Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging two policies related to the provision of basic utility services from the City on the ground that the policies have a disproportionate impact on black and Hispanic residents.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act is unambiguous and reaches certain post-acquisition conduct, including post-acquisition conduct related to the provision of services. The panel held that a service within the meaning of section 3604(b) must be a housing-related service that is directly connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling, and the water, gas, and electricity services at issue here fall within the scope of section 3604(b). Finally, the court rejected the City's argument that it is not a housing provider subject to section 3604(b), and held that section 3604(b) does not limit its applicability in such a manner and the court's case law has never held that only housing providers are subject to liability thereunder. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange" on Justia Law

Defendant's prior conviction in Washington for delivery of cocaine is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), which bars him from establishing the "good moral character" necessary for naturalization. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, challenging DHS's denial of his application for naturalization. The court held that accomplice liability under the Washington statute is no broader than under the federal Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Washington statute is no broader than the federal Act regarding "administering" a controlled substance. View "Bourtzakis v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against Mentor and Mentor Corporation for compensatory and punitive damages for injuries she suffered as a result of the surgical implantation of a polypropylene mesh sling manufactured by Mentor to treat her stress urinary incontinence, a jury found Mentor liable and awarded $400,000 in compensatory and $4 million in punitive damages. The district court upheld the jury's verdict with respect to liability and compensatory damages, but concluded that the punitive damages award exceeded Florida's statutory cap, reducing the punitive damages award to $2 million.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the trial court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in allowing the jury to consider an expert's testimony relating to specific causation and Mentor was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also held that, in this case, which was focused on the physiological response to a design defect in a medical device, the dose-response relation was not implicated and there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony. The court considered Mentor's remaining evidentiary challenges and held that the district court at no point exceeded the bounds of its discretion. Therefore, Mentor was not entitled to a new trial. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's reduction of the punitive damages award where evidence that Mentor knew of a high incidence of injury was not sufficient for finding a specific intent to harm. View "Taylor v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas corpus petition challenging his convictions for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.Applying de novo review, the court held that petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present available evidence that his relationship with the victim was loving and respectful and that he did not "live off" her, because the evidence at issue was repetitious; even assuming that counsel provided ineffective assistance, petitioner failed to show prejudice; and although petitioner's claim was procedurally defaulted, the court held that the Florida Supreme Court's decision denying his Brady claim was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. View "Riechmann v. Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's order revoking the discharge of debtors' debt. Debtors claimed that the trustee had pre-discharge knowledge of the alleged conduct that resulted in the revocation.The court held that the "lack-of-knowledge" requirement that is explicitly contained in one subsection of the bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. 727(d)(1), cannot be read into the adjacent subsection of the same statute, 11 U.S.C. 727(d)(2), thereby barring revocation. The court need not reach the factual determination of whether the trustee had prior knowledge of the fraud issue, because it would be inappropriate to rewrite section 727(d)(2) to include that requirement. Therefore, the court held that the bankruptcy court and district court correctly interpreted section 727(d)(2). View "Thompson v. Gargula" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Immigration Services violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in two ways: when it used a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard rather than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to evaluate his I-130 petition for sponsorship of close relatives, and when it did not allow him to offer rebuttal evidence. In this case, plaintiff had been convicted of possession of child pornography, which put him outside the bounds of the visa-sponsorship program unless he could show that he posed no risk to his wife, the person he was trying to sponsor.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, holding that courts lack jurisdiction to review either the process or the outcome of the no-risk decision. Under the Adam Walsh Act, the USCIS has "sole and unreviewable discretion" to determine if citizens like plaintiff pose "no risk" to their foreign relatives. Therefore, the district court correctly held that the Adam Walsh Act prevented it from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's APA claim. View "Bourdon v. United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant's prior New York convictions for first degree robbery and attempted second degree murder qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause.The court held that New York first degree robbery, which requires the defendant to "forcibly steal" has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court also held that New York's second-degree murder statute, which requires the intentional causation of death, categorically requires the use of physical force. The court saw no reason to draw a distinction between administering a poisonous substance with the intent to cause death and withholding a life-saving substance with the intent to cause death, where both must in fact cause death to be prosecuted. The court also upheld the district court's imposition of a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's restitution order after she pleaded guilty to numerous criminal charges related to her involvement in a fraudulent tax credit scheme. The Eleventh Circuit set aside the restitution order and held that the refunds issued by the IRS due to the fraudulent tax credit scheme were all for the same exact amount — $1,000 — and the evidence the government submitted in support of its restitution request was admittedly and demonstrably inaccurate. In this case, where the appropriate restitution amount is definite and easy to calculate, the government cannot satisfy its burden of proof by relying on the oft-stated (but not always applicable) principle that restitution can be based on a reasonable estimate of loss. View "United States v. Sheffield" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion to withdraw a prior motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to reduce defendant's sentence based on his substantial assistance. The court held that the government did not breach the plea agreement by withdrawing its prior motion and there was nothing in the plain language of the agreement that limited the government's discretion when it came to withdrawing a motion. The court also held that an evidentiary hearing to allow defendant to present evidence that he complied with the cooperation agreement, as he requests, was unwarranted. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Rothstein" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's second or successive motion to correct his sentence. Petitioner argued, in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that his seven principal-to-robbery-with-a-firearm convictions qualified as a third violent-felony conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act.The court held, under Florida law, that an aider and abettor is responsible for all acts committed by his accomplice in furtherance of the criminal scheme. Under the Florida statute, a person is a principal in the first degree whether he actually commits the crime or merely aids, abets or procures its commission, so it is immaterial which kind of liability the indictment or information alleges. Therefore, one who commits the Florida crime of principal to armed robbery necessarily commits the Florida crime of armed robbery. Because all of petitioner's armed-robbery convictions, even those where he only aided and abetted an armed robbery, count as violent felonies the same as if he had committed the armed robbery himself, there was no error in denying petitioner's motion. View "Boston v. United States" on Justia Law