hormone therapy and mental-health counseling. Previously, Bayse was allowed to follow female grooming and cosmetic standards at another prison. However, at the current prison, these accommodations were denied, leading Bayse to file a lawsuit against several prison officials, alleging that the denial violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia denied the officials' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the social transitioning accommodations were medically necessary and whether the officials acted with deliberate indifference. The court also concluded that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established that denying medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria constituted deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the burden of proving medical necessity for the social transitioning accommodations was on Bayse, and Bayse failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet this burden. The court also determined that the district court erred in its analysis of clearly established law by relying on nonprecedential decisions. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit instructed the district court to grant qualified immunity to the prison officials. View "Bayse v. Philbin" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, Alin Pop, filed a putative class action against LuliFama.com LLC and other defendants, including several social media influencers, alleging a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). Pop claimed he purchased Luli Fama swimwear after seeing influencers endorse the products on Instagram without disclosing they were paid for their endorsements. Pop argued that this non-disclosure was deceptive and violated FDUTPA.The case was initially filed in Florida state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that because Pop's FDUTPA claim sounded in fraud, it was subject to the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court found that Pop's complaint failed to meet this standard as it did not specify which posts led to his purchase, which defendants made those posts, when the posts were made, or which products he bought. The court also found that the complaint failed to state a claim under the ordinary pleading standards.Pop appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies to FDUTPA claims that sound in fraud. The court found that Pop's allegations closely tracked the elements of common law fraud and thus required particularity in pleading. The court also held that Pop failed to properly request leave to amend his complaint, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. View "Pop v. LuliFama.com LLC" on Justia Law

Federal agents discovered that an individual was sharing files containing child pornography over a peer-to-peer network. After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement searched his residence and seized several digital devices. Forensic analysis revealed that he had downloaded and shared over 300 images and 150 videos depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on one count of possessing and accessing with intent to view child pornography involving a minor under twelve years of age. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial based on stipulated facts, after which the district court found him guilty.Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report, which calculated his total offense level as 30, including a five-level enhancement for offenses involving 600 or more images. The calculation treated each video as equivalent to 75 images, based on Sentencing Commission commentary. The defendant objected, arguing that the guideline’s text did not support this interpretation, but the district court overruled the objection and imposed a sentence of 97 months’ imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release. The court also ordered restitution of $3,000 to each of thirteen victims, totaling $39,000, and denied the defendant’s request for a jury to determine restitution. The written judgment included standard conditions of supervised release, which were not individually enumerated at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the sentencing guideline unambiguously requires each video frame containing child pornography to be counted as one image, but since the defendant conceded that his conduct exceeded the threshold for the highest enhancement, the sentence was affirmed. The court also held that neither the Fifth nor Sixth Amendments require a jury to determine restitution amounts, and that the district court was not required to disaggregate losses caused by the initial abuse. Finally, the court found no error in the district court’s pronouncement of supervised release conditions. View "USA v. Kluge" on Justia Law