Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendants Chacon, Altamirano, Portela, and Dixon's convictions and sentences for conspiracy to distribute 280 grams of cocaine base and several other charges of drug trafficking, firearm possession, armed robbery, and assault. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a drug conspiracy in Little Havana, Miami.The court held that sufficient evidence supported each defendant's conviction for the drug conspiracy; the district court correctly denied Portela's motion to suppress evidence, sufficient evidence supported his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, he was not entitled to a competency hearing, and he waived his right to appeal his sentence; sufficient evidence supported Altamirano's conviction for a violent crime in aid of racketeering; sufficient evidence supported Chacon's convictions for possession of a firearm and for possession of narcotics and the district court did not err when it admitted evidence of his uncharged conduct, when it refused to instruct the jury on entrapment, or when it denied his motion for a mistrial; Chacon's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable; and defendants' remaining claims were meritless. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in Florida state court alleging that defendants, including Union Carbide, negligently failed to warn users of the health hazards of asbestos and defectively designed their products. Union Carbide removed the case to federal court where the district court dismissed Union Carbide based on lack of personal jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Union Carbide was not subject to specific jurisdiction because plaintiffs could not show that their claims arose out of Union Carbide's contacts with Florida. Furthermore, Union Carbide was not subject to general jurisdiction because there was no evidence that Union Carbide was at home in Florida. View "Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Time Warner in an action brought by Cableview seeking to recover a payment it made to Time Warner based on a disputed indemnity claim. The court held that there were two disputed issues of fact regarding whether Time Warner initially gave its consent to the Installation Agreement assignment through its director of technical operations and whether Time Warner entered into new vendor contracts with FTS, which it later revoked, that made formal assignment of the Installation Agreement unnecessary. The court held, however, that these disputed issues were not material and that a reasonable jury could not find for Cableview on duress. The court also held that the settlement agreement contained sufficiently definite terms and that Cableview could not succeed on its other claims despite the settlement. View "Cableview Communications of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable Southeast, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the motion for a new trial filed by American Home Mortgage Servicing, now known as Homeward, the defendant in this action brought by Jane McGinnis alleging, among other claims, wrongful foreclosure, holding that Homeward was not entitled to relief on its claims of error related to the jury’s punitive damages award.McGinnis, the owner of several rental properties, brought this action against Homeward, the servicer of seven of her properties’ mortgages, alleging wrongful foreclosure, conversion, interference with property, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found in favor of McGinnis on all claims and awarded $3,506,000 in damages, including $3,000,000 in punitive damages. In this appeal, Homeward argued that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process Clause and that the punitive damages award exceeded Georgia’s $250,000 cap on punitive damages. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive; and (2) the punitive damages award did not unlawfully exceed the $250,000 statutory cap in O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(g) because there was no evidence from which a jury could conclude that it acted with the specific intent to harm McGinnis. View "McGinnis v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction entered by the district court in favor of Maurice Walker and against the City of Calhoun and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, holding that the injunction violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.Walker filed this action against the City while he was in custody, alleging that the City’s bail policy violated equal protection and due process principles by conditioning immediate release from jail on an arrestee’s ability to pay a cash bond without providing alternatives to indigent arrestees. Walker filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin the City from jailing him or other similarly situated indigent arrestees without offering them release on their own recognizance or on an unsecured bond. The district court granted the motion. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the order granting the motion for a preliminary injunction, as written, cannot stand. View "Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the outdoor food sharing hosted by FLFNB, a non-profit organization, is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, and therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Fort Lauderdale on FLFNB’s suit challenging an ordinance enacted by the City that restricted this food sharing.In 2014, the City enacted an ordinance that restricted FLFNB’s weekly food sharing at a City public park. In its complaint, FLFNB argued that the ordinance, enacted in 2014, and a related park rule violated their First Amendment free speech and free association rights and were unconstitutionally vague. The district court disagreed, concluding that the outdoor food sharing was not constitutionally-protected expressive conduct and that the ordinance and park rule were not vague. The Supreme Court reversed after examining the nature of FLFNB’s food sharing activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which the activity was undertaken, holding that FLFNB engaged in a form of protected expression. View "Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court properly denied relief on Appellant’s claim alleging that trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of his trial.Appellant, an inmate in a Georgia prison, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in the Southern District of Georgia, asserting eighteen claims. The district court denied the petition in its entirety. At issue on appeal was whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of Appellant’s trial by failing to use certain pretrial statements and police reports to impeach several of the State’s witnesses and by failing to object to the introduction of certain evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a fair-minded jurist could agree with the state habeas court’s denial of relief. View "Meders v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that the Alabama Unborn Child Protection from Dismemberment Abortion Act “constitutes an undue burden on abortion access and is unconstitutional” and granting as-applied injunctive relief to Plaintiffs, holding that, under Supreme Court precedent, the Act is unconstitutional.At issue was a method of abortion referred to as dilation and evacuation, or dismemberment abortion, which involves tearing apart and extracting piece-by-piece from the uterus, at the fifteen to eighteen week stage of development, what was until then a living unborn child. The State sought to make the procedure more humane by enacting the Act, which required the one performing the abortion to kill the unborn child before ripping apart its body during the extraction. See Ala. Code 26-23G-2(3). Plaintiffs brought this complaint claiming that the Act was unconstitutional on its face. The district court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional because it would place substantial obstacles before women seeking pre-viability abortions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed after applying the undue burden test, holding (1) the methods of fetal demise that the State proposed were not safe, effective, or available; and (2) neither the Act’s health exception nor its intent requirement saves the Act. View "West Alabama Women's Center v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Appellant unconditional release from civil commitment, holding that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Appellant’s risk of danger to others was due to a “mental disease or defect” under 18 U.S.C. 4243(d).Appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity by threatening the President of the United States, among other offenses. After a hearing, the district court found that Appellant’s underlying crimes involved a substantial risk of bodily injury to another and that there was a substantial risk that Appellant would harm others in the future. The district court then ordered Appellant civilly committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4243(e). On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in committing him because there was no evidence that he suffered from a present mental disease or defect. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding (1) Appellant suffered from a mental disease or defect, and (2) Appellant’s dangerousness was due to his mental disease or defect. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

In these 30 consolidated appeals, individuals with severe autism filed suit against Disney, alleging that the company and its theme parks failed to accommodate their disabilities, in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiffs claimed that access to all of Disney's rides must be both nearly immediate and in each plaintiff's individual, pre-set order to accommodate fully their impairments. The district court granted summary judgment to Disney and concluded that the Disability Access Service (DAS) program already accommodated plaintiffs' disabilities and that revising the DAS program was not necessary for plaintiffs to have equal access and enjoyment of Disney's parks.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and held that Disney's generalized issuance of DAS Cards, in and of itself, did not violate the ADA. However, the DAS Card, as good as it may be, still failed to address plaintiffs' alleged impairments of the inability to wait virtually for rides and the need to adhere to a routine order of rides or repeat rides. Because factual disputes existed as to those impairments, the court reversed summary judgment on the necessary-modification inquiry. The court remanded for the district court to address Disney's alternative argument that plaintiffs' requested modification was not reasonable and would fundamentally alter the park experience. Finally, plaintiffs' complaints did not contain a cause of action for intentional or disparate-impact discrimination under the ADA and thus the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to that issue. View "A.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc." on Justia Law