Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Valencia College did not violate plaintiff's statutory or constitutional rights when it suspended him for his conduct toward another student at the college. In this case, plaintiff was suspended from the college after he sent numerous unwanted texts to his former lab partner.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the college, holding that plaintiff's as applied claim that the college violated his First Amendment right to free speech failed because the college could regulate plaintiff's expressive conduct because it invaded the rights of another student; the college's stalking provision was not unconstitutionally overbroad nor was it facially vague or vague as applied to his conduct; and plaintiff was not denied substantive or procedural due process. View "Koeppel v. District Board of Trustees of Valencia College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against a police officer and the city, alleging claims of excessive force. In this case, plaintiff was experiencing an episode of diabetic shock when he lost control of his car, came to a stop at an interstate median, and was tased four times by the officer as he attempted to comply with the officer's orders.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the case. The court also held that plaintiff, for purposes of summary judgment, established a constitutional violation. Therefore, the district court properly denied the city's motion for summary judgment. View "Glasscox v. City of Argo" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision ordering the City to remove a 34-foot Latin cross from a public park. The court held that American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983), was controlling here, because both Rabun and this case involved a private organization placing a similarly-sized cross on government property for Easter services. The court noted that, although the Supreme Court's contemporary jurisprudence seems to have substantially weakened Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and thus by extension Rabun, it was bound to follow precedent that was closely on point with the case before it and precedent that had not been overruled. View "Kondrat'yev v. City of Pensacola" on Justia Law

The SSA determined that because plaintiff was also receiving civil service disability retirement payments, his Social Security benefits should be reduced under the windfall elimination provision. At issue was the boundaries of "payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service" for the purpose of social security benefit calculations.The Eleventh Circuit, accounting for the unique nature of the dual status technician position and applying Skidmore deference, held that plaintiff did not perform his dual status technician employment wholly as a member of a uniformed service. Consequently, payments based on that employment did not qualify for the exception. The court did not think the requirements of the dual status technician position were sufficient to place dual status technicians within the sweep of the exception—especially given the provision's use of the word "wholly." Therefore, the uniformed services exception did not apply in plaintiff's case. View "Martin v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for unintentional and intentional torts arising from the death of her mother. Plaintiff alleged that her mother's illnesses were caused by her addiction to cigarettes manufactured by defendants. The jury found for plaintiff and defendants appealed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and rejected defendants' due process arguments because, consistent with precedent, the use of the Engle findings to establish the conduct elements of the progeny plaintiffs' tort claims was a constitutionally permissible application of res judicata. The court rejected defendants' contention that their Seventh Amendment rights were violated because the court concluded that the jury was not asked or required to reexamine the Engle findings. The court also rejected defendants' contention that the damages award should have been apportioned based on the mother's comparative fault, because the district court neither misinterpreted nor misapplied Florida law and plaintiff did not waive her statutory right to full, unapportioned damages. View "Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

12 U.S.C. 1715z-20(j) can not be read to prevent foreclosure pursuant to a reverse-mortgage contract that, by its terms, permits the lender to demand repayment immediately following a borrower's death, even if his or her non-borrowing spouse continues to live in the mortgaged property. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statute addressed and limited only the Secretary's authority—specifying the types of mortgages that HUD "may not insure"—and thus did not alter or affect the rights that a lender independently possessed under a reverse-mortgage contract. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Live Well's motion to dismiss because, even if HUD should not have insured the mortgage at issue, section 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit Live Well's right to foreclose under the terms of its valid mortgage contract. View "The Estate of Caldwell Jones, Jr. v. Live Well Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of a federal narcotics conspiracy offense, contending that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest that had an adverse effect on his performance at trial. The Eleventh Circuit held that counsel did have a conflict of interest when he represented a government witness who was then appealing his own sentence after pleading guilty to federal narcotics charges. Although counsel knew that the witness had been found to have obstructed justice in his own criminal case, counsel did not ask the witness about the obstruction scheme at defendant's trial. Therefore, the court remanded for the limited purpose of having the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether counsel's conflict resulted in an adverse effect. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

At issue was two questions under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the Convention) regarding federal subject matter jurisdiction established in an arbitration agreement and whether the parties entered into an agreement under the meaning of the Convention to arbitrate their dispute.Plaintiff’s predecessor entered into contracts that contained arbitration clauses and included “subcontractors.” Defendant was listed as a subcontractor. Plaintiff and its insurers later filed suit, and the case was removed to federal district court. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand and granted Defendant’s motions to compel and dismiss. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to remand but reversed and remanded the order compelling arbitration, holding (1) where jurisdiction is challenged on a motion to remand, the district court shall perform a limited inquiry to determine whether the suit “relates to” an arbitration agreement pursuant to the Convention under the factors articulated in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005); and (2) on a motion to compel arbitration, the district court must engage in a rigorous analysis of the Bautista factors to determine whether the parties entered into an agreement under the meaning of the Convention to arbitrate their dispute. View "Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS" on Justia Law

In this appeal challenging the constitutionality of Alabama’s three percent signature requirement for ballot access under certain election circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit held that the case was moot.Under Alabama law, independent candidates for political office have the right to have their name listed on the election ballot by filing a petition signed by at least three percent of qualified electors. James Hall, who ran as an independent candidate in a special election to fill a vacancy in Alabama’s First United States House of Representatives District, brought this action challenging the constitutionality of the three percent requirement as applied during a special election cycle. The district court issued a declaratory judgment that Alabama’s three percent signature requirement for ballot access violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments when enforced during any off-season special election for a U.S. House of Representatives seat in Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot, holding that there was no expectation that Hall, the same complaining party, will again be subject to the three percent requirement as an independent candidate or voter in a special election for a U.S. House seat. View "Hall v. Secretary, State of Alabama" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the standard for denying a motion for directed verdict in a criminal trial in Georgia can accurately gauge whether summary judgment was properly granted to a defendant in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution case.The district court applied Georgia’s Monroe rule, which provides that denial of a motion for directed verdict in a criminal trial conclusively demonstrates the existence of probable cause, thereby precluding a state civil malicious-prosecution claim based on the prosecution in which the criminal court denied the directed verdict. In applying the rule, the court granted summary judgment to Defendant and against Plaintiff on his section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the entry of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) a district court evaluating a motion for summary judgment on a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim must apply only the federal summary-judgment standard in determining whether summary judgment should be granted; and (2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment based solely on the Monroe rule. View "Blue v. Lopez" on Justia Law