Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States was held liable upon the district court's finding that a doctor at a federal health facility caused plaintiffs' son E.R.T. to suffer severe and life-altering injuries at the time of his birth. On appeal, the government challenged the application of section 768.78(2) of the Florida Statutes to the method of payment the district court chose for the government to satisfy the judgment against it. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's application of section 768.78(2)'s bond requirement.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in allowing the United States to pay the full damages award into a trust for E.R.T. to be dispensed periodically without requiring the United States to make a security payment for the full amount of damages; the district court did not err in concluding that the United States was not entitled to a reversionary interest in any future economic damages remaining in the trust after E.R.T.'s death; the district court erred in not awarding the government an interest in (1) the difference between the full value of the balance remaining in the trust in the case of E.R.T.'s premature death and its present value, and (2) the amount of interest that the trust earns solely because the United States paid the entire future-economic-damages award into the trust up front in a lump sum, not reduced to present value; the district court erred in setting the United States's deadline for paying the judgment within thirty days of the entry of this decision on appeal; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the United States to make a future-lost-earnings payment when E.R.T. turns 17 and 1/2 years old. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Dixon v. United States" on Justia Law

The doctrine of equitable mootness, which permits courts sitting in bankruptcy appeals to dismiss challenges when effective relief would be impossible, applies in the Chapter 9 context. The Eleventh Circuit held that it would be appropriate to note federalism concerns when deciding whether the doctrine should bar an appeal in a particular bankruptcy case. In this case, equitable mootness barred the ratepayers' appeal because they have never asked any court to stay the implementation of the plan that the bankruptcy court confirmed and thus no court has ever stayed the implementation of the plan. Furthermore, the County and others have taken significant and largely irreversible steps in reliance on the unstayed plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Finally, after considering notions of fairness by looking at the merits and the public interest, the court held that dismissing the ratepayers' appeal was appropriate. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded for dismissal of the ratepayers' appeal from the plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court. View "Bennett v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his sentence in light of Johnson v. United States. The court held that petitioner's Indiana battery convictions were violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) elements clause. The court explained that a conviction under the Indiana statute necessarily required that the defendant use force capable of causing physical pain or injury. View "DeLeon Colon v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether it was a judge or an arbitrator who must decide if the arbitration agreement between Spirit Airlines and members of its $9 Fare Club allows for arbitration of claims brought by a class of claimants. The Eleventh Circuit held that the agreement's choice of American Arbitration Association rules, standing alone, was clear and unmistakable evidence that Spirit intended that the arbitrator decide this question. Therefore, the district court was not permitted to rely on testimony from Spirit's vice president to explain the agreement's meaning, and was correct to reject the offer of that testimony. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 132 month sentence for drug trafficking under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. The court held that the Fifth Amendment did not entitle defendant to relief from his mandatory minimum sentence; in light of international concerns, Congress was entitled to mete out hefty sentences to maritime drug runners; the inherent difficulties of policing drug trafficking on the vast expanses of international waters suggested that Congress could have rationally concluded that harsh penalties were needed to deter would-be offenders; circuit precedents foreclosed defendant's arguments about the constitutionality of the Act and its application to him; and defendant's guilty plea foreclosed his constitutional challenges to his detention. View "United States v. Lemus Castillo" on Justia Law

Defendants Joyner and Sturgis appealed their convictions and sentences for multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not reversibly err by declining to repeat a jury instruction when it provided the indictment to the jury; the district court's denial of motions to suppress cell site data did not warrant reversal; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Joyner's motions for new counsel; the district court did not err in rejecting Joyner's Bruton argument; but, as conceded by the government, Joyner should be resentenced under a correct offense level and guidelines range. Accordingly, the court remanded Joyner's case for resentencing and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Joyner" on Justia Law

After debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, the trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Blue Bell to recover from Blue Bell more than $500,000 in a series of payments that Blue Bell had received from debtor during the 90-day period preceding debtor's bankruptcy filing. Blue Bell acknowledged that the payments it received from debtor constituted preferences under 11 U.S.C. 547(b), but that it had a new-value defense.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the bankruptcy court's judgment and held that the language in Charisma Investment Company, N.V. v. Airport Systems, Inc. (In re Jet Florida System, Inc.), 841 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1988), relied on by the bankruptcy court was dictum and, as such, it did not bind the court. The court construed section 547(c)(4) anew, and held that it did not require new value to remain unpaid. Therefore, the court remanded for a new calculation of Blue Bell's preference liability. View "Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that its order denying a certificate of appealability (COA) to petitioner in this case should not be reconsidered. The court held that petitioner was not entitled to a COA for two distinct reasons: first, his claim arose from the rule announced in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), and that rule did not apply retroactively; and second, he has failed to show cause to overcome his procedural default. View "Tharpe v. Warden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's award of sanctions against plaintiff and his attorneys in an action against Pro Transport and its owners, seeking to recover unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court held that Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), made clear that plaintiff and his attorneys did not act in bad faith or took legal action that had no reasonable chance of success in litigating the FLSA claim. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions. View "Antonio Silva v. Pro Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that this court must "look through" an unexplained decision by a state supreme court to the last reasoned decision and presume that the state supreme court adopted the reasoning in the decision by the lower state court. The court held that the superior court concluded that counsel provided petitioner effective assistance where, even if additional potential mitigating evidence had been admitted in petitioner's sentencing, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing trial could be different. Finally, the court denied petitioner's motion to remand or, alternatively, to expand the certificate of appealability and to permit supplemental briefing. View "Wilson v. Warden" on Justia Law